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Abstract 
The standard narrative of nineteenth‐century imperialism in Latin America is 
one of US expansion and British informal influence. However, it was France, not 
Britain, which made the most concerted effort to counter US power through Louis‐
Napoléon’s creation of an empire in Mexico under the Habsburg Archduke 
Maximilian. Despite its significance to French and Mexican history, this intervention 
is invariably described as an “illusion”, an “adventure” or a “mirage”. This thesis 
answers the question why some Mexicans believed that the survival of the nation 
itself depended upon French intervention, and why France sought to impose an 
informal‐imperial model on Mexico. It does so by analysing the full context of 
Franco‐Mexican relations from 1820 onwards: French and Mexican ideas about 
monarchy in Latin America; responses to US expansion and the development of 
anti‐Americanism and pan‐Latinism; the consolidation of Mexican conservatism and 
the French Second Empire’s influence as a political paradigm; and, finally, the 
collaboration of some Mexican elites with French imperialism. 
This thesis draws upon French, Mexican, British and US sources, especially 
diplomatic dispatches, periodicals and published works. The approach challenges 
the separation between intellectual history and international history. By going 
beyond the conventional history of ideas focus on ‘canonical’ texts, it seeks to 
identify the extent to which currents of thought normally considered to be the 
preserve of well‐known intellectuals and politicians were part of a wider political 
culture that influenced French policy in Mexico, and shaped the contours of 
Mexican political discourse. An important dimension of the relationship between 
Mexico and France was the transatlantic and transnational context in which it 
developed, where competing conceptions of Mexico and France as nations, the role 
of Europe and the United States in the Americas and the idea of Latin America itself 
were challenged and debated. 
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Figure 1: A cartoon from a satirical Mexican periodical depicting Louis‐Napoléon, Emperor of the French. The 
caption translates idiomatically as “There is no pain without gain”, a more literal translation would read: 
“Where there are pleasures, there are risks”. La Orquesta (Mexico City), 7 May 1863, no page no. given. 
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Introduction 
 
In the south of Mexico City a former Franciscan monastery built in the 
sixteenth century today houses the Museo Nacional de las Intervenciones. The 
museum’s collection documents armed interventions in Mexico from independence 
to the Mexican Revolution, beginning with a Spanish attempt at reconquest in 1829 
and ending with punitive US expeditions in 1916. According to a review in the LA 
Times, the museum was proof of Mexico’s “obsession” with intervention and a 
“repository” of “unhealed wounds to Mexico’s self‐esteem”.1 A more sympathetic 
interpretation is that the museum, opened in 1981, demonstrates that the history 
of post‐independent Mexico is one throughout which foreign powers repeatedly 
violated its national sovereignty. Rather than dwell upon perceived slights to 
Mexican amour propre, it might be more pertinent to ask why foreign nations were 
‘obsessed’ with intervening in an independent country.  
Amongst the Spanish uniforms, French flags and US weapons on display in 
the National Museum of Interventions, one imperial power is conspicuous by its 
absence: Britain. This is surprising because the standard narrative of imperialism in 
post‐independence Latin America is one of British influence followed by the rise of 
the United States. Yet, in Mexico, it was France, not Britain that intervened 
militarily, first from 1838 to 1839 and then, on a much larger scale, from 1862 to 
1867. These expeditions did not aim at territorial conquest. The objective of the 
1838 intervention was to coerce the Mexican government into complying with 
French demands: payment of compensation to French nationals in Mexico and the 
negotiation of a Franco‐Mexican treaty to regulate future relations. In order to 
achieve these goals, France sent its navy to blockade the Atlantic coast of Mexico. 
When the Mexican government refused France’s ultimatum, French forces 
bombarded and then occupied the fortress of San Juan de Ulúa which guarded the 
entrance to the port city of Veracruz. To end the intervention, the Mexican 
                                                          
1 Dan Williams, ‘Mexico's Obsession With “Foreign Intervention” Enshrined in Museum’, LA Times 
(Los Angeles), 5 June 1986, p. 21. 
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government was forced to pay France an indemnity of 600,000 piastres and sign a 
provisional treaty of commerce, navigation and friendship.2  
The ostensible reasons the French government gave for the second 
intervention, which began in 1861 as a tripartite expedition with France, Britain and 
Spain, shared the same basic purpose as the 1838 expedition: to ensure the 
compliance of the Mexican government with French demands. The specific aims 
were outlined in the Convention of London signed on 31 October 1861: coerce the 
Mexican government, led by Benito Juárez (1806‐72), to honour payments on 
Mexico’s international debt, which Juárez had suspended in July, and secure better 
protection for European nationals in Mexico.3 However, the ambitions of the 
French emperor, Louis‐Napoléon Bonaparte (1808‐73), extended far beyond mere 
debt collection. He planned regime change (to use an anachronism) in order to 
establish a state closely tied to French interests, but not ruled from Paris. Once this 
became clear, Spain and Britain withdrew from the expedition.4  
Unhindered by its erstwhile allies, France, from April 1862, began an 
imperial project on a grand scale. The initial expeditionary force was defeated by 
Juárez’s forces at Puebla on 5 May 1862, but the city was taken the following year 
and in the face of the advancing French army, the constitutional government of 
Mexico was forced to flee its capital in May. In June 1863 Mexico’s republican 
institutions were replaced by a regency which governed Mexico until the Austrian 
Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian (1832‐67) and his Belgian wife Marie Charlotte 
(1840‐1927) were crowned as Emperor and Empress of Mexico in June 1864.5 Faced 
                                                          
2 The piastre was the Mexican currency, fixed and equivalent in value to the US dollar. One franc was 
worth roughly a fifth of one piastre or dollar and therefore the indemnity was equal to circa 3 million 
francs. $600,000 was 3.42 percent of the total tax revenue collected by the Mexican government in 
1839. Tax figures taken from Barbara Tenenbaum, The Politics of Penury: Debts and Taxes in Mexico, 
1821-1856 (New Mexico: University of New Mexico, 1986), ‘Appendix: Mexican Finances, 1821‐56, 
Table C, Income vs Expenses, 1821‐61’, 182. 
3 The convention is printed in ‘The Mexican Convention between England, France, And Spain’, The 
Times (London), 18 November 1861, p. 7. 
4 For the diplomacy behind this see Carl Bock, Prelude to Tragedy: The Negotiation and Breakdown 
of the Tripartite Convention of London, October 31, 1861 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1966). 
5 The choice of Maximilian was made for a variety of reasons, not least of which was his desire to 
take the throne. Other candidates had been suggested, but a Spanish Bourbon was considered 
impractical from a Mexican perspective because of antipathy towards Spain and from a French point 
of view because Spain as a maritime power would have significant influence over the new monarch. 
Louis‐Napoléon considered a French candidate impolitic. Finally, he harboured vague hopes that 
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with continuing Mexican opposition from forces led by Juárez, and US diplomatic 
pressure, Louis‐Napoléon announced in January 1866 that French troops would 
withdraw. Charlotte returned to Europe to plead in person to Louis‐Napoléon for 
continued military support, but, unmoved by her appeals, the French emperor 
ensured that the last French troops evacuated Veracruz by March 1867. Three 
months later, on 19 June 1867, Maximilian was executed and republican 
government in Mexico was restored. The life of the second emperor of Mexico 
ended as had that of the first, Agustín de Iturbide (1783‐1824), by execution.6 Three 
years later, 4 September 1870, the French Second Empire collapsed, its emperor in 
captivity after defeat at the battle of Sedan during the Franco‐Prussian War.7  
The Historiography of the 1862-67 French Intervention 
The Mexican and French Second Empires have been judged by their 
dramatic conclusions, obscuring the ideas that underwrote French intervention in 
Mexico and the regime which it created. In Mexico, the empire of Maximilian 
(1864‐67) was condemned by those who defeated it. Interpreted through the prism 
of national history, it was represented as an arcane aberration, like the French 
Second Empire in France, before the triumph of liberal republicanism. This 
explanation was embedded into Mexican national discourse by writers of officialist 
history under the Porfiriato (the period from 1876 to 1911 marked by the 
authoritarian rule of Porfirio Díaz, 1830‐1915) who had supported Juárez.8 The 
struggle was portrayed as a Manichean one of good versus evil, liberal republicans 
against foreign invaders supported only by a small number of reactionary and 
                                                          
supporting a Habsburg would facilitate a rapprochement with Austria after the 1859 Italian War. The 
most detailed analysis the diplomacy behind Maximilian’s acceptance of the crown remains Egon 
Caesar Corti, Maximilian and Charlotte of Mexico, 2 vols., trans. Catherine Alison (New York; London: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1928). See also Mary Margaret McAllen, Maximilian and Carlota: Europe's Last 
Empire in Mexico (San Antonio: Trinity University Press, 2014). 
6 Iturbide was elected emperor of the First Mexican Empire on 19 May 1822. He abdicated on 19 
March 1823 and went into exile. He was executed a year later when he returned to Mexico without 
the authorisation of the republican government. See Timothy Anna, The Mexican Empire of Iturbide, 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990).  
7 Three chronologies are given at the end of the thesis which detail events in Mexico and France for 
the years 1820 to 1867, pp. 253‐64. 
8 Most notably by José María Vigil, La Reforma, vol. 5 of Vicente Riva Palacio (ed.), México a través 
de los siglos: Historia general y completa del desenvolvimiento social, político, religioso, militar, 
artístico, científico y literario de México desde la antigüedad más remota hasta la época actual, 5 
vols. (Barcelona: Espasa y Compañía, 1884‐89).  
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treasonous Mexican Conservatives and monarchists. Juárez’s victory in 1867 
became one of the foundational moments of Mexican history.9 The Mexican 
Revolution (1910‐20) appropriated the legend of Juárez into its own rhetoric of 
triumphant progress,10 and historians repeated the by‐now standard narrative of 
the French intervention and its place in Mexico’s past.11 With few exceptions,12 
there was no counter to this interpretation because of the near‐complete 
abandonment of the Mexican Second Empire by its adherents: even those who had 
been plus royaliste que le roi, such as General Leonardo Marqúez (1820‐1913), who 
held Mexico City for the empire even after its emperor had been executed, or one 
of the earliest proponents of a monarchy in Mexico under Maximilian, Francisco de 
Paula Arrangoiz y Berzábal (1812‐1899), distanced themselves from the regime.13  
Early analysis of the intervention in France was similarly negative for two 
reasons. First, the intervention never had widespread public or political support.14 
The expedition to Mexico united conservative legitimists, liberal Orléanists and 
                                                          
9 See Charles Weeks, The Juárez Myth in Mexico (Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1987) and 
his earlier article Charles Weeks, ‘Uses of a Juárez Myth in Mexican Politics’, Il Politico, 29 (1974), 
210‐33. 
10 Alan Knight, ‘The Peculiarities of Mexican History: Mexico Compared to Latin America, (1821‐
1992)’, Journal of Latin American Studies, 24 (1992), 139‐40. 
11 See, for example, Jesús Reyes Heroles, El Liberalismo mexicano, 3 vols. (Mexico City: Universidad 
Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM), 1957‐61). 
12 Although he was not an apologist for the French intervention or the Mexican Second Empire, the 
Porfiriato‐era Mexican writer and politician Francisco Bulnes attempted to debunk the hero worship 
of Juárez in El verdadero Juárez y la verdad sobre la intervención y el imperio (Mexico City: Vda. de C. 
Bouret, 1904), and Juárez y la revoluciones de Ayutla y de Reforma (Mexico City: Tip. de la Compañia 
Editorial Católica, 1906). This resulted in numerous articles, pamphlets and books attacking Bulnes 
as well as public demonstrations denouncing him as a “traitor to the fatherland”. Weeks, ‘Uses of a 
Juarez Myth’, 220. On Bulnes see David Brading and Lucrecia Orensanz, ‘Francisco Bulnes y la verdad 
acerca de México en el siglo XIX’, Historia Mexicana, 45 (1996), 621‐651. 
13 Leonardo Marqúez, Manifiestos: El imperio y los imperiales (Mexico: F. Vazquez, 1904), 23‐29; 
Francisco de Paula Arrangoiz y Berzábal, Mej́ico desde 1808 hasta 1867. Relacion de los principales 
acontecimientos ... desde la prison del Virey Iturrigaray hasta la caida del segundo imperio. Con una 
noticia preliminar del sistema general de gobierno que regia en 1808, etc., 4 vols. (Madrid: A. Pérez 
Dubrull) III, 219. For an overview of the historiography see Erika Pani, El Segundo Imperio: pasados 
de usos multiples (Mexico: Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, Fondo de Cultura 
Económica, 2004) and ‘Republicans and Monarchists, 1848–1867’ in William Beezley (ed.), A 
Companion to Mexican History and Culture (Chichester: Wiley‐Blackwell, 2011), 273‐87.  
14 French public opinion is explored in Lynn M. Case, French Opinion on the United States and 
Mexico, 1860-1867. Extracts from the reports of the procureurs geńeŕaux (New York: D. Appleton‐
Century Co., 1936). See also Frank Lally, French Opposition to the Mexican Policy of the Second 
Empire (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, 1931). The 
French historiography on the Mexican expedition is discussed in Guy Martinière, ‘L'expédition 
mexicaine de Napoléon III dans l'historiographie française’, Revue d'histoire moderne et 
contemporaine, 21 (1974), 142‐173. 
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moderate republicans in opposition to the government. The criticisms of celebrated 
orators such as Pierre Antoine Berryer (1790‐1868), Adolphe Thiers (1797‐1877) 
and Jules Favre (1809‐1880) in the Corps législatif were widely publicised.15 
Furthermore, returning French officers wrote unfavourable accounts of the 
Mexican Second Empire which augmented the negative portrayal of French policy.16 
Second, events in France meant that the Mexican intervention was subsumed into a 
wider vilification of the Second Empire itself. After 1870, French republican 
historiography, building on earlier attacks,17 created a black legend around the 
second Bonapartist regime.18 Moreover, the abdication of Louis‐Napoléon during 
the Franco‐Prussian War encouraged his opponents to portray his Mexican policy as 
a microcosm for the Emperor’s own failings; a stepping stone on the road to Sedan. 
For French republicans, it was no coincidence that the commander‐in‐chief of the 
army in Mexico from 1863 to 1867, Achille Bazaine (1811‐88), was the man who 
surrendered the fortress of Metz to the Prussians on 27 October 1870.19  
Contemporary French critics of Louis‐Napoléon’s policy, such as Thiers, 
described it as a “chimera”, an “illusion”, or an “adventure”.20 These epithets have 
                                                          
15 Their speeches were reproduced the next day in the official government paper, Le Moniteur 
universel (Paris). The published speeches of Berryer, Favre and Thiers all contain their attacks on the 
government’s Mexican policy. Pierre Antoine Berryer, Oeuvres de Berryer: discours parlementaires, 8 
vols. (Paris: Didier, 1872‐78); Jules Favre, Discours parlementaires, publieś par Mme. Vve. J. Favre, 4 
vols. (Paris: E. Plon, 1881); Adolphe Thiers, Discours parlementaires de M. Thiers, 16 vols. (Paris: M. 
Calmon, 1879‐89). 
16 One of the earliest and most influential in this genre, with a preface by Lucien‐Anatole Prévost‐
Paradol, was Émile de Kératry’s, L'élévation et la chute de l'empire Maximilien: intervention française 
au Mexique, 1861-1867 (Paris: A. Lacroix, Verboeckhoven et Cie, 1867). Followed by Kératry, La 
contre-guérilla française au Mexique: souvenirs des Terres chaudes (Paris: Librairie internationale; 
Bruxelles; Leipzig; Livourne: A. Lacroix, Verboeckhoven & Cie, 1868).  
17 Most famously Victor Hugo, Napoleón le Petit (London: Jeffs; Bruxelles: A. Mertens, 1852). 
18 On the black legend see Maurice Agulhon (ed.), Pourquoi reh́abiliter le Second Empire?: actes du 
colloque organise ́par le Souvenir napoleónien (Paris: Souvenir Napoléonien, 1997); Pierre Guiral and 
Émile Témime, ‘L’Historiographie du Second Empire’, Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine, 
21 (1974), 1‐17. In English see Roger Price, The Second French Empire: An Anatomy of Political 
Power, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Stuart Campbell, The Second Empire 
Revisited: A Study in French Historiography (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1978). 
19 In its obituary for Bazaine, La Presse cheerfully announced “[t]he traitor is dead!” ‘Bazaine – La 
mort d’un soldat traître à son pays’, La Presse (Paris), 26 September 1888, p. 2. As late as 1927 an 
article in La Revue de Paris argued that attempts to rehabilitate “the man of Metz” and his role in 
Mexico were undeserved: “[Bazaine] was the principle architect of the catastrophe and history 
should consider him primarily responsible for the death of the unfortunate Maximilian”. Louis 
Sonolet, ‘Agonie de l’Empire du Mexique – I’, Revue de Paris, 34 (1927), 590. All translations are the 
author’s except where otherwise noted. 
20 In a speech made in 1864 criticising the Mexican intervention Thiers managed to fit the word 
“illusion” three times into one sentence which concluded with the adjective “chimerical” before 
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become the conclusions of historians who have studied the intervention, which, in 
these works, remains condemned by the disjuncture between the Mexican ‘reality’ 
and Louis‐Napoléon’s false understanding of it. In this view, Louis‐Napoléon was 
misled into an ill‐advised intervention at the behest of a small clique of émigré 
Mexican Conservatives and by affairiste French diplomats.21 A recent French 
historian concludes: “the intervention, from the beginning, was only a monumental 
and regrettable misunderstanding.”22 Moreover, those anglophone historians who 
have addressed the French foundation of Maximilian’s empire have done so from 
an almost exclusively French, or at best European and/or US, perspective, studying 
it in isolation with little reference either to wider French imperial policy or Mexican 
sources. Many have similarly concluded that the intervention was embarked upon 
because Louis‐Napoléon was deluded, either by his own dreams, those of others, or 
a combination of the two.23 
                                                          
pronouncing that he would henceforth refer to the intervention as an “adventure”. Thiers, Discours, 
XIX, 468‐70. The criticisms of Thiers and Favre were followed by early historians of the French 
Second Empire. See, for example, Émile Ollivier L’Empire liberal, 18 vols. (Paris: Garnier frères, 1895‐
1915), V and VI, and Taxile Delord, Histoire du Second Empire, 6 vols. (Paris: G. Baillière, 1869‐75), III, 
287‐88; 289‐90; 366. 
21 A view recently restated by Romain Delmon, ‘Les acteurs de la politique impériale lors de 
l'expédition au Mexique: L’ecart entre la vision de Napoléon III et la réalité Mexicaine’ in Gabriel 
Leanca (ed.), La politique extérieure de Napoléon III (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2011), 75‐99. See also (and 
note the titles), Guy‐Alain Dugast, La tentation mexicaine en France au XIXe siècle: L’image du 
Mexique et l’Intervention française, 2 vols. (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2008); Alain Gouttman, La guerre du 
Mexique (1862-1867): Le mirage américain de Napoléon III (Paris: Perrin, 2008); Jean‐François 
Lecaillon, Napoleón III et le Mexique: les illusions d'un grand dessein (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1994); 
Jean‐Franco̧is Lecaillon, ‘Mythes et phantasmes au cœur de l’intervention française au Mexique, 
1862‐1867’, Cahiers des Amériques latines, 9 (1990), 69‐79; Nancy Nichols Barker, The French 
Experience in Mexico 1821-1861: A History of Constant Misunderstanding, (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1979); Christian Schefer, La Grande Pensée de Napoléon III, Les 
origines de l’Expédition du Mexique (Paris: M. Riviére, 1939).  
22 Lecaillon, Napoléon III, 222. 
23 Michelle Cunningham explores the intervention through the prism of Louis‐Napoléon’s approach 
to nationalities and his European system of diplomacy, Mexico and the Foreign Policy of Napoleon III 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001). Nancy Nichols Barker addresses interventionist diplomats and the 
Jecker bonds in ‘The Duke of Morny and the Affair of the Jecker Bonds’, French Historical Studies, 6 
(1970), 556‐61; ‘The French Legation in Mexico: Nexus of Interventionists’, French Historical Studies, 
8 (1974), 409‐26. Shirley Black offers an alternative interpretation: the intervention was undertaken 
to guarantee France’s supply of precious metals in order to maintain its monetary system of 
bimetallism, Shirley Black, Napoleon III and Mexican Silver (Colorado: Ferrell, 2000). A conclusion 
that Marc Flandreau considers unlikely, The Glitter of Gold: France, Bimetallism, and the Emergence 
of the International Gold Standard, trans. Owen Leeming (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 
179, fn 9. See also Jack Autrey Dabbs, The French Army in Mexico 1861-1867: A Study in Military 
Government (The Hague: Mouton and Co., 1963), for a good narrative account of the intervention 
following French sources, especially the archive of Marshall Bazaine. Alfred Jackson Hanna and 
Kathryn Abbey Hanna, Napoleon III and Mexico. American Triumph over Monarchy (Chapel Hill: 
  14 
In studies of the French Second Empire, moreover, the Mexican intervention 
is generally seen as tangential to the central story of the regime, and relatively 
unimportant in terms of foreign policy compared to the Crimean War (1854‐56), the 
Italian War of 1859 or the Franco‐Prussian War (1870‐71). Furthermore, unlike 
French imperialism in Algeria or Indochina, it did not form part of a longer narrative 
which continued to affect France and its colonies. As a consequence, academics 
have focussed their attention elsewhere,24 and Louis‐Napoléon’s Mexican policy is 
still frequently described as an “adventure” or an illusion.25  
Mexican historians have recently challenged this dominant interpretation of 
Maximilian’s empire as a folie de grandeur. Rather than viewing the empire as a 
European imposition alien to Mexican politics and history, recent scholarship has 
analysed the Mexican origins of the empire’s political, economic, cultural and 
intellectual foundations,26 a process Erika Pani describes as recovering “the empire 
                                                          
University of North Carolina Press, 1971), is, as the title suggests, a partisan narrative, but remains a 
frequently cited work as does Thomas David Schoonover, Dollars over Dominion: The Triumph of 
Liberalism in Mexican-United States Relations (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978).  
24 Modern analyses of the French Second Empire or Louis‐Napoléon give the expedition little space. 
For example, Éric Anceau, Napoléon III: Un Saint-Simon à cheval (Paris: Tallandier, 2008), 391‐93 and 
429‐31; Jean‐Claude Yon, Le Second Empire: politique, société, culture (Paris: A. Colin, 2004), 97‐100; 
Price, Anatomy of Power, 57, 71, 305 and 401; Sylvie Aprile, La IIe République et le Second Empire, 
1848-1870: du prince président à Napoléon III (Paris: Pygmalion, 2000), 321‐25; James McMillan, 
Napoleon III (London: Longman, 1991), 149‐52; Alain Plessis, The Rise and Fall of the Second Empire, 
1852‐1871, trans. Jonathan Mandelbaum (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 149‐50; 
Louis Girard, Napoléon III (Paris: Fayard, 1986), 315‐20. 
25 The word “adventure” is used seven times in the three‐page preface to Lecaillon, Napoléon III, a 
work which contains “illusions” in the title, v‐vii. The intervention is described as an “adventure” in 
the introduction of José Moya (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Latin American History (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 5.  
26 Patricia Galeana (ed.), El Imperio napoleónico y la monarquía en México, (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 
2012); Patricia Galeana (ed.), Impacto de la intervención francesa en México (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 
2011); Kristine Ibsen, Maximilian, Mexico and the Invention of Empire (Nashville: Vanderbilt 
University Press, 2010); Claudia Ceja Andrade, Al amparo del imperio: ideas y creencias sobre la 
justicia y el buen gobierno durante el Segundo Imperio mexicano (Mexico: Universidad Autónoma de 
Ciudad Juárez, 2007); Erika Pani, ‘Dreaming of a Mexican Empire: The Political Projects of the 
"Imperialistas"’, Hispanic American Historical Review, 82 (2002), 1‐31; Brian Hamnett, ‘Mexican 
Conservatives, Clericals, and Soldiers: The 'Traitor' Tomás Mejía through Reform and Empire, 1855‐
1867’, Bulletin of Latin American Research, 20 (2001), 187‐201; Erika Pani, Para mexicanizar el 
Segundo Imperio: el imaginario polıt́ico de los imperialistas (Mexico City: Colegio de México, Centro 
de Estudios Históricos, 2001); Berta Flores Salinas, Segundo Imperio mexicano (Mexico City: Editorial 
Praxis, 1998); Robert Duncan, ‘Political Legitimation and Maximilian's Second Empire in Mexico, 
1864‐1867’, Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos, 12 (1996), 27‐66. Recent work has focussed on 
the Second Empire’s impact on a regional level. See Douglas Richmond, Conflict and Carnage in 
Yucatán: Liberals, the Second Empire, and Maya Revolutionaries, 1855–1876 (Alabama, University of 
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as a Mexican experience.”27 Although such an approach is greatly to be welcomed, 
these investigations, relying on the problematic historiography of French 
intervention discussed above, frequently take as their starting point the arrival of 
European forces on the shores of Mexico and treat the intervention as an 
accomplished fact without interrogating the policy goals of France or exploring 
what Louis‐Napoléon hoped to construct in Mexico. Not only is it necessary to 
“Mexicanise” (Pani’s term) the experience of politicians who worked with the 
French in order to create a Mexican empire, but also to imperialise the French 
decision to intervene in Mexico. 
This thesis explores what can be learned by Mexicanising and imperialising 
the intervention and the regime which it created. In order to do this, the Mexican 
Second Empire will be placed within the wider context of Mexican history and 
French imperialism from 1820 to 1867. In Mexico, the ideas that underwrote calls 
for French intervention were partially formed in response to the problems the 
nation faced from its inception. From a French perspective, Latin America was part 
of a broader imperial context. This call to Mexicanise and imperialise the French 
intervention raises some general questions that this thesis will address: What might 
be learned from thinking about this intervention within the wider context of French 
imperialism? Why was it a failure when other French imperial projects, most 
notably Algeria or Indochina, proved to be much more enduring? How might 
historians think about it differently if Mexico is fully taken into account as a 
historical agent in its own right rather than a passive recipient of European policy? 
In order to answer these questions, French intervention might better be 
understood as an imperial policy, rather than an exceptional event shrouded in 
romantic language, while the decision of Mexicans to support French imperialism, 
and the foundation of a monarchy in a post‐independence republic, can be 
analysed as a rational choice, instead of as a betrayal of the Mexican nation.  
                                                          
Universidad Autónoma de Querétaro, Editorial Universitaria, 2013); Roberto Lara, La intervención 
francesa en Nuevo León (1864-1866): estudio de la resistencia a las autoridades y fuerzas armadas 
del Segundo Imperio Mexicano (Mexico: Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León, 2011); Carlos 
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27 Pani, Para Mexicanizar, 20. 
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Mexican Political Thought and the Intervention:  
Monarchism, Conservatism and Liberalism 
Any attempt to Mexicanise the French intervention must begin with the 
Mexican historical context in which it took place. The collapse of Spain’s rule 
triggered a prolonged conflict over what should fill the void of empire throughout 
its former colonies in America. From 1808 until 1867 a struggle for sovereignty and 
legitimacy, frequently violent, ensued in Mexico between competing political, 
economic and social visions of the nation. These distinct visions inspired different 
conceptions of the Mexican state and had multiple origins and multiple outcomes.28 
The Second Mexican Empire was one such conception and outcome, which its 
supporters hoped would provide a solution to the political instability of post‐
independence Mexico.  
Stability was a key question for all Mexico’s politicians in the period 1820‐
67. The crowning of Mexico’s first emperor, Iturbide, to the execution of its second, 
Maximilian, has been described as a period of chaos “unparalleled in Mexican 
history”.29 Mexico was an empire under Iturbide (1822‐23); a federal republic 
(1824‐35); a central republic (1836‐46); a restored federal republic (1846‐53); and a 
dictatorship (1853‐55).30 This last government was overthrown and two years later 
the 1857 Constitution was proclaimed. However, this liberal, federal and republican 
document resulted in a civil war, with a de facto government in Mexico City 
opposing the new constitution and a de jure one at Veracruz, led by Juárez, 
supporting it. These two sides fought for power during the War of Reform (1858‐
1861). Juárez was victorious, but the French intervention (1862‐67), supported by 
                                                          
28 An argument made for South America by Jeremy Adelman, ‘Iberian Passages: Continuity and 
Change in the South Atlantic’ in David Armitage and Sanjay Subrahmanyam (eds.), The Age of 
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Timothy Anna, Forging Mexico: 1821-1835 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998). The Central 
Republic is covered in depth from 1835 to 1846 by Michael Costeloe, The Central Republic, 1835-
1846: Hombres de Bien in the Age of Santa Anna (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). On 
Santa Anna’s last dictatorship see Carmen Vázquez Mantecón, Santa Anna y la encrucijada del 
estado: La Dictadura, 1853-55 (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1986). Works on Juárez and 
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many of those who lost the civil war, replaced his government with a regency 
(1863) in preparation for the empire of Maximilian (1864‐67).31 Regimes were 
frequently overthrown by successful pronunciamientos (plans issued against the 
serving government) backed by military support.32 Mexican politics was, therefore, 
characterised by instability.33 
That a monarchy under an Austrian Archduke was seen by some as a 
solution to this problem is a testament to the endurance of the ideas that lay 
behind it. A centralist regime with a strong government and powerful executive, as 
opposed to a federal republic with a weak executive and powerful legislature, was 
one system that had its adherents in Mexico throughout the period 1820‐67. For 
some in Mexico, monarchy remained a viable means of implementing this political 
vision. Indeed, Mexico initially achieved independence under these principles with 
Iturbide as emperor. However, he reigned for only eight months (from coronation 
to abdication) and his rule was pronounced as anathema after his fall by nearly all 
sections of Mexico’s political elite. Within the traditional Mexican liberal 
historiography this disavowal of monarchy as a form of government suited to 
Mexico became subsumed in a wider critique of Mexican conservatism.  
Although Mexican politics belies neat schematic categorisations, in general 
those who supported centralism, and certainly those who supported monarchy, 
became associated with the Mexican Conservative Party, founded in 1849 by Lucas 
Alamán (1792‐1853), the leading proponent of conservative thought in Mexico as 
politician and historian.34 The Conservative Party was defeated twice: first in the 
War of Reform by Juárez’s liberals and then in 1867 with the fall of Maximilian. The 
triumph of liberals in 1867 followed by the Porfiriato ensured that supporters of the 
Conservative Party were vilified in subsequent Mexican historiography alongside 
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the Second Mexican Empire. After 1867, Mexican liberalism became a victorious 
force with its own “unifying political myth”.35 Enrique Krauze writes that in these 
Mexican officialist historical accounts (historia de bronce) there is a simple 
deification of liberals as the saviours of the patria in contrast to a vilification of 
conservatives as “traitors”, “turncoats” and “reactionaries”.36 Moreover, the 
triumph of liberalism not only condemned conservatives as the enemies of Mexico, 
but also consigned them to historical oblivion because of a sympathy amongst 
many anglophone historians for federalist, liberal‐republicans, who encouraged 
closer links between Mexico and the United States, rather than authoritarian or 
monarchical clerical Catholics, who understood the United States to be the national 
enemy and its values entirely contrary to Mexican political culture and society.37  
The liberal historiographical interpretation understood federal 
republicanism as the endgame of Mexican history and thus obscured alternative 
political visions for the Mexican nation, such as monarchism. This is a particularly 
striking example of the tendency towards what Eric van Young has referred to as 
“outcomism” in Mexican history: simplifications are reinforced by historia de bronce 
literature where “political roads not taken are erased from the maps”.38 The view 
that monarchism was something exotic to Mexican history has been challenged. 
Edmundo O’Gorman argued that the “monarchical idea” was a powerful rival to 
republicanism and federalism during the period 1820‐67,39 and a number of 
subsequent works have explored various points in Mexican history when 
monarchical ideas became particularly prominent.40 An analysis of why monarchism 
                                                          
35 Charles Hale, The Transformation of Liberalism in Late Nineteenth-Century Mexico (Princeton: 
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in Mexico persisted, why some actively sought European support in order to 
implement it and why many in Europe understood it as the best solution for 
Mexico’s problems may elucidate further not only why France tried to found an 
empire in Mexican, but also why some Mexicans rallied to it.  
Monarchism was a subset of Mexican conservatism and it was those 
associated with the Conservative Party who called for French intervention in 
Mexican politics. Thus analysis of Mexican conservatism is central to explaining the 
French intervention. However, work on Mexican conservatism remains limited 
when compared to the historiography on Mexican liberalism for the period.41 
Recent studies, however, have shone light onto Mexican conservatism, its beliefs 
and importance to Mexican history.42 Conservatives never formed a unified political 
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movement, even after the foundation of the Conservative Party in 1849;43 
nonetheless, certain general principles of Mexican conservatism can be identified in 
the period 1820‐67. These were i) a preference for a strong, centralist state 
administered by a large bureaucracy and maintained by a professional standing 
army; ii) the Catholic Church as a base of Mexican identity and morality; iii) a 
preference for institutions over individuals; iv) a rejection of laissez‐faire liberal 
economics in favour of moderate protectionism and state intervention; v) the 
preservation of colonial fueros (legal privileges accorded to the army and the 
Church) and indigenous communal landholdings and vi) a restricted franchise.44 In 
addition to these national goals, Benjamin Smith identifies four elements that 
ensured this platform had popular appeal at a local level: i) political pragmatism, ii) 
openness to socioeconomic change, iii) support for clerical Catholicism and iv) 
concern for order and stability.45 
These general trends notwithstanding, Mexican political affiliations were 
complex, fluid and changed over time.46 The term “Conservative”, with an upper‐
case “C”, is used in this thesis to describe individuals who self‐identified with the 
Conservative Party, after its foundation in 1849.47 However, there were currents of 
thought in Mexico in the decades before the Party’s foundation that can best be 
described as “conservative”, though their proponents would not often have used 
this word. The term “conservative”, with a lower‐case “c”, will therefore be used in 
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this thesis to describe politicians, intellectuals and their ideas prior to the 
foundation of the Conservative Party.  
Prior to the appearance of the Conservative Party, what is meant by 
conservative politicians and intellectuals is best defined through their relationship 
to liberalism.48 Far from being binary opposites, conservatism and liberalism in 
Mexico grew out of shared intellectual traditions. The 1789 French Revolution had a 
profound impact upon Mexican political ideas.49 Currents of eighteenth‐century 
French thought, as well as Spanish, British and US ideas, shaped Mexican 
liberalism,50 but individuals of varying political persuasions, including conservatives, 
appropriated different elements from these to support their views. Furthermore, 
there was broad agreement across the political spectrum in post‐independent 
Mexico on key principles of the 1789 French Revolution, such as constitutional 
representative government, right to property and security. There was disagreement 
on the best way to implement and safeguard these, but, in the immediate 
aftermath of independence, the similarities between the majority of Mexican 
politicians were more apparent than the differences.51  
Leaders of liberal thought and politics in Mexico, such as José María Luis 
Mora (1794‐1850), Valentín Gómez Farías (1781‐1858) and Lorenzo de Zavala 
(1788‐1836), were politically and socially conservative.52 They advocated restricting 
the franchise and limiting mass participation in electoral politics and they 
understood property to be the bulwark upon which liberty (and electoral law) was 
founded.53 More radical liberals, like Zavala, who argued for the introduction of 
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freedom of worship in the years following independence, were in a minority.54 The 
1824 Constitution, which was the rallying cry for many liberals in the decades after 
independence, stated in article three: “[t]he religion of the Mexican nation is and 
will permanently be the Roman, Catholic, Apostolic” to the exclusion of all others.55 
The main political disputes in the 1820s and 1830s revolved around issues 
that do not break down along ideological lines such as federalism and centralism, 
the relationship between the executive and the legislative, or the expulsion of the 
Spaniards from Mexico in the 1820s. Nonetheless, politicians, many of whom later 
became leaders of the Conservative Party, coalesced around these disputes in 
support of greater centralism, a more powerful executive and the defence of 
Church and army privileges. Furthermore, conservative politicians disapproved of 
the anti‐corporatist tendencies of liberals, who at times attacked legal privileges left 
over from Spanish colonialism, or their support for classical liberal economic 
doctrine, which clashed with conservatives who argued for protectionism and state 
intervention to develop industry.56 Therefore when referring to these individuals 
and their ideas the term “conservative” is used relatively to indicate a group of 
politicians who were more inclined to preserve colonial institutions in post‐
independent Mexico, were suspicious of some of the causes championed by those 
who identified themselves as liberals and rallied around the national and local 
conservative principles outlined above.  
Within liberalism itself two distinct factions emerged: the moderados and 
the more radical puro wing. However, it was not until a new generation of puro 
liberals rose to prominence in the 1850s that an unbridgeable divide arose between 
those who supported their anti‐clerical reforms and the Conservative Party which 
opposed them.57 Another faction in Mexican politics, santanistas, the supporters of 
the caudillo and many‐times president Santa Anna (1794‐1876), a military and 
political leader with his powerbase in the state of Veracruz, is emblematic of the 
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(ed.), Documentos para la historia del Mex́ico independiente, 1808-1938 (Mexico City: Miguel A ngel 
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fluid nature of Mexican politics. Santa Anna was initially a supporter of federalism 
and associated with more radical liberals (especially during his first presidency, 
1833‐34), but later backed centralism and increasingly tended towards dictatorial 
rule and allied with the Conservative Party in 1853. His chief ideologue was José 
María de Tornel, who articulated santanista thought as it evolved throughout the 
period under study.58 
The focus of this thesis will be on conservative ideas particularly as they 
were shaped by currents of French thought and by international events. 
Furthermore, the ideas of Mexican politicians will be analysed in this thesis from 
the premise that “political differences” need to be taken seriously, rather than 
accepting the historiographical tradition that emphasises personal ambition as the 
reason for shifts in political affiliations as opposed to an evolving ideological 
worldview that responded to events both within Mexico and internationally.59 This 
is particularly pertinent as regards those who called for French intervention or later 
rallied to the Mexican Second Empire because the charge of contemporary 
opponents and some historians was that these individuals were motivated by an 
unprincipled desire for power.  
An area of divergence in Mexican politics that had geopolitical implications 
was that conservative politicians were sympathetic to Europe, and feared the 
United States not only because of its expansion at Mexico’s expense, but also 
because they believed the political institutions of the neighbouring republic to be 
inapplicable in Mexico. On the other hand, liberals tended to admire the United 
States, attribute its prosperity to federal republicanism, which strengthened their 
commitment to a similar political organisation in Mexico and, in spite of the Texan 
revolt (1835‐36) and the US‐Mexican War (1846‐48), which saw Mexico lose nearly 
half of its national territory, much liberal opinion on the United States remained 
uncritical.60 The majority of liberals “were mesmerized by the ideal society to the 
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north and the spectacular material progress of the United States under republican 
federal institutions.”61 For conservatives, however, the United States was identified 
as the root cause of Mexico’s endemic instability which it had deliberately 
fomented in order to weaken Mexico and thus make its conquest and eventual 
absorption easier. Analysis of this anti‐Americanism forms a central part of this 
thesis because it helps to explain why conservatives increasingly looked to Europe, 
and France especially: in their eyes the United States was not a suitable model for 
Mexico. 
Europe, to the contrary, provided solutions, not because it was free from 
the problems that afflicted Mexico and the United States, but because, Mexican 
conservatives argued, regimes and thinkers had developed ways to deal with these 
challenges. For conservative politicians events in Mexico mirrored the revolutions 
of 1789 and 1848.62 Not only were the ideas developed by the philosophes in the 
eighteenth century, or later radical thinkers and politicians such as Pierre‐Joseph 
Proudhon (1809‐65) or Alexandre Auguste Ledru‐Rollin (1807‐74), seen as 
responsible for upheaval throughout the Atlantic world, but post‐revolutionary 
French regimes, such as the July Monarchy and the Second Empire, were seen as 
exemplars to adapt to Mexican circumstances. For conservative politicians, 
European (by which was usually meant Spanish, French or British) models and ideas 
were the bases from which to construct the Mexican state and national identity, 
while the apposite revolutions were not in the Protestant United States, but 
Catholic France. 
France as an Imperial Power 
French history and culture featured prominently as a reference point in 
Latin America political thought, and France also played an active role in the 
continent throughout the nineteenth century. France sent its navy to impose an 
indemnity on Haiti in return for recognition of Haitian independence (1825); 
threatened to bombard Cartagena (1834); blockaded Mexico in 1838‐1839, and 
Argentina twice (1838‐40 and 1845‐48); garrisoned Montevideo with French troops 
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(1850‐52); and made the first concerted attempt to construct the Panama Canal 
(1881‐94). All this, of course, was in addition to the second French intervention in 
Mexico which saw the largest deployment of men and resources in Latin America by 
any power in the nineteenth century. France, then, did not lack ambition when it 
came to Latin America, yet there is no general survey of French policy in the region 
for the nineteenth century. 
This lack of scholarly attention to French imperial projects in Latin America is 
part of a more general tendency in the study of French colonialism, which has 
suffered from what Nicolas Bancel, Pascal Blanchard, and Françoise Vergès refer to 
as a “black hole of memory”.63 Colette Zytnicki and Sophie Dulucq argue that, in 
France, colonial history emerged on the periphery of the historical field and, despite 
gaining some prominence between 1900 and 1920, was not institutionalised as an 
academic discipline. In the 1930s, it remained open to non‐historians and anchored 
“in the political and business worlds which gave a dual image of amateurism and 
political activism.”64 France’s acutely painful experience of decolonisation in the 
1950s and 1960s ensured that colonial history, lacking firm institutional 
foundations, was marginalised: as Cécile Vidal writes, “France tried to erase the 
memory of its colonial empire and start from scratch.”65  
The last twenty five years, however, have seen a renewed interest in French 
imperial history from both French and anglophone historians.66 Nonetheless, the 
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period 1815 to 1870 remains relatively underexplored.67 In part this can be 
explained by the fact that ‘l’empire” in French historiography usually refers to the 
First and Second Bonapartist empires. The term “imperialism” is conventionally 
associated with the Napoleonic model of continental expansion and French 
overseas territories are generally referred to as “l’empire colonial’.68 This 
concentration on French colonialism has largely ignored non‐colonial attempts to 
further French influence.69 This preference for research into areas of formal French 
rule may perhaps explain why there is no general analysis of French imperialism in 
Latin America,70 which, aside from the colonies of Guadalupe, Martinique and 
French Guiana, remained outside France’s formal empire. 71  
In 1815 this empire was at its smallest territorial extent since the early 
seventeenth century. However, despite defeat in the Napoleonic wars, David Todd 
argues that France remained a “military, economic, scientific, and cultural super‐
power”, which deployed its influence on a global scale throughout the nineteenth 
century.72 The most prominent example of this assertion of French power in the 
extra‐European world was the conquest of Algeria, begun in 1830.73 However, this 
was an exception because the means (eventually) adopted for the conquest and 
then administration of Algeria was to bring the region under formal French control.  
Elsewhere, French politicians extended the influence of France through 
indirect means, underpinned by a particular conception of European Christian 
civilisation, commerce and, particularly from the 1850s, capital. This was backed by 
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hard power, but when force was deployed it was generally through naval 
expeditions combined with small‐scale military interventions. Policymakers wished 
to avoid what they considered to be costly colonial entanglements; in short, they 
feared another Algeria. This approach, which privileged economic and cultural 
factors over conquest, was facilitated by the rise of the French economy: between 
1840 and 1880 French commodity exports increased fivefold, while capital exports 
grew twelvefold.74 France was able to protect these interests through a powerful 
navy, second only to Britain’s throughout the period under study.75  
The most pertinent contemporary French imperial project comparable to 
Mexico is French policy in Indochina. France, ostensibly to protect Christian 
missionaries in China, fought with Britain in the Second Opium War (1856‐60). This 
was part of the development of French influence in mainland Asia, where the 
protection of Catholic rights played a prominent role as the pretext for military 
action. It was within this context that troops were diverted from China to Tourane 
in Annam and then Saigon in Cochinchina, which were occupied in 1858 by French 
and Spanish troops. As with Mexico, the initial aim of the expedition was not 
territorial conquest. The 1862 Treaty of Saigon did acknowledge French possession 
of Saigon and granted France protectorates over three provinces of Cochinchina, 
but Louis‐Napoléon was opposed to further annexations. Under pressure from 
admirals in the French navy, and politicians, such as Thiers, who argued for a more 
active policy in the region, as well as French officials who took territory without 
instructions from Paris, French possessions in the region slowly increased in the 
1860s. In addition to Cochinchina, a protectorate was also established over 
Cambodia in 1863.76  
French intervention in Mexico thus took place within a general context of 
the expansion of French influence globally from 1815 onwards, and specifically in 
                                                          
74 David Todd, ‘Transnational Projects of Empire in France, c. 1815‐70’, Modern Intellectual History, 
12 (2015), 293. 
75 See Charles Iain Hamilton, Anglo-French Naval Rivalry, 1840-1870 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 
and Ernest Harold Jenkins, A History of the French Navy, from its Beginnings to the Present Day 
(London: Macdonald and Jane's, (1979), chs. 13 and 14. 
76 Pierre Brocheux and Daniel Hémery, Indochina: An Ambiguous Colonization, 1858-1954, trans. Ly 
Lan Dill‐Klein (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), ch. 1; John Frank Cady, The Roots of 
French Imperialism in Eastern Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1954), chs. 12 and 16. 
  28 
the later 1850s and early 1860s at a time when France launched a succession of 
broadly successful overseas military expeditions. Aside from the Second Opium War 
and Indochina, France intervened successfully in Syria (1860‐61).77 Within the 
setting of these interventions, there was nothing exceptional about the 6,000 
troops in Mexico under General Charles Ferdinand de Latrille, Count of Lorencez 
(1814‐92), marching on Puebla in 1862 that distinguished it from the 4,000 or so 
troops that Admiral Léonard Charner (1797‐1869) had at his disposal in the same 
year to relieve a besieged French garrison at Saigon.78 Indeed, Cochinchina and 
Mexico were always mentioned together in Louis‐Napoléon’s speeches from the 
throne. “How,” asked the Emperor of the French rhetorically in one of these 
addresses, “[are we] to develop our foreign trade if, on the one hand, we renounce 
all influence in America and, on the other, in the presence of the vast territories 
occupied by the English, the Spanish and the Dutch, France remains the sole 
[power] without possessions in the seas of Asia?”79 It was not merely the French 
government that linked the two expeditions. Contemporary criticisms of French 
intervention in Cochinchina mirrored those levelled at the Louis‐Napoléon’s 
Mexican policy: no discernible national interest furthered; poor preparation, no 
long‐term plan and, as a result, merely responding to events with ever‐greater 
expense of men and resources; lack of knowledge of local politics.80 Indochina, 
however, became one of the most important parts of the French empire, an 
outcome dramatically different to that of the Mexican intervention.81  
Informal Empire 
Placing the Second Mexican Empire within the context of French imperial 
policy raises questions about the nature of the imperialism France practised in Latin 
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America. The distinguishing feature of imperialism, following Cain and Hopkins, “is 
that it involves an incursion, or attempted incursion, into the sovereignty of 
another state”.82 Clearly French policy in Mexico meets this criterion, but it does 
not fit very easily with other features usually associated with formal imperialism. 
France did not seek to acquire territory in Mexico as it had done in Algeria. Nor did 
it look to establish a colony, or even a formal protectorate as with Cochinchina and 
Cambodia – Veracruz did not become a Mexican Saigon. Maximilian was, in theory 
at least, an independent sovereign, the equal of Louis‐Napoléon, and Mexicans held 
the highest offices of state and administered the empire.  
The French army, of course, played a significant role in what contemporaries 
called “pacification”. This military involvement in order to found and then 
consolidate the Second Mexican Empire has led to some historians to categorise 
French intervention as simple colonialism. Alan Knight describes it as “a foreign 
invasion of crude, colonial style, which brought with it all the practices of primitive 
counter‐insurgency”. He calls the French intervention an attempt “at 'formal' 
empire‐building, geared to territorial conquest” and contrasts it with “the more 
subtle and insidious modes of 'informal' empire, or 'neo‐imperialism'”.83 Yet to 
conclude that French intervention in Mexico was a colonial project which aimed at 
formal empire is to conflate means with ends. Many of the strategies the French 
army employed in Mexico had been developed in Algeria, where many of the 
French soldiers who carried them out had served,84 but Louis‐Napoléon at no point 
entertained the annexation of all, or even part, of Mexico, nor was Mexico to be 
governed by French administrators appointed from Paris. 
 A potentially illuminating framework, therefore, for Mexicanising and 
imperialising the French intervention is the concept of informal empire as 
developed by Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher in their article ‘The Imperialism 
                                                          
82 Peter Cain and Anthony Hopkins, British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion, 1688-1914 
(London: Longman, 2002), 54. 
83 Knight, ‘The Peculiarities of Mexican History’, 125. Knight also refers to it as colonialism in Alan 
Knight, ‘Rethinking British Informal Empire in Latin America (Especially Argentina)’ in Matthew 
Brown, Informal Empire in Latin America: Culture, Commerce and Capital (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), 
38. Pascal Blanchard, Sandrine Lemaire, Nicolas Bancel and Dominic Thomas (eds.), Colonial Culture 
in France since the Revolution (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014), cite Mexico as an 
example of colonialism, which marks “the end of setback‐free colonial expansion for France”, 76‐78. 
84 Lecaillon, Napoleón III, 69. 
  30 
of Free Trade’ (1953).85 Whereas formal empire relies on direct rule from the 
metropolis, the theory of informal imperialism posits that a state can employ a 
variety of means in order to influence another sovereign government. In the classic 
model of informal empire these means are primarily political and economic, 
however, cultural factors have been added to the repertoire of imperial strategies 
by later historians who have embraced the concept.86 Historians have also focused 
on the role of non‐state actors, such as foreign nationals, business interests and 
missionaries, which work alongside, or in some cases independently of, 
metropolitan governments in order to further limit local sovereignty and advance 
imperial aspirations.87  
Axiomatic to the theory of informal empire as originally elaborated is the 
idea that it was the preferred imperial relationship of British Victorian 
policymakers.88 Informal empire provided the benefits of colonial rule without the 
costs and therefore it was only when informal rule broke down as a consequence of 
local crises which threatened imperial interests that a move was made to direct 
rule. Informal empire was cheaper than direct rule because local actors incurred the 
burden of administration, what Robinson termed “collaborating elites”, while 
subordinating local economic interests to the metropole.89 The relationship was 
attractive for local elites because it was mutually beneficial for primary product‐
exporting economies reliant upon lucrative metropolitan markets. Nonetheless, 
informal imperialism is predicated upon an asymmetrical exercise of power of one 
group over another whereby agents of an “expanding society gain inordinate 
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influence or control over the vitals of weaker societies by ‘dollar’ and ‘gun‐boat 
diplomacy’ [and] ideological suasion”.90 
As has been noted, the period 1815‐70 is something of a terra incognita in 
the study of French imperialism, but by focussing on informal imperialism Todd 
argues the period can be cast as a French imperial meridian.91 Latin America, and 
Mexico in particular, therefore offers a case study through which to test this 
hypothesis. Latin America had long been a battleground for advocates and 
detractors of the theory of informal empire,92 but interest in informal imperialism 
as an analytical tool to view British relations with Latin America was revived by 
Matthew Brown’s edited volume Informal Empire in Latin America: Culture, Capital 
and Commerce (2008). Broadly, the conclusion of the volume is that for the British 
informal “imperialism in Latin America was less a fact […] than an aspiration.”93 This 
conclusion raises the question as to whether other powers harboured similar 
ambitions in the region. As has been outlined above, the French government 
launched the most determined attempt to create an informal‐imperial relationship 
with a Latin American state; nonetheless, the theory has never been applied to 
French policy in the region. 
This thesis will draw on many of the themes developed in the theory of 
informal empire and use them as a prism to analyse French relations with Mexico. 
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The following definitions of “empire” and “imperialism” will apply throughout the 
work: “[e]mpire […] is a relationship, formal or informal, in which one state controls 
the effective political sovereignty of another political society [….] Imperialism is 
simply the process or policy of establishing or maintaining an empire.”94 Following 
Andrew Thompson, it is important to see informal empire as a “continuum” which 
includes formal empire rather than as a rigidly defined and separate “category”.95 
There were different means by which states could attempt to impose informal rule, 
and Alan Knight postulates a fluid fourfold typology of formal and informal empire 
that combines direct and indirect rule with de jure and de facto authority.96 And, 
focussing on these differences within informal imperial rule, John Darwin suggests a 
division between “western” (the Americas) and “eastern” (Turkey to Japan) 
versions of (what he terms) “semi‐colonial” relationships, the former relying on 
private enterprise occasionally backed by diplomats and naval force while the latter 
was much more formal and underwritten by legal and territorial concessions. 
Darwin concludes, as regards the former, that it was ineffectual and that no British 
government could have contemplated diverting the military force necessary to 
occupy or annex a Latin American state.97 This conclusion begs the question why 
did a French government not merely contemplate but enact such a policy in 
Mexico? 
This thesis will address three additional questions related to these 
categorisations of informal empire: i) why did some Mexican elites support this 
project? And ii) where, if at all, can French imperialism be placed within the models 
outlined above, which were developed to describe British informal imperialism? Or 
does a different paradigm need to be proposed if French imperialism in Latin 
America is to be incorporated into the continuum of informal empire? 
A third and final question arises from this discussion of informal empire. 
Robinson argued that the “efficiency [of informal empire] was clearly proportionate 
to the amount of wealth and power committed to it”.98 In order to consolidate the 
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Mexican empire of Maximilian, Louis‐Napoléon mobilised immense resources. He 
sent to Mexico some 30,000 French troops, who fought alongside thousands of 
Belgian and Austrian volunteers as well as Egyptian soldiers recruited from France’s 
Cairo ally and local Mexican troops loyal to Maximilian. The cost of the intervention 
up to April 1864 was estimated by the French government at 270 million francs. In 
addition to this, two loans totalling 534 million francs were raised on the financial 
markets of London and Paris to support the Mexican empire. The result: one of the 
least successful examples of imperialism in the entire nineteenth century.99 Why 
France failed to construct a stable polity in Mexico tied to French interests despite 
the immense “wealth and power” it deployed remains a pertinent question that 
this thesis will address. 
Pan-Latinism: A Transnational and Imperial Idea 
Central to the theory of informal empire is the concept of collaborating 
elites and without Mexican politicians to call for, administer and support the 
empire of Maximilian France would not have intervened. British informal influence 
was predicated upon its economic hegemony combined with its naval power. 
France’s economic and maritime might was, in the period under study, second only 
to Britain’s, but because France lacked the clear lead in commerce and capital 
enjoyed by Britain, the rationale that underpinned French involvement in Latin 
America relied more heavily on discourses that defined the area as a natural French 
sphere of influence. Although French imperialism in Mexico and Latin America was 
ultimately unsuccessful, French thinkers played an active role in demarcating the 
region as “Amérique latine”, a categorisation that proved more enduring than, for 
example, “Afrique latine”.100 The points where French ideas intersected with 
currents of thought in Mexico, which drew some elites towards France as both a 
political model and an auxiliary in promoting their own vision for the Mexican 
nation, are a focus for the thesis in addition to French policy. 
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Mexican conservatism and monarchism were shaped in dialogue with 
European, particularly French, models and ideas. Another current of thought that 
united some French thinkers and conservative Mexican politicians was the 
discourse of pan‐Latinism, and French intervention in order to found the Mexican 
Empire was depicted in pan‐Latinist terms by its proponents.101 International 
historians continue to debate what causal role can be attributed to pan‐Latinism in 
the French intervention, tending to play it down in favour of other factors.102 In a 
separate historiographical field, cultural and intellectual historians have focused on 
the professed goals of pan‐Latinists and their implications for the idea of “Latin 
America”.  
An important figure in the development of pan‐Latinist thought is the 
economist and adviser to Louis‐Napoléon, Michel Chevalier (1806‐79).103 Historians 
have concentrated on Chevalier’s role in the generation of a pan‐Latinist discourse 
not only because of his important position in the French Second Empire, but also 
due to his classification of the races of the Americas into two categories: “Anglo‐
Saxon” and “Latin”.104 However, Reinhart Koselleck warns against falling prey to a 
“new nominalism”, which would have us believe that the emergence of a category 
of thought is dependent on the creation of the term designating it.105 A focus on 
published texts that explicitly deal with “Latin civilisation” and “Latin races” in the 
Americas has meant that historians have ignored earlier expressions of the ideas 
that underpin these terms and the extent of their diffusion. By going beyond the 
conventional history of ideas focus on canonical texts, this thesis seeks to identify 
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the extent to which currents of thought, such as pan‐Latinism, monarchism and 
Mexican conservatism, normally considered to be the preserve of well‐known 
intellectuals and politicians, were part of a wider political culture that influenced 
French policy in Mexico and shaped the contours of Mexican political discourse. If, 
for example, it can be shown that pan‐Latinism was an older and far more widely 
shared idea in both France and Mexico then this may provide an intellectual and 
geostrategic rationale for the French decision to intervene, and help to account for 
the collaboration of some Mexican elites with French imperialism. 
As will be seen, pan‐Latinism was far from an exclusively French discourse: 
one of the earliest pan‐Latinist rationalisations of French intervention in Mexico 
was not made by Louis‐Napoléon or Chevalier, but in 1853 by José Ramón Pacheco 
(1805‐65), the Mexican minister to France. Many of those who adopted the rhetoric 
of pan‐Latinism in Mexico were conservatives, and this calls into question the 
argument that initial supporters of the idea of “Latin America” tended to be liberals 
“who claimed to be waging a pro‐democracy crusade against the ‘aristocratic’ 
conservatives controlling many of the continent’s governments.”106 This shows the 
importance of imperialising French intervention in Mexico, and Mexicanising the 
experience: pan‐Latinism influenced French relations with Latin America, Mexican 
perceptions of Europe and the idea of Latin America itself. 
Sources 
The methodology is situated in transnational history and internationalised 
intellectual history.107 The research seeks to discover how far the discourse of 
Mexican conservatism, which came to favour European intervention to support its 
aims, was formed in dialogue with, or in opposition to, European and US political 
and economic models, and how these were debated and then adapted to address 
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local issues.108 A transnational approach allows for an exploration of the movement 
of thinkers, and the circulation, transmission and reception of texts and ideas, both 
within and beyond state boundaries which shaped currents of Mexican and French 
thought. 
In order to achieve this, a wide range of published and archival Mexican, 
French, British and US sources were researched. In France, the Archives du 
ministère des affaires étrangères in Paris contains the despatches of French 
diplomatic agents and the correspondence of the foreign ministry. These sources 
not only provide material for French diplomatic relations with Mexico, but also for 
how French diplomatic agents interpreted and applied the ideas articulated by 
influential figures such as the politician and intellectual François Guizot (1787‐1874) 
or Chevalier. In Mexico, the Archivo Histórico Genaro Estrada de la Secretaría de 
Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico City, houses Mexican diplomatic sources. As many of 
Mexico’s leading statesmen served as foreign minister, these documents provide an 
insight into how these individuals interpreted international events as well as their 
views on different nations and their political systems. British diplomatic sources 
were also consulted at the National Archives in London where relevant, while many 
US diplomatic despatches are available in published form.109  
Alongside diplomatic sources, the private papers of prominent individuals 
were researched, notably the Genaro García Collection held at the Benson Latin 
American Collection, The University of Texas at Austin. This collection contains the 
papers of numerous nineteenth‐century Mexican politicians. Private papers were 
also consulted at the Archives nationales in France as well as the National Archives 
and British Library in London. In addition, various Mexican, French, British and US 
published works, including books, pamphlets, manifestos and periodicals, were 
read. These are variously located at the Hemeroteca Nacional de México, 
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Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, and the Archivo General de la Nación, 
Mexico City; the Benson Latin American Collection; the Bibliothèque nationale de 
France; the British Library; and the New York Public Library.   
Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis consists of five chapters in addition to the introduction and 
conclusion. The main chapters are organised thematically. Chapter one places Latin 
America within the context of French imperialism from 1820 to 1860. The focus is 
on the position Mexico occupied in the worldview of French policymakers: its 
economic and geostrategic importance is explored alongside the ideas that 
underpinned French imperialism more generally. As noted above, France also 
intervened in the River Plate.110 French activities in this region are referred to as a 
comparative in order to explore more general trends in French policy towards Latin 
America, particularly the discourse of civilisation that promoted an active role for 
France in the extra‐European world and the use of local elites to further French 
goals. Finally, the relationship of Britain to French policy in Latin America is 
explored in order to see what effect it had on French imperialism in the region. 
Chapter two analyses monarchism in Mexico, and its place in French 
discourse towards Mexico. Latin American independence had an important 
international dimension as rival nations competed for influence over the new 
states.111 Within this struggle monarchy had geopolitical significance for France 
because it was seen, in the 1820s, as a way of countering British power and, from 
the 1830s onwards, as one potential means of constraining the United States. Long 
before Louis‐Napoléon launched his intervention in 1861, the French Bourbon 
Restoration had wanted to place Bourbon princes on the thrones of Spain’s former 
colonies. Because of these European connections, there is a strong case for placing 
Mexican monarchism in a transnational context. Moreover, the failure of a 
monarchy with a Mexican as ruler (the First Mexican Empire under Iturbide) meant 
that for those in Mexico who favoured the creation of a new kingdom a European 
                                                          
110 Chronology 2 provides key dates for French involvement in the region, pp. 258‐60. 
111 Rafe Blaufarb, ‘The Western Question: The Geopolitics of Latin American Independence’, 
American Historical Review, 112 (2007), 742‐763; Piero Gleijeses, ‘The Limits of Sympathy: The 
United States and the Independence of Spanish America’, Journal of Latin American Studies, 24 
(1992), 481‐505. 
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monarch was a necessity, and without European support this project could not 
have been realised. The endurance of the idea that monarchy was the form of 
government best‐suited to Mexico amongst French and Mexican observers thus 
forms the focus of the chapter. This addresses the question why French 
policymakers and some Mexican politicians saw an empire under a foreign prince as 
a legitimate means to save the Mexican nation. 
Chapter three explores the shared discourse of pan‐Latinism in Mexico and 
France. By analysing French and Mexican reactions to the Texan revolt (1835‐36) 
and the subsequent US annexation of this former Mexican territory (in 1845) 
through diplomatic correspondence, newspapers and the writings of publicists and 
journalists as well as the speeches of politicians, this chapter shows that the ideas 
behind pan‐Latinism can be identified earlier than the 1860s: they date back at 
least to the 1830s. This has important implications for the French intervention 
because it places Latinity at the centre of France’s transnational informal 
imperialism, and identifies the ideas behind it as an important factor in the decision 
of some Mexican elites to look towards France to further their own vision for the 
Mexican nation. 
The 1850s saw the consolidation of Mexican conservatism. Chapter four 
explores the worldview of the Mexican Conservative Party, particularly as it was 
shaped by international events and transnational currents of thought. The period 
1848 to 1861, bookended by the US‐Mexican War and the French intervention, has 
seen historians focus on domestic Mexican politics, particularly the struggle 
between ‘reactionary’ Conservatives and ‘progressive’ liberals culminating in the 
War of Reform.112 However, the chapter argues that those associated with the 
Mexican Conservative Party understood themselves to be part of an international 
reaction against the doctrines that, they believed, caused the 1848 revolutions in 
Europe and contributed to instability in Mexico. In searching for a model to inspire 
their dream of turning a tumultuous democratic republic into an orderly 
authoritarian state, the newly formed Mexican Conservative Party looked to the 
                                                          
112 The diplomatic relationship between Washington and reformist liberals is explored in Donathon 
Olliff, Reforma Mexico and the United States: A Search for Alternatives to Annexation, 1854-61 
(Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1981). 
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French Second Empire. The chapter will analyse the response of Mexican 
Conservatives to the 1848 revolutions in the aftermath of the US‐Mexican War 
(1846‐48). It argues that Mexican Conservatives placed themselves within a 
geopolitical struggle of global importance – a Western version of the Crimean War. 
Chapter five will address the French intervention in Mexico and the 
foundation of Maximilian’s empire. It will answer some of the questions posed 
above on informal empire. The chapter also explores the economic and 
administrative rationale behind the empire. In addition, the chapter will analyse the 
architecture of informal rule, the means by which France hoped to construct an 
edifice that would remain within its sphere of influence and promote French 
economic and political power as well as advance French civilisation. Finally, the 
chapter looks at the reasons for the collapse of the Second Mexican Empire. 
First, however, it is necessary to explore what place Latin America, and 
Mexico specifically, occupied in the worldview of French policymakers. David Todd 
argues that French intervention in Mexico was “the hubristic apex of French 
aspirations to transnational empire.”113 For many contemporary French 
commentators, the special place Latin America, and Mexico in particular, occupied 
in French imperial discourse meant the Second Mexican Empire should have been 
the apotheosis of French informal imperial power. Rather than being the nadir of 
French informal empire, Mexico should have, to paraphrase Louis‐Napoléon, 
crowned the French imperial edifice. The next chapter discusses the nature of 
French imperialism from the 1820s to the 1860s, French policy towards Latin 
America and why Mexico was identified as an area of especial interest for many 
French policymakers, commentators and diplomats.  
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Chapter One 
French Policy towards Latin America, 1820-60 
 
 “Why”, Thiers demanded of the French National Assembly in 1850, “do we 
spend 120 million francs a year on a navy?” Thiers answered his own question: “[i]t 
is so that we can take action far away, so that the influence of France is not 
confined by the Rhine and the Pyrenees, but extends 2,000 to 3,000 leagues 
overseas, to do what the English do, to make ourselves respected”. For Thiers, 
French commerce needed to be backed by hard power and “there is no commerce 
in the world that has more need of protection than that of South America”.1 In this 
debate, Thiers, one of the great critics of Louis‐Napoléon’s Mexican intervention, 
argued for a large‐scale military expedition to be sent to the River Plate in order to 
protect French nationals and develop French influence. This apparent contradiction 
highlights one of the main continuities in French policy towards Latin America: all 
France’s leading politicians agreed that French power and trade should be 
developed and extended, and by force if necessary; the differences between them 
were over how and where this should be done. 
This consensus helps explain the readiness of French regimes in the period 
1815‐70 to intervene militarily in Latin America.2 This attitude shaped US policy 
towards Latin America: James Monroe’s 1823 message to Congress was partly 
prompted by fears that France’s 1823 invasion of Spain was a prelude to the 
forcible restoration of Bourbon rule in the New World.3 In December 1845 
President James Polk’s first annual message to Congress attacked the “[p]owers of 
Europe”, who wished to see a “balance of power” in North America. This was a 
direct response to a speech of 10 June 1845 in the French Chamber of Deputies by 
the then foreign minister, Guizot, who had advocated that there should be a check 
on US expansion.4 In response to Polk’s address, Guizot maintained that France had 
                                                          
1 Thiers, Discours, VIII, 381‐82. 
2 A list of French interventions in Latin America is given in the introduction, 24‐25. 
3 ‘The Monroe Doctrine’ in Robert Holden and Eric Zolov (eds.), Latin America and the United States: 
A Documentary History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 11‐14.  
4 James Polk, ‘Texas, Mexico and Manifest Destiny’ in ibid., 21‐23. Guizot’s speech: ‘Chambres des 
Députés. Présidence de M. Sauzet. Séance du mardi 10 June’, Le Moniteur universel, 11 June 1845, p. 
  42 
the right to intervene in the affairs of the Americas.5 Guizot thus publically 
disavowed the Monroe Doctrine, but it was some 30,000 French troops supporting 
a monarchy under an Austrian Archduke that posed the greatest challenge to the 
doctrine in the nineteenth century.  
France, then, played an active role which not only impacted upon the new 
states of Latin America in which it intervened, but also affected the policy of the 
United States towards the region. Furthermore, French trade with the region vied 
with that of the United States during the period 1820‐67 to occupy second place 
behind Britain;6 French nationals settled in relatively large numbers, particularly in 
Mexico and the River Plate; and local elites looked to French political culture for 
inspiration. In short, France wielded considerable political, economic, cultural and 
military power in the region. In the absence of any general survey of French 
imperialism in Latin America, it is hoped that this chapter can begin to address this 
gap by focussing on particular aspects of French policy towards Latin America. The 
key question for this chapter is: why did France commit more resources to Latin 
America, and Mexico specifically, than any other extra‐European region, Algeria 
excepted, in the period under study? 
In order to answer this question, the transnational nature of French imperial 
thought will analysed: French intellectuals and politicians developed an idea of 
European civilisation which encouraged informal expansion in the extra‐European 
world. The chapter will then explore Latin America’s place within this worldview. 
Four factors are identified which saw French policymakers mark it out as an area of 
significant focus for French imperialism: i) economic wealth, ii) the perceived state 
of civilisation, iii) local elites and iv) the British attitude towards French policy in 
Latin America. 
                                                          
1655. On the Monroe Doctrine and its evolution see Jay Sexton, The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and 
Nation in Nineteenth-Century America (New York: Hill and Wang, 2011). 
5 First in a speech to the Chamber of Peers and then to the Chamber of Deputies, ‘Chambre des 
Pairs’, Le Moniteur universel, 13 January 1846, pp. 73‐74, and ‘Chambre des Députés’, ibid., 22 
January 1846, pp. 158‐63. 
6 For an analysis of Mexico’s overseas trade for the period see Inés Herrera Canales, El comercio 
exterior de Mex́ico, 1821-1875 (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1977). 
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I 
Enlightenment for Informal Empire 
Studies of French imperialism, colonialism or empire – the categorisation is 
rarely clear – if they cover 1815‐70 at all, normally view this period as one of 
incoherent foreign policy subordinated to domestic concerns. Imperial policy during 
these years is variously seen as reactive to events, commercially of dubious value, 
elitist and lacking popular support, yet somehow connected to an ill‐defined desire 
to restore French prestige in the world after the defeat in the Napoleonic Wars. In 
this view, there was little continuity and no long‐term strategic vision, although the 
period culminates in a “burst of imperialism at the century’s end” under the Third 
Republic.7 Thus the years from the Bourbon Restoration to the fall of Second French 
Empire have been defined as “an intermediate period”,8 within which it would be 
vain to look for “an overall doctrine” or “a coherent idea”.9 
As has been noted in the introduction, this is partially a result of the focus 
on formal imperialism which, with the exception of Algeria, was generally absent 
from French policy from 1815 to 1870. Furthermore, intellectual historians have 
provided a rationale for the dominant historiographical interpretation that French 
imperialism was incoherent and limited, especially when compared to the Third 
Republic, by arguing that French political thought was itself anti‐imperial. Jennifer 
Pitts identifies a shift in French (and British) liberal thought from anti‐imperialism in 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries to pro‐empire liberalism by the 
mid‐nineteenth century, what Pitts calls “a turn to empire”.10 In this interpretation, 
limited overseas expansion in the first half of the nineteenth century can in part be 
                                                          
7 The quote is from Alice Conklin and Sarah Fishman, France and its Empire since 1870 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 16. For the various interpretations see Raoul Giradet, L’idée coloniale 
en France (Paris: La Table ronde 1972), 5‐6; Blanchard, Culture coloniale, 13‐14 and 92; Denise 
Bouche and Pierre Pluchon, Histoire de la colonisation française, 2 vols. (Paris: Fayard, 1991), I, 52; 
Henri Brunschwig, Mythes et reáliteś de l'impeŕialisme colonial franca̧is (Paris: A. Colin, 1960); Agnes 
Murphy, The Ideology of French Imperialism (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 
1948). 
8 Jacques Binoche‐Guedra, La France d’outre-mer, 1815-1962 (Paris: Masson, 1992), 30. 
9 Bernard Lauzanne (ed.), L’Aventure coloniale de la France, 5 vols. (Paris: Denoël, 1987–97), 
II, Jean Martin, L’Empire renaissant, 1789–1870, 257. 
10 Jennifer Pitts, A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2005), 1. See also Sankar Muthu, Enlightenment against Empire 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003) and Uday Singh Mehta, Liberalism and Empire 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1999). 
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explained by a hostility towards empire, or at least a lack of interest in it, until the 
development of pro‐colonial arguments which gained prominence under the Third 
Republic. 
However, just as a focus on formal empire has ignored informal attempts to 
extend French influence, a focus on imperial thought only insofar as it relates to 
territorial expansion has meant that ideas which supported informal or 
transnational models of domination have been overlooked. Liberal intellectuals 
under the Bourbon Restoration or the July Monarchy believed that the expansion of 
French influence was inherently valuable, but the means to achieve this should not 
be annexation or conquest. It is therefore possible to recast the so‐called “liberal 
turn to empire” in the mid‐nineteenth century, “as a more modest tactical shift 
from informal to formal dominance.”11 
A particular vision of European civilisation tied to Christianity and progress 
underpinned the ideas which supported informal imperial expansion. As will be 
seen, this was most coherently articulated by Guizot. However, the continuities in 
French liberal thought on empire are perhaps more striking than the changes, and 
the relationship of intellectuals to imperialism more ambivalent or, at least more 
ambiguous, than generally supposed. For example, Nicolas de Condorcet (1743‐94) 
and Benjamin Constant (1767‐1830) are considered to be the exemplars of French 
thinkers opposed to empire,12 but it is often overlooked that they were reacting to 
specific forms of imperial relationship. It does not follow that Condorcet’s criticisms 
of mercantilist colonies predicated on slave labour or, in Constant’s case, 
Napoleonic European empire based on the subjugation of other Europeans, were 
outright rejections of all forms of imperialism. 
Pitt’s argument relies on the assumption that imperialism entails 
colonialism, rather than seeing the latter merely as subset of the former. The word 
“colony” had a specific meaning for eighteenth‐century writers: “the movement of 
people, or a portion of people, from one country to another”, and a positive view of 
                                                          
11 Todd, ‘Transnational Projects’, 266. 
12 Pitts, Turn to Empire, 168‐85. 
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colonisation had been inherited from ancient history, particularly Greece.13 No 
eighteenth‐century thinker, no matter how critical of empire, was in principle 
opposed to the peaceable settlement of foreign land and the creation of colonies. 
As one of the most vociferous opponents of mercantile colonialism, Denis Diderot 
(1713‐84), wrote, “both reason and equity permit the founding of colonies”.14 
However, Diderot and Condorcet were highly critical of the results of the recent 
European colonisation of the Americas: slavery and mercantilism. 
For Condorcet the two were linked and had deleterious effects on the 
economy and morality of both metropole and colony.15 He especially attacked the 
restricted commercial relationships that underpinned imperial trade. Condorcet, 
like Diderot,16 was an advocate of free(r) trade.17 The tightly controlled commercial 
organisation of the French Empire developed under Louis XIV’s minister, Jean‐
Baptiste Colbert (1619‐1683), and confirmed by the Exclusif legislation of 1717 and 
1727, forced colonies to trade solely with the metropole. This model was 
antithetical to Condorcet’s understanding of political economy. However, 
Condorcet argued that European civilisation, minus the evils of slavery and 
mercantilism, should be exported to non‐European lands, an assumption based on 
a theory of progress which came to influence the civilizing mission of the Third 
Republic.18 That Europeans should colonise other territories is laid out in the 
Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain (1794): “colonies of 
citizens […] will radiate, throughout Africa and Asia, the principles and the example 
                                                          
13 See François Véron de Forbonnais, “Colony,” ‘The Encyclopedia of Diderot & d'Alembert 
Collaborative Translation Project’, trans. Alyssa Goldstein Sepinwal and Ann Arbor: MPublishing, 
University of Michigan Library, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.did2222.0000.246 accessed 16 
January 2013. Originally published as "Colonie," Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, 
des arts et des métiers, III, 648–51 (Paris, 1753). 
14 Guillaume‐Thomas Raynal, Histoire philosophique et politique des établissemens et du commerce 
des européens dans les deux Indes, 10 vols. (Geneva: n.p., 1781), IV, 201. Diderot contributed to this 
work and is identified as the author of the quoted section in John Hope Mason and Robert Wokler 
(eds.), Political Writings: Denis Diderot (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 167. 
15 See Condorcet, Réflexions sur l’esclavage des nègres (Neufchatel: Société typographique, 1781). 
16 Denis Diderot, Observations sur le Nakaz, 417‐18, printed in Paul Vernière (ed.), Diderot. Œuvres 
politiques (Paris: Garnier frères, 1963), 417‐18. 
17 See Condorcet, Réflexions sur le commerce des blés (London: n.p., 1776). 
18 On the civilizing mission under the Third Republic see Alice Conklin, A Mission to Civilize: The 
Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1930 (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1997). 
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of liberty, the light and the reason of Europe.” The European population would 
“civilise or make disappear, without conquest, the savages who still occupy these 
vast countries.”19  
The advance of French civilisation became a cornerstone of nineteenth‐
century French imperialism, but Condorcet’s vision lacked a military dimension. 
Another thinker identified as opposed to empire, Constant, provided a rationale for 
a more muscular liberalism. His anti‐imperial reputation largely derives from his 
essay De l'esprit de conquête et de l'usurpation: dans leurs rapports avec la 
civilisation européenne (1814), but, as is made explicit in the title, it is concerned 
with European civilisation and, exclusively, “the present condition of European 
peoples”.20 The work is a direct attack on the Napoleonic Empire and its methods, 
which, for the author, created despotism in France and undermined political liberty 
and personal freedom.21 Furthermore, and in spite of this condemnation of 
Napoleonic expansion, Constant was no pacifist. In Principes de politique 
applicables à tout les gouvernements (1815) he outlined an argument which stated 
that so long as war was legally sanctioned by parliamentary process and in keeping 
with public opinion, which is “almost never wrong about the legitimacy of war 
undertaken by any government”, then military action was justifiable. Indeed, 
Constant went further, arguing “[t]o say that one must keep on the defensive is to 
say nothing at all” and that “to forbid governments to continue the war beyond 
their borders is again a useless precaution.”22  
Constant, therefore, did not reject outright military action, nor is it clear 
that his denunciation of expansion is “a much broader brief against imperial 
expansion in the modern age”,23 which extended to the extra‐European world. It 
certainly did not include the Dey of Algiers, as Constant’s comments in Le Temps on 
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the French expedition of 1830 to Algiers make clear: “we applaud the destruction of 
a den of pirates […] rather than respecting the sovereignty of a barbarian. May the 
city of Algiers be thrown into its harbour!”24 For Constant, then, as for other French 
liberal parliamentarians, at least in practice, the “liberal project of representative 
government” was not, as some have argued, “inextricable from an international 
politics of peaceful commerce and mutual respect of sovereign states.”25 Rather, as 
regards the extra‐European world, the “liberal project of representative 
government” was used by all French regimes in the period 1815‐70 to secure 
national resources for overseas intervention with the express purpose of abrogating 
the sovereignty of states which were not considered to be legitimately or 
enduringly constituted. 
Algeria, however, was a colonial exception in French imperial policy which 
affected subsequent overseas expeditions. Guizot argued that it was not in France’s 
interests to found “new and great colonial establishments far from its territory”, 
which would involve France in long struggles to subjugate the local population and 
provoke conflict with European rivals; France had “enough in Algeria to conquer 
and colonise”. Rather, France’s imperial strategy was twofold: “wherever European 
and Christian civilisation establishes itself, there also France is bound to assume her 
place and exercise her peculiar genius”,26 and France would also possess points on 
the “globe which are destined to become great centres of commerce” maritime 
posts to further and protect French trade.27  
In part, the conclusion that informal imperial relationships with overseas 
states could be preferable to colonial conquest and commercially more lucrative 
had been arrived at as a consequence of the independence of the former Spanish, 
British and Portuguese colonies in the Americas.28 The thinker that did most to 
                                                          
24 The article was first published in Le Temps (Paris), 20 June 1830, and is printed in Ephraïm Harpaz 
(ed.), Recueil d'articles: [1825-1830] / Benjamin Constant; texte et́abli, introduit, annote ́et 
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25 Jennifer Pitts, ‘Republicanism, Liberalism, and Empire’ in Sankar Muthu (ed.), Empire and Modern 
Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 268. 
26 François Guizot, Mémoires pour servir à l’histoire de mon temps, 8 vols. (Paris: Michel‐Lévy frères: 
1858‐67), VI, 272‐75. 
27 ‘Chambre des Députés’, Journal des débats, 1 April 1843, third page.  
28 In 1795 Charles‐Maurice de Talleyrand wrote that despite the loss of its colonies in North America, 
Britain retained the economic advantages this market provided. Talleyrand to Lord Landsdowne, 1 
February 1795, printed in Michel Poniatowski (ed.), Talleyrand aux États-Unis, 1794–1796 (Paris: 
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draw French attention towards Latin American independence and its potential 
benefit for Europe was the Abbé Dominique de Pradt (1759‐1837). De Pradt 
enjoyed a peripatetic political career as a representative of the clergy to the Estates 
General, a diplomatic agent of Napoléon Bonaparte and a supporter of the restored 
Bourbons in 1814 before rallying again to the empire during the Hundred Days. This 
act disgraced him in the eyes of the Louis XVIII and he became a liberal opponent of 
the Bourbon Restoration. His exile from politics gave new impetus to his life as a 
publicist. He published an array of works on various topics as well as contributing 
articles to newspapers and journals.29 The numerous editions of his works as well as 
foreign translations attests to his popularity both in France and abroad, but he was 
to gain contemporary fame in Latin America,30 where he was made an honorary 
citizen of Mexico and Colombia, while Bolívar paid him a pension out of his own 
funds,31 in recognition of his defence of Latin American independence.  
In Des colonies, et de la révolution actuelle de l’Amérique (1817), de Pradt 
reiterated what he had predicted at the beginning of the nineteenth century:32 
colonies inevitably tended towards independence. Moreover, freedom of 
commerce led to prosperity which made this outcome more, not less, 
advantageous for both colony and metropole.33 Latin American wars of 
independence had shown the futility of trying to subjugate colonies once they had 
reached “maturity” and it was, therefore, a waste of Spain’s resources to oppose 
militarily independence as well as the cause of severe economic dislocation.34 US 
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31 Bornholdt, ‘Abbé de Pradt’, 203‐8. 
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and Latin American independence was also understood in geostrategic terms. De 
Pradt had argued that global power was not a consequence of continental 
domination, but rather of industrial, financial, commercial and naval pre‐eminence. 
This meant that Britain was unrivalled and benefitted the most from the breakup of 
colonies.35 François‐René de Chateaubriand (1768‐1848), who served as French 
foreign minister from December 1822 to August 1824, shared this analysis as 
regards Latin America. He argued that the former Spanish colonies had at the 
moment of independence become “a type of English colony” because of Britain’s 
commercial and financial hegemony.36 Moreover, influential French economists, 
such as Jean‐Baptiste Say (1767‐1832), agreed with the basic economic conclusions 
of Talleyrand and de Pradt and built on the late eighteenth‐century critiques of 
mercantilist colonialism to argue for freer trade.37 
Events in Latin America not only informed ideas about imperialism, but also 
French political thought. Constant and de Pradt became engaged in a debate over 
whether Bolívar should have assumed dictatorial powers in Colombia. This 
discussion drew in French royalist ultras who looked to legitimise their own views 
through an analysis of Latin American events.38 Discussions in the press such as 
these drew French attention towards Latin America, and for French policymakers 
Latin American was a testing ground for informal imperial strategies because, as will 
be discussed below, it was a region of great economic potential, which consisted of 
what were understood in France as weakly or illegitimately constituted states. 
Indeed, de Pradt argued that “France, deprived of its colonies, has of all the states 
of Europe, the most need of the emancipation of [Latin] America.”39 
                                                          
35 Ibid., I, xviii; 193‐4; II, 200; 248‐70. 
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Amérique (Paris: Garnier Frères, 1861), 217. 
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II 
Early Franco-Mexican Relations: Diplomatic Distance, Commercial Closeness 
Latin American independence thus presented France with particular 
opportunities, but the Americas had long occupied an important place in the French 
worldview.40 At its apogee France’s first colonial empire stretched from Quebec to 
New Orleans;41 Saint‐Domingue was “the Pearl of the Antilles” in the latter half of 
the eighteenth century providing two‐fifths of the sugar and over half of the coffee 
produced in the New World;42 French involvement in the American War of 
Independence renewed French interest and engendered enduring political 
sympathies amongst influential French politicians such as the Marquis de La Fayette 
(1757‐1834).43 Furthermore, in the immediate aftermath of the defeat to Britain in 
the Seven Years War (1756‐63), it had been to Guiana that France looked to 
compensate its colonial losses with a disastrous colonisation scheme involving 
some 15,000 settlers.44 Napoléon Bonaparte’s dreams of recreating France’s 
American empire were only extinguished with the failed attempt to re‐occupy Haiti 
(1801‐3) and then defeat at Trafalgar.45 The Bourbon Restoration harboured 
ambitions of restoring Haiti to the French empire up to 1818.46 More prosaically, 
France retained Guadalupe and Martinique in the Antilles and these colonies 
regained their prosperity in the 1820s in a decade which saw colonial imports 
average 15 percent of French total imports – a figure reached again only in the 
1930s.47 
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Aside from these long‐term historical connections, the importance of 
France’s remaining colonies and the issue of Haitian independence, the relationship 
of Spain to its former colonies and the question of whether Bourbon France should 
recognise them dominated initial French relations with Latin American post‐1815. 
At a surface level, Talleyrand’s quip that the Bourbon Restoration had learned 
nothing and forgotten nothing is applicable to colonial policy. Although it is possible 
to discern a more liberal approach from 1815‐21 and a vigorous protectionism from 
1821‐28,48 in general, France reasserted mercantilist principles. Moreover, it 
became the second largest slave trading nation after Portugal while its plantation 
colonies regained some of their pre‐1789 prosperity.49 However, as regards Latin 
America Bourbon policy demonstrated the necessity of considering alternative 
imperial relationships in the aftermath of the wars of independence in the Atlantic 
world. 
First, faced with the impracticality, and dubious economic benefit, of 
restoring Haiti to French rule, France sent a naval squadron in 1825 to impose a 
treaty that granted favourable tariffs on French goods and an indemnity of 150 
million francs to French colonists in return for French recognition of Haitian 
independence.50 The terms of the treaty included a secret clause which stipulated 
that Haiti would contract a loan of 30 million francs with French banks to help pay 
for the indemnity, which was the first significant overseas loan raised on the French 
market.51 This use of military force to procure French interests became the 
blueprint and reference point for future French interventions in Latin America, 
particularly those of 1838 (discussed below).  
Policymakers under the Bourbon Restoration were, therefore, willing to 
make compromises over sovereignty in Haiti. The same was true as regards Latin 
American independence, although here French freedom of action was restricted by 
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its ties to Spain. France joined the Holy Alliance in 1818 and upheld the principle of 
legitimacy in Europe and the Americas. Indeed, Mexican independence was 
proclaimed in the same year, 1821, that the Jean‐Baptiste de Villèle (1773‐1854), 
head of the legitimist ultra party in France, formed his ministry. Furthermore, 
France invaded Spain in 1823 to restore the Spanish king Ferdinand VII (1784‐1833) 
to absolutist rule and French troops remained there until 1828. This was seen by 
many in Mexico as the prelude to a French‐backed Spanish expedition to reconquer 
its former colonies and, despite French protestations to the contrary, continued to 
be a concern in Mexico until 1830.52 Intervention in the Americas to support 
royalism was seriously entertained in Europe by the Holy Alliance, particularly in 
France. Although the Polignac Memorandum, signed in 1823 between France and 
Britain, bound France not to intervene militarily in the Latin American wars of 
independence, both Louis XVIII (1815‐24) and Charles X (1824‐30) refused to 
recognise the new American republics.53  
However, this diplomatic distance did not preclude sending diplomatic 
agents to Latin America in order to develop political and economic ties. France 
required information about the Latin American states and therefore the foreign 
ministry sent representatives to Argentina, Colombia and Mexico in 1822. The aim 
was not merely to report, but also to develop relations with the most important 
politicians in these countries in order that France could influence local politics.54 
Moreover, the foreign ministry realised the commercial potential of the new 
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republics and feared that delay in establishing ties with the new states of Latin 
America would hand the economic advantage to Britain.55  
The instructions to one of these agents stated: Mexico is “the most 
important of the new American republics”.56 The position conferred on Mexico by 
the foreign ministry is borne out by the value of its trade. According to the official 
French government statistics, between 1827 and 1836 Mexico was the twelfth 
largest export market for French goods in the world, totalling 145.4 million francs, 
and made up 2.18 percent of the value of France’s total exports. This was second 
only to Brazil in Latin America,57 which was marginally larger at 152.5 million (2.28 
percent of total exports). By way of comparison, the largest export market, the 
United States, at 1,205 million francs, was about 18 percent of the total.58 Mexico 
was more important as a destination for French goods than European powers such 
as Portugal, Russia and Austria, and, although France could not match Britain’s 
export trade to Mexico, it vied with the United States as the second largest 
exporter throughout the period. In terms of imports, during the same period, 
Mexico furnished France with 65.4 million francs worth of goods and, again, was 
second only to Brazil in Latin America.59 
Given this volume of trade, it was hardly surprising that calls to normalise 
relations with Mexico came from chambers of commerce in France’s main ports.60 
These bodies had in turn been lobbied by agents of the Mexican government. The 
commercial agent for Mexico at Bordeaux, Jacques Galos (1774‐1830), in an 
address to the members of the Bordeaux Chamber, echoed de Pradt and argued 
that France, “poor in colonies” but “rich in industry”, should fix its attention on 
these “vast regions” in order to compensate for “the painful loss of [France’s] most 
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precious overseas possessions”. According to the agent, more had been exported 
from the port of Bordeaux to Latin America than to Martinique, Guadeloupe, 
Guiana, Pondicherry and Senegal and other French colonies combined. He informed 
Tomás Murphy Senior (unknown‐1830),61 an early Mexican diplomatic agent to 
France, that his work had been successful and the Bordeaux and Marseilles 
Chambers of Commerce had pressured the French government. Murphy in turn 
reported that this pressure was positively influencing the French cabinet towards 
recognition of Mexico’s independence.62 Indeed, the French foreign ministry 
instructed a commercial agent, Adrien Cochelet (1788‐1858), to tell the Mexican 
government of “our desire to extend and complete our relations with her”, but that 
recognition would not be immediate: “[i]t is doubtless to be desired that this 
acknowledgement take place, but it is necessary that such an important action be 
examined with care”.63 Diplomatic recognition was a long‐term intention of the 
Bourbon Restoration.   
Mexico’s economic importance was linked to its production of precious 
metals, especially silver, which was of particular concern to France given its 
bimetallic monetary system.64 The reality behind the legend of New Spain’s mineral 
wealth was confirmed in Europe by Alexander von Humboldt’s travels through the 
kingdom between 1799 and 1804.65 Indeed, Chevalier, an economist who studied at 
the École des Mines de Paris, published a work on the gold and silver mines of the 
Americas. Mexico formed a significant portion of the work and Chevalier wrote that 
the mining of precious metals was “a subject of particular interest for France” 
because “amongst all the nations […] it must retain the most silver” to maintain its 
fixed gold and silver exchange rate.66 Silver production declined in Mexico after 
                                                          
61 Date of birth not given in Miguel León‐Portilla (ed.), Diccionario Porrúa de historia, biografıá y 
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independence,67 but diplomatic reports and published works recognised Mexico’s 
immense mineral wealth and, if some noted the decline in output, all agreed that 
properly exploited Mexican mines would overtake pre‐independence levels.68  
The most common description of Mexico in French discourse was of a 
country blessed by nature through its fertile soil and favourable climates, by its 
abundance of natural resources and its strategic location between the Atlantic and 
Pacific Oceans, which made it ideally placed to develop commerce.69 It was also a 
destination for French settlers and by the 1850s there were some 5,000 French 
residents there.70 These French nationals comprised the largest group of foreigners 
in Mexico after the Spanish and provided an alternative means for the exchange of 
French and Mexican culture.71  
Mexico, then, occupied an important place in the French worldview, but 
relations were impeded by the refusal to recognise independence. French investors 
were interested in the loans raised for the newly independent Latin American 
republics and some subscribed on the London markets, but non‐recognition meant 
that these loans could not be raised in Paris. Furthermore, Alamán had originally 
attempted to secure capital to exploit Mexico’s mines in Paris, where he spent 
some time after serving in the Spanish Cortes. In 1822 he formed the Franco‐
Mexican Mining Company in Paris, but the venture failed and Alamán reconstituted 
the company in London as the United Mexican Mining Association.72 These 
                                                          
67 Jaime Rodríguez, ‘La crisis de México en el siglo XIX’, Estudios de Historia Moderna y 
Contemporánea de México, 10 (1986), 85‐107. 
68 Beltrami, Le Mexique, 2 vols. (Paris: Crevot, 1830), I, 332; Mathieu de Fossey, Le Mexique (Paris: H. 
Plon, 1857), 429; Hippolyte Du Pasquier de Dommartin, Les États-Unis et le Mexique. L’intérêt 
européen dans l’Amérique du Nord (Paris: Guillaumin, 1852), 51‐54; Martin to La Ferronnays, 24 July 
1828, AAE, CP Mexique, 4; ‘Note de Monsieur Gabriac sur les mines du Mexique’; ‘Note sur la 
Sonora par Eugène  du Moflas’, AAE, MD Mexique, 10. 
69 See Dugast, La tentation mexicaine, I, chs. 5 and 6. 
70 Jean Meyer, ‘Les Français au Mexique au XIXe siècle’, Cahiers des Amériques latines, 9–10 (1974), 
51; Barker, French Experience in Mexico, 123‐30. 
71 Several of them published works on Mexico, such as Ancharsis Brissot, Voyage au Guazacoalcos, 
aux Antilles et aux E tats-Unis (Paris: A. Bertrand, 1837) and Fossey, Le Mexique. These French 
communities as well the influence and impact of French culture and science in Mexico are explored 
in Javier Perez Siller, David Skerrit and Chantai Cramaussel (eds.), México Francia: Memoria de una 
sensibilidad común; siglos XIX-XX, 4 vols. (Mexico: Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla; San 
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disappointments did not diminish interest, rather, rivalry with Britain and the 
United States focussed attention on ways in which France could profit from Latin 
American independence. 
Julien Schmaltz (1771‐1827), who had been sent by the foreign ministry to 
Mexico in order to report on its political, social and economic state, wrote to Paris 
“the English in Mexico are in a much better position than us”. His analysis echoed 
Chateaubriand’s conclusion that Latin America had become a “type of British 
colony” and the reasons Schmaltz gave for this for this read like a manual for 
informal empire. He argued the following: the British navy maintained a constant 
presence on the coasts and in the ports of Mexico while naval officers frequently 
visited the capital, which gave Mexicans a strong impression of British “power”. The 
pro‐independence editorials in British papers, the declarations and attitude of 
George Canning (1770‐1827) in favour of Latin American independence, the 
response to the Monroe Doctrine by British journalists and, above all, the sending 
of accredited agents, “seemed to confirm all these good dispositions [of Britain]”. 
Moreover, loans contracted with London financial houses marked the beginning of 
a “political dependence” which was becoming all the more of a “dangerous 
influence” because London’s capital markets were currently the “only resource and 
the unique hope of the Mexican government” to relieve its current financial 
distress. In addition to this political and financial dominance, it was necessary to 
add British commercial hegemony. And, if this was not enough, British companies 
and capital were poised to exploit Mexico’s mines. There was even talk that a bank 
would be set up to disburse British funds towards agricultural improvement with 
the eventual result, Schmaltz concluded, that Mexico would be almost entirely 
subordinated to British economic and political interests.73 
Despite Schmaltz’s concerns, the activities he identified above were not part 
of a systematic and coherent British attempt to establish what would amount to 
informal empire directed from London, nor did they confer as much long‐lasting 
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influence as feared.74 Even so Schmaltz, and many subsequent French diplomats in 
Mexico as well as ministers in Paris, wanted to procure Britain’s supposed 
hegemony for France, or at least, in the 1820s, to limit Britain’s power. The problem 
was how to achieve it. Schmaltz, in a somewhat fatalistic early acceptance of the 
dominance of Anglo‐Saxon capitalism, argued that the British could not be 
challenged financially or commercially. He claimed that “[French] capitalists and 
businessmen did not have either the same mass of funds disposable, nor the genius 
of enterprise, nor the boldness in speculation which gives so many advantages to 
our rivals”, but he nonetheless urged that France should employ the means it did 
have to advance its interests because it “did not lack partisans in Mexico”. Schmaltz 
was an early proponent of a proto‐pan‐Latinist interpretation: just as had happened 
in Spain, similarity of “religion, customs, mores and spirit” in Mexico meant there 
was a preference for France as a protector rather than Britain.75 Monarchy, like 
religion or pan‐Latinism (and frequently all three were inseparable), was another 
means of increasing French influence via non‐economic means, as will be discussed 
in subsequent chapters. 
The economic wealth, both recorded and potential, combined with 
geostrategic and commercial rivalry meant that France saw Latin America, and 
especially Mexico, as an area of great importance. The identification of Latin 
America as a key market for French trade was borne out by the fact that the volume 
of French trade increased throughout the period. Further attention was drawn to 
the region because it was feared, in the 1820s, that British policy was securing an 
advantageous position for itself at the expense of other powers.76 However, the 
Bourbon family compact meant that Louis XVIII and Charles X, already ideologically 
opposed to the independence of Spanish America because of its republican 
direction, had yet more reason to delay the recognition of these emerging states. 
This in turn meant that France, unlike Britain, could not negotiate commercial 
treaties with the news states of Latin America. After the collapse of the Bourbon 
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Restoration in 1830, the July Monarchy deployed its powerful navy in order to 
secure by force what Britain had attained by negotiation.  
III 
Wars of Civilisation in Mexico and the River Plate 
With the fall of Charles X French policy towards Latin America was no longer 
shackled to Ferdinand VII’s intransigence. France unilaterally recognised the 
independence of all the existing republics in 1830. While sympathy for monarchy in 
the region would remain a leitmotif of many diplomats, politicians and publicists 
under the July Monarchy and Second Empire, French policy was no longer tied to 
the restoration of Spanish sovereignty,77 thereby removing Britain’s principal 
objection to French intervention in the Americas. Indeed, as will be discussed later, 
after 1830 France frequently acted in concert with Britain when pursuing its goals. 
However, France’s recognition of independence did not secure stable relations with 
the new states; rather, its newfound freedom of action led to military intervention 
in both Mexico and the River Plate.  
Because France had not recognised independence, it had not negotiated 
treaties of amity, navigation and friendship to regulate its commerce and the status 
of its foreign nationals. The protection of nationals from damage to property and 
forced loans was seen as essential to promote French emigration and trade. The 
refusal of both Mexico and Argentina to ratify treaties and indemnify French losses 
during civil conflict were the pretext for French intervention. Senior French officials 
took the view that unstable republics such as Mexico and Argentina left France with 
no option other than intervention to forcibly secure French goals once both 
governments had rejected ultimatums. This was deemed to be justified because 
these Latin American governments had failed to uphold a French conception of 
international law and civilisation.78 The two naval expeditions of 1838 to blockade 
Mexico and Argentina were predicated on the assumption that these nations were 
semi‐civilised and based on the conviction that demonstrations of naval power 
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would coerce these governments in accepting French demands, as had been the 
case with Haiti in 1825 and Colombia in 1834.79 A display of French power was 
intended to provide a salutary lesson to the continent as a whole. The then French 
foreign minister, Count Louis‐Mathieu Molé (1781‐1855), stated: “the future of 
France’s relations with the many states of Spanish American depend on the results 
of the course France has taken towards Mexico and the Republic of Argentina.”80 
This course began in 1838 with the blockade of Veracruz and Buenos Aires. 
Discussing French policy towards Mexico in 1838, an editorial in the semi‐official 
Orléanist newspaper the Journal des débats informed its readers that France no 
longer took up arms for conquest or ambition. Instead, its wars were in order to 
“uphold a great principle of the laws of nations, and to safeguard the interests of 
civilisation.”81  More cynical readers may have wondered exactly how blockading 
the Mexican coast and seizing the fortress of San Juan de Ulúa at Veracruz in order 
to extract an indemnity of 600,000 piastres and force Mexico to sign a treaty would 
advance the cause on civilisation, but French policymakers deployed a discourse of 
civilisation, a continuum with which to measure other states, which drove and 
legitimated intervention in the extra‐European world. This conception was most 
fully articulated by Guizot in lectures delivered at the Sorbonne between 1828 and 
1830.82  
For Guizot, civilisation was a “fact” and could be quantified by “its 
institutions, its commerce, its industry, its wars, all the details of its government”. 
Having considered these factors, the task was to “estimate them, judge them […] 
ask in what manner they have contributed to the civilisation of that nation [….] It is 
in this way that we not only form a complete idea of them, but measure and 
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appreciate their true value; they are, as it were, rivers, of which we ask what 
quantity of water it is they contribute to the ocean?”83 For French observers in the 
1830s, the “rivers” that made up civilisation in Latin America were running dry.84 
While there was a French discourse that depicted Mexico as part of a Latin 
civilisation that would naturally gravitate towards France, discussed in chapter 
three, this interpretation existed concurrently with negative views of Mexico as a 
backwards, unstable and semi‐civilised state that required firm action on the part of 
France to protect its interests. This was a point made by the Journal des débats, 
which argued that independence from Spain had resulted in regression. What the 
paper described as the perpetual state of anarchy in Latin America was not 
“favourable to the progress of civilisation”. Mexicans were “still childlike and 
barbarous”. This was a state of society was mirrored throughout Latin America and 
it was, therefore, necessary to treat these states as France treated the Ottoman 
Empire. Moreover, by upholding the principles of international law, French 
intervention would inculcate “civilisation” in Mexico.85  
The newspaper’s view was one shared by France’s minister to Mexico during 
the 1830s, Baron Antoine‐Louis Deffaudis (1786‐1869). He believed Mexico to be so 
politically fractious that it was impossible for them to “constitute themselves into 
an orderly and stable government.”86 The internal and external wars, parliamentary 
debates, administration, even the press, “everything […] in these new states is a 
bad parody of what occurs in Europe.”87 Deffaudis summarised what he understood 
as the main failing of French policy in a summary of relations with Mexico since 
1825: “[i]nstead of treating these ignorant, presumptuous, cowardly and arrogant 
people, without morals or probity, as one would handle […] badly raised children 
[…] we have treated the Mexicans like […] the civilised nations of Europe.”88 
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Deffaudis concluded that it was therefore necessary henceforth to treat Mexico as 
France treated the “Barbary states” or the “Turks” – with “force”.89 A similar 
narrative of superficially civilised or European society that masked barbarism was 
deployed by French diplomats in the River Plate.90 And the portrayal of Mexicans as 
infants was shared by Admiral Charles Baudin (1784‐1854), sent in 1838 to blockade 
Veracruz, and Baron Alleye de Cyprey (1784‐1858), Deffaudis’ successor in Mexico 
from 1840‐46.91 
However, Deffaudis’ equation of Mexico with the Ottoman Empire or the 
Dey of Algiers was at the nadir of his (and France’s) relations with the Mexican 
government in the 1830s. His representation of Mexico was not monolithic, nor was 
it entirely dismissive. He shared with many of his contemporaries the belief that it 
was drawn towards France by a shared culture. He also did not place Mexico 
entirely outside of civilisation: it was a “semi‐civilised” state.92 Similarly, for Guizot 
all the republics of “South America” were “semi‐barbarous”.93 In this view, these 
nations were at risk of becoming more barbaric because of corrupt administration, 
ill‐suited constitutions, the influence of the clergy (especially in Mexico), prejudice 
against European immigrants and restrictive tariffs on commerce, and the lack of 
the rule of law. However, with the right guidance these countries could be restored 
to civilisation. Moreover, it was not necessary for France to take on this burden 
itself because there were those who would do it for them: there were, in these 
republics, “many enlightened men”.94  
The second reason why Latin America was an area where it was supposed 
that French informal imperialism could be effective was the role of local elites, the 
“enlightened men”. The 1838 interventions hoped to combine naval power with 
parties sympathetic to France in order to procure French goals overseas. As Count 
Narcisse‐Achille de Salvandy (1795‐1856) made clear while defending government 
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policy in the Chamber of Deputies in 1839 there were in Latin America “parties 
which attach themselves to the politics and protection of France […] we want to be 
sure that these parties can be for us serious sources of support.”95 The most 
concerted enactment of this policy under the July Monarchy, which was continued 
by the Second Republic, was in the River Plate. Here, France backed one faction 
over another in a regional power struggle that lasted from 1838 to 1852. Space 
precludes detailed discussion of French imperialism in the River Plate,96 but policy 
will be briefly outlined and analysed below to demonstrate how the French 
discourse of European civilisation played out in practice.  
In the decade that followed independence in the former Spanish viceroyalty 
of Río de la Plata factions that coalesced around centralism and federalism 
competed for power. The former, known as the Unitarian Party, were defeated by 
supporters of federalism at Buenos Aires in 1829 and nationwide in 1831. 
Federalists were led by Juan Manuel de Rosas (1793‐1877), who, after defeating the 
Unitarians, became the authoritarian leader of the Argentine Confederation from 
1829 to 1852. His regime was considered by French policymakers to be hostile to 
foreigners, illiberal and contrary to French commercial interests because Rosas 
prohibited direct trade with the internal provinces of Argentina. As with various 
Mexican governments, Rosas had refused to negotiate a commercial treaty with 
France and French nationals suffered acts of violence and damage to property. 
France, therefore, presented Rosas with an ultimatum in 1837 demanding that 
French subjects be treated on the same terms as British subjects resident in 
Argentina. Rosas’ refusal of this ultimatum led to a naval blockade which lasted 
from 1838 to 1840. However, French intervention in the River Plate became part of 
a regional power struggle and internal civil war because French diplomatic agents, 
and policymakers in Paris, saw the divisions in Platine politics as a means to secure 
French policy aims. 
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Many of Rosas’ opponents not only supported French intervention, but had 
actively called for it. A large number of the leaders of the Unitarian Party had 
emigrated to Montevideo. Here they allied with a new generation of Argentines, 
ideologically opposed to Rosas and strongly influenced by French doctrinaire 
liberalism, who looked to the July Monarchy as a political model and French 
political culture for their own intellectual inspiration.97 For Guizot, it was clear 
where civilisation lay in this struggle: “there are two parties in South America, the 
European party and the American party […the European party] is made up of the 
most enlightened men, the most accustomed to European civilisation […] they want 
to assimilate America to Europe.” However, the American party was “tyrannical, 
violent and bloody” and “outside of civilisation”.98 In the hope of advancing French 
interests and protecting French nationals, France sided with the local elites of the 
“European party”.  
The plan was that aid to Rosas’ enemies would topple his regime and 
replace it with one sympathetic to France, or, at the very least, the pressure on 
Rosas would force him to concede to French demands. To achieve this, France gave 
leaders of the opposition to Rosas based at Montevideo diplomatic support and 
material aid. These individuals were “auxiliaries” (Guizot’s term) for France’s anti‐
Rosas policy.99 Guizot refused to go beyond this strategy and send a large French 
expeditionary force because he feared it would be drawn into the interior where 
they might encounter another Abd al‐Qādir (1808‐83), 100 who was tying down 
100,000 French troops in Algeria at the time.  
France also supported the government at Montevideo, which was itself 
besieged from 1843 to 1851 as part of a civil war which saw Rosas send Argentine 
troops to Uruguay in an attempt to dislodge the government there that supported 
his enemies and welcomed French intervention. However a reliance upon local 
elites combined with limited French support proved largely ineffectual. Despite a 
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second blockade of Buenos Aires in conjunction with Britain (1845‐47),101 a naval 
expedition down the Paraná River into the interior of Argentina (1846), a direct 
French subsidy to the government at Montevideo (1848‐52) and, finally, the 
garrison of the Uruguayan capital with French troops (1850‐52), French policy 
barely succeeded in maintaining the independence of Montevideo, let alone 
overthrowing Rosas or even coercing his government to accept French demands.  
French aims in the 1838 Mexican intervention were similar to those in the 
River Plate. However, in contrast to the 1862‐67 intervention France did not find 
obvious collaborators analogous to the Unitarian Party in the River Plate. 
Nonetheless, French observers viewed Mexican society through the prism of 
civilisation and attempted to forge links with factions within Mexico in order to 
further their aims. However, while in the River Plate intellectuals and politicians 
openly sided with French intervention, in Mexico all parties more or less rallied 
around the national government against France and, for French observers, it was 
less clear which faction in Mexico embodied civilisation.  
The difficulties France encountered in securing a treaty combined with the 
treatment of its nationals meant that French hostility developed towards those who 
held power in Mexico in the 1830s. During this decade, Mexican governments were 
generally composed of the conservative members of Mexico’s elite. They had 
become disillusioned with the federal 1824 Constitution and wished to create a 
more powerful executive, restrict the franchise and establish a centralised state. 
They achieved these reforms with the “Seven Laws” (discussed in more detail in 
chapter two) published in 1836 which replaced the existing constitution. The only 
government made up of Mexican liberals during the 1830s was a reformist 
administration with Santa Anna as nominal president, but run by his vice‐president 
Gómez Farías from 1833 to 1834. Liberals who supported federalism were thus out 
of power at the time French grievances increased against Mexico.  
It was not merely federalist opposition to the national government that led 
some French observers to favour their cause in Mexican politics. Liberal federalists 
were considered to be more sympathetic towards France, and closer to French 
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liberal values, than their conservative opponents. The Mexican liberal Mora, who 
after 1834 spent most of his life in Paris, argued that the French divided Mexican 
politics into two camps: “federalist” and “clerical”. They wished for the “reformist 
ideas” of the former to triumph not because they supported federal republicanism, 
“[in France] they love nothing but constitutional monarchy”, but because they 
sympathised with the federalist party which they saw as more tolerant of 
foreigners, and because of its “well known tendencies towards free trade” as well 
as freedom of worship.102  
Mora’s analysis was correct: many French observers tended to categorise 
conservative politicians as retrograde. The first administration of Anastasio 
Bustamante (1780‐1853), in which Alamán had significant influence, and which was 
in power 1830‐32, was described as “faithful in some ways to the old Spanish 
traditions” and looked to found its power “on the same bases of fanaticism [the 
Church and the military]”. One of the first French diplomatic agents wrote that the 
July Revolution “frightened” the men of this government because they feared that 
the “revolutionary torrent” would cross the ocean and be unleashed in Mexico.103 
According to another French diplomat, Bustamante’s ministers had heard of the 
overthrow of the Bourbons in France “with pain” because they wanted to destroy 
federalism and replace it with a kingdom ruled by a Spanish prince.104 The French 
foreign minister therefore looked forward to the overthrow of Bustamante’s regime 
because it would bring to power a government “less hostile to the principles of [the 
July Revolution].105  
                                                          
102 José Luis Mora to Gomez Farías, 20 May 1845, [B]enson [L]atin [A]merican [C]ollection, The 
University of Texas at Austin, Valentín Gómez Farías collection.  
103 Cochelet to foreign minister, 1 January 1832, AAE, CP Mexique, 7. 
104 Baron Jean‐Baptiste Louis Gros to Count Horace François Bastien Sébastiani de La Porta, 30 
August 1832. For similar views see Gros to Sébastiani, 13 February, 5 April, 5 June 1832, AAE, CP 
Mexique, 7. 
105 Sébastiani to Baron Gros, 4 March 1832. Tornel was pleased by the July Revolution. Tornel to 
Alamán, 19 and 28 September 1830, AHGE, Estados Unidos, L. 17; e.1. Alamán welcomed it insofar 
as it led to French recognition of Mexico and gave no indication of hostility towards it in his 
diplomatic correspondence. Alamán to Murphy, 29 September and 27 October 1830, Francia, L. 8; e. 
57, and L. 9; e. 73. 
  66 
Federalists were understood to be more favourably inclined towards 
France.106 Deffaudis reported back to Paris that “France is more in favour when [the 
federalists] are in power.” As with the River Plate, therefore, the conclusion was 
that the solution to French problems “would seem to depend on a change of 
government.”107 In contrast to the River Plate, however, French sympathy for a 
political faction did not develop into a long‐term relationship. Divisions within 
Mexican politics were exploited to further immediate French goals, but French 
attempts to co‐opt federalists were opportune and short‐lived. The leader of the 
French naval intervention, Baudin, was in communication with the leaders of 
federalism in Mexico. He maintained that he would not help the federalist cause 
because if it were associated with a foreign flag national opinion would rise against 
it. He did, however, argue that the fall of the present government and the 
proclamation of federalism would be a mutually beneficial outcome. In order to 
help bring about this state of affairs, Baudin lifted the blockade on ports controlled 
by federal forces in revolt against the government in Mexico City, such as Tampico. 
Baudin considered the federalist cause to be that of “liberty, unity, civilisation and 
progress” against the retrograde ideas of “priests and Spaniards”. Despite this 
admiration, his conclusion was that Mexico was not “advanced enough in political 
ideas to understand and appreciate the views of the federalists”.108  
In an account of the campaign published by one of his subordinates, the 
binary French image of Mexican politics was reinforced. There was the “party of the 
Church, strengthened by former Spaniards” and this “clerical‐Spanish party” 
wanted to see the establishment of a “monarchy more or less constitutional, less 
rather than more.” Those who fought for the reinstitution of the 1824 constitution 
and federalism proclaimed “strongly liberal ideas”, including freedom of worship. 
The head of this faction was Gomez Farías, “a man of talent and a constant 
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defender of the most advanced liberal ideas”. However, the author reiterated 
Baudin’s analysis that Mexico was not ready for such ideas. Furthermore, he 
summarised what was to become the dominant interpretation of the prospects for 
liberalism in Mexico. The members of the federal party may have been “the most 
enlightened” section of the population, but they were neither the most numerous, 
the richest nor the most influential, and against them were the Church and the 
great landowners. The conclusion was not promising: “[i]f there is a future [for the 
federalists], it does not seem likely it will arrive soon.”109  
The local situation in Mexico differed significantly from that of the River 
Plate, which meant that the strategy of supporting local elites in revolt against the 
national government did not develop into the kind of relationship France 
established with the Argentine Unitarian Party or Uruguayan liberals at 
Montevideo. First, there were fewer French nationals in Mexico than the River Plate 
(roughly 5,000 in Mexico compared with some 15,000 in Montevideo). 
Furthermore, in Mexico, these immigrants were not concentrated in one place, but 
spread throughout the country. Although French nationals in Mexico were 
threatened with expulsion, at Montevideo they were faced with an army of 
Argentine troops that from 1843 onwards besieged the city. Second, although the 
blockade of the Mexican coast caused significant economic problems for the 
Mexican government because of its dependence on customs revenue, pressure 
could not be put on Mexico City without an inland military expedition. It was 
argued that naval power was more effective in the River Plate because the two 
major cities, Montevideo and Buenos Aires, were ports.  
Third, Rosas’ regime was represented as barbarism incarnate, while the 
Unitarian liberals were seen as a viable alternative. In Mexico, by contrast, 
federalists were seen as enlightened, but impractical, while the Mexican 
government was not, unlike Rosas, irredeemable. Fourth, when Mexico declared 
war on France because of its naval action many federalists rallied to the national 
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cause, whereas in the River Plate opposition to Rosas openly welcomed French 
imperialism. Fifth and finally, the Mexican government, was willing to negotiate 
with France and eventually agreed to sign a convention regulating Franco‐Mexican 
relations until a permanent treaty was concluded as well as paying an indemnity of 
600,000 piastres. Although Rosas did sign a treaty with France, he later attempted 
to overthrow the French‐backed government at Montevideo, which led to the 
second French intervention in 1845. 
The success of the interventions discussed above was limited and they were 
widely criticised, not least by Thiers.110 But not because the policy was in itself 
considered flawed; rather, the support given to local elites and the military force 
sent to procure French goals was deemed to be insufficient. Deffaudis, who after 
serving in Mexico was appointed as minister to Buenos Aires and coordinated 
efforts against Rosas from 1845 to 1848, wrote “we conducted [the intervention] 
with such insufficient means that, far from remedying the evil, we only increased 
it”.111 The novelist Alexandre Dumas asked rhetorically whether French intervention 
in the River Plate was “anything other than the ineffective aid one brings to the 
mortally wounded?”112  
There was, however, no disagreement between those like Salvandy or 
Guizot who argued for a more limited deployment of resources, or those like Thiers, 
who wanted to see a greater commitment of men and money in the River Plate, 
over where civilisation lay. Thiers similarly understood the opponents of Rosas to 
be the “enlightened” party, while one of the earliest proponents of active French 
intervention in the region on a larger scale argued for it in the following terms: 
“when a revolution carries to power a party of […] more enlightened, more moral 
and more capable of […] re‐establishing the nation to prosperity would France be 
committing a great crime if it lent, in whatever it form it might take, serious and 
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disinterested support? Would it not be, on the contrary, the fulfilment of the duty 
imposed on [it] by superiority of power, of wisdom and of civilisation?”113  
One notable critic of Orléanist policy towards Mexico and Argentina was 
Louis‐Napoléon. In articles published in the Progrès du Pas-de-Calais the future 
emperor attacked the July Monarchy’s imperial projects. Were France in a “normal 
state” it could embrace the words of God: “increase and multiply”. It could say 
“traverse the seas, and everywhere you find a shore, continent, island or rock, 
plant, as a germ of a new civilisation, your intelligent and laborious race.” 
Unfortunately, France was not in a “normal state” and needed to concentrate, 
rather than disperse, its forces, otherwise the overseas possessions it did have 
would be a “cause of weakness”, not “prosperity.”  
There were only two motives to found colonies, Louis‐Napoléon argued: 
military and commercial. Vast swathes of Africa, Asia and America had been seized 
in order to found “satellite kingdoms” which were “producers and consumers for 
the metropole”. Colonies had also been established in order to “occupy strategic 
points, which, by their position, dominate the great commercial routes” and, in 
time of war, assured influence to the countries that possessed them. French 
expansion in the Pacific (the Marquesa Islands, Tahiti and the Society Islands were 
his examples) met none of these criteria and thus the government was spending 
“millions in order to establish onerous colonies”. Instead, France should 
concentrate its resources and look to develop Algeria and Guiana, which were “the 
sole and unique possessions which can truly be of great benefit to France”. 
However, rather than developing what it had, the French government preferred to 
“seize all the barren rocks that the other powers scorn.”114 
In this article Louis‐Napoléon largely echoed the ideas of Orléanist 
imperialism even if he criticised the practice. If France could afford it then the 
extension of French civilisation overseas was desirable, with a preference for 
strategic points on the globe that dominated commercial routes. These elements 
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would underpin his own imperial policies, while the designation of Guiana as an 
existing French colony of value showed his interest in the circum‐Caribbean.115 
Indeed, the importance he attached to Latin America is demonstrated by the fact 
that while he attacked Orléanist policy in the Pacific for diminishing the power of 
France, he condemned the government for not deploying sufficient resources in 
Mexico and the River Plate. France’s overseas military interventions had been 
counterproductive. They had done nothing but “give foreigners more and more 
striking proofs of the submission of the French government to their demands”. In 
this category he included expeditions to Lisbon in 1832 and Ancona in 1837, but it 
was Buenos Aires and Montevideo that best illustrated the impotence of the French 
government: Baudin’s forces, he argued, captured the fortress of San Juan de Ulúa, 
but they could not “profit from their victory because they did not have enough 
marines” to continue French operations inland. The result was a “weakening of our 
influence in [Mexico].” In the River Plate, Baron Ange René Armand de Mackau 
(1788‐1855), who had led the naval squadron that imposed the treaty recognising 
independence on Haiti, “trampled underfoot all French interests, and abandoned to 
the fury of a tyrant [Rosas] 15,000 of his compatriots” by negotiating with Rosas.116  
The debates over late 1830s and 1840s French intervention in Mexico and 
the River Plate informed later policy towards Mexico, not least because France did 
not withdraw militarily from Montevideo until 1852. Furthermore, the Second 
Republic seriously entertained a much greater military deployment, discussed in 
heated debates in the National Assembly where one of the great critics of Louis‐
Napoléon’s Mexican policy, Thiers, argued for a large expeditionary force to be 
sent. Opposing this idea was Louis‐Napoléon’s future minister of state, and the 
defender of French intervention in Mexico, Eugène Rouher (1814‐84).  
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Thiers had also been a consistent critic of what he understood to be Guizot’s 
pusillanimous policy towards Rosas at Buenos Aires. The irony was not lost on 
Rouher who, in a reply to an 1864 speech of Thiers that criticised the 1862‐67 
French intervention, quipped that he preferred Thiers’ language in 1844. Indeed, it 
is striking that Rouher used the exact same geostrategic rationale in his justification 
for intervention in Mexico as Thiers had used in 1850 to argue for intervention in 
the River Plate. Like Thiers, Rouher emphasised a global role for France: “[Louis‐
Napoléon] was the apostle of a daring, but far‐sighted and wise policy, [which] 
recognised that the balance of power in Europe is no longer […] on the Alps, the 
Pyrenees, or the Black Sea, but embraces the whole world, and that such great 
interests must be the object of France’s concern, however far it is necessary to go 
to protect them with the French flag.”117 Thiers’ opposition was based on the 
perceived impracticality of the policy, not the informal‐imperial ideas that lay 
behind it. In conversation with Nassau William Senior (1790‐1864) he remarked, “I 
believe that nothing but European intervention can save civilisation in Mexico. I 
should be glad to see Europe interfere […] for a joint purpose and at a joint 
expense. But that [only] France […] should send an army and a fleet for the purpose 
of raising an Austrian Archduke to a Mexican throne, is a madness which has no 
parallel since Don Quixote undertook the cause of the Princess Autonomasia 
[sic].”118  
French intervention in Mexico and the River Plate demonstrates that a 
shared discourse of European civilisation tied to the belief that limited military 
intervention combined with the support of local elites would secure French goals 
and develop French influence. The importance of this observation lies not only in 
the fact that this model underpinned French intervention in Mexico from 1862 to 
1867, but also that the limited results achieved by France from 1838 to 1852 in 
Latin America did not discredit the strategy: the conclusion of Louis‐Napoléon, and 
one shared by Thiers, was the policy had been badly executed.  
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For Thiers in the River Plate, and Louis‐Napoléon in Mexico, one of the key 
reasons for intervention was economic. It has already be seen that Latin America in 
general and Mexico specifically were important markets for France in the first 
decades after independence. Trade with Latin America increased in the following 
years and the expansion of the French economy between 1815 and 1870 focussed 
politicians’ attention on commerce and overseas markets. French economic growth 
was fairly consistent between 1815 and 1860: industrial output increased on 
average between 2.5 to 3 percent annually and total national income increased at 
roughly 2 percent.119 Furthermore, although France could not compete with Britain 
as an industrial nation, it was more industrialised than the majority of its European 
neighbours in the first half of the nineteenth century: 70 percent of its exports were 
manufactured goods and a similar proportion of its imports were primary 
commodities.120 French exports rose steadily throughout the period, but especially 
under the French Second Empire where they tripled in value between 1850 and 
1870 and the French share of global exports rose to fifteen percent.121 
Thiers linked commerce with military intervention and compared trade 
outside the French empire to colonial commerce in his arguments for further 
intervention in the River Plate. “Why”, he asked the National Assembly, “do you 
support the inconveniences of the colonial system and all the difficulties it entails 
and the […] enormous expenses [it involves]?” There was only one reason: 
“restricted shipping (navigation réservé)”. Yet, he continued, commerce with Latin 
America, which did not have this privilege, was more important to France than 
trade with its colonies.122 Thiers’ analysis was correct: taken individually countries 
like Mexico only made up a small percentage of French exports. However, as Table 
1 (on page 73) shows, taken collectively Latin American trade was as important a 
destination for French goods as the United States and second only to Britain. For 
the years 1849 to 1860,123 French exports to the United States accounted for 13.14 
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percent of the total and those to Latin American countries were slightly higher at 
13.99 percent (Britain was the highest at 21.16 percent). Latin America therefore 
had increased its share in the total volume of French export trade, while the United 
States’ had decreased, compared with the figures from 1827 to 1836. For those 
who argued, like Thiers, that this trade needed to be developed and protected by 
force, interventions were a logical, although not inevitable, outcome where threats 
were perceived.  
Table 1: Latin American, British and US share of French export trade by value (expressed in millions of francs).  
Year Total Exports 
(worldwide) 
United States Britain Latin America 
1849 1032.2 147.4 200.1 149.6 
1850 1123.6 177.9 225.6 140.2 
1851 946.6 134.3 277.9 193.8 
1852 1233.3 162.9 250.4 188.6 
1853 1363.2 216.5 317 180.7 
1854 1261.1 182.1 279.5 179.1 
1855 1441.7 203.8 250.9 202.6 
1856 1626.9 244.1 278.9 226.3 
1857 1640.3 198.8 291.5 255 
1858 1777.5 180 371.4 227.7 
1859 1998 245.5 474 240.5 
1860 2090.5 210.6 493.8 269.1 
Total 17534.9 2303.9 3711 2453.2 
Percentage of 
total 
 13.14 21.16 13.99 
Source: Compiled from ‘Tableau des exportations par pays de destination. Commerce special. (Valeurs 
exprimées en millions [francs,“valeurs officielles”]’ in Annuaire de l'ećonomie politique et de la statistique (Paris: 
H. Guillemin & Cie, 1847‐99) from the issues 1851 to 1862. 
As will be discussed in chapter three, some French policymakers, such as 
Guizot, Chevalier and Louis‐Napoléon, identified US expansion as the greatest 
threat to Latin American markets. All three saw Mexico as a geostrategic barrier to 
prevent US expansion, but it was also a fulcrum to protect and develop markets for 
French commerce and industry in the region: a gateway to Central and South 
                                                          
Between 1861 and 1867 Latin America’s share of the total volume of French imports and exports 
increased. The statistics are taken annually from Annuaire de l'ećonomie politique et de la statistique 
(Paris: H. Guillemin & Cie, 1847‐99) from the issues 1848 to 1869. By Latin America it is meant all 
countries listed in the journal’s tables that are part of this area today, which are the following (these 
names are those used by the Annuaire translated into English – not the present day equivalents): 
Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Chile, the River Plate, Uruguay, New Granada, Venezuela, Cayenne / French 
Guiana, Haiti, Guatemala, Ecuador, Bolivia, Martinique, Guadeloupe, Dutch, Spanish and Danish 
Possessions in the Americas (three separate categories). 
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America. Moreover, it occupied an important place within Chevalier’s Saint‐
Simonian worldview which saw communications as central to the development of 
global commerce. Chevalier initially argued for an interoceanic canal through 
Panama, while Louis‐Napoléon identified Nicaragua as the most promising site. The 
arguments for both locations outlined the civilisational advances such a project 
would bring.124 The identification of Mexico or Central America as a key point of 
commerce fits into the general pattern of French imperialism during the period 
under study, which was concerned with developing and protecting French trade 
across the globe. The semi‐official Le Mémorial diplomatique noted the continuities 
between the policies of Louis‐Napoléon and Guizot. An editorial argued, quoting 
Guizot directly, that Rouher’s defence of Louis‐Napoléon’s Mexican intervention 
reminded the author of Guizot: both understood that in order to develop and 
protect commerce it was necessary for a French navy to have posts in the “great 
commercial regions” of the world in order to advance French interests.125 In this 
context, where the French Second Empire favoured free trade and concentrated its 
imperial activities in Egypt, Indochina and Mexico, imperial policy does not seem 
quite so incoherent or bereft of ideas as some historians have alleged. 
France’s ability to act on a global scale was predicated on its powerful navy. 
After 1815 naval revival began in France under the Bourbon Restoration, but it was 
during the July Monarchy that it was greatly expanded. In 1846 the Chamber of 
Deputies voted to provide an additional thirteen million francs above the normal 
budget for naval construction for a period of seven years, but even before this 
extraordinary increase in funding France had a navy that could be deployed across 
the globe and came second only to Britain in its overseas reach.126 Latin America 
was a region within which France could deploy its forces in pursuit of its interests 
                                                          
124 Michel Chevalier, L'Isthme de Panama, examen historique et géographique des différentes 
directions suivant lesquelles on pourrait le percer et des moyens à y employer, suivi d'un aperçu sur 
l'isthme de Suez (Paris: C. Gosselin, 1844); Louis‐Napoléon Bonaparte, Canal of Nicaragua, or a 
Project to Connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans by Means of a Canal (London: Mills and Son, 
1846). Mexico’s position between two oceans formed part of Chevalier’s argument for its economic 
potential and he hoped that a canal, certainly a railroad, could be built across the Isthmus of 
Tehuantepec. Chevalier, Le Mexique, 445‐47. 
125 ‘Politique – Bulletin de la semaine’, Le Mémorial diplomatique, pp. 65‐66. 
126 Hamilton, Anglo-French Naval Rivalry, 36‐37. 
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because, far from seeing these interests as a threat, British policymakers believed 
they converged with Britain’s own commercial and strategic goals. 
IV 
The Anglo-French Partnership 
Thus the fourth and final factor that made Latin America a focus for French 
imperialism was that from 1830 to 1867 France could prosecute its interests 
through military intervention in the region without British opposition, and, at times, 
with active British support. This had not been the case In the 1820s when Britain 
opposed French plans to support Ferdinand VII’s attempted re‐conquest of his 
former colonies. Chateaubriand made this clear: “[The Holy Alliance], which makes 
so much noise about its theories [legitimacy], would not support [France] if we 
wished to sustain those theories by armed force against England. The Spanish 
colonies will therefore leave the motherland”.127 As the Polignac Memorandum 
(1823) demonstrates further, France remained in a subordinate position to Britain 
globally: it could only act unilaterally as long as Britain acquiesced.  
With the fall Charles X, and thus the end of the Bourbon Family Compact, 
French governments lost any interest in intervening in Latin America to support 
Spanish reconquest. Therefore Britain’s principal objection to French policy in Latin 
America was removed. Moreover, despite the narrative of Anglo‐French rivalry, and 
the habitual upsurge in anti‐British public opinion,128 French foreign policy after the 
fall of the Bourbon Restoration, and especially from 1840 to 1870, was generally 
directed by Anglophile statesmen. Guizot and Louis‐Napoléon wished for a cordial 
relationship with Britain which would avoid hostilities.129 Britain never went to war 
against France after 1815; only with it, notably in the Crimea and the Second Opium 
War for the period under study. 
In Latin America the relationship varied between formal arrangements and 
informal cooperation. For example, in the River Plate, a joint expedition blockaded 
                                                          
127 Franco̧is‐René de Chateaubriand, Congrès de Veŕone. Guerre d'Espagne. Neǵociations: Colonies 
espagnoles, 2 vols. (Paris: Delloye, 1838), II, 351. 
128 Robert Tombs, That Sweet Enemy: The French and the British from the Sun King to the Present 
(London: Pimlico, 2007), ch. 7 and 8. 
129 See Roger Bullen, Guizot, Palmerston and the Breakdown of the Entente Cordiale (London: 
Athlone Press, 1974) and Price, The French Second Empire, ch. 13. 
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Buenos Aires from 1845 until 1847. Britain was also a participant in the Tripartite 
Convention of 1861 that was a prelude to the French intervention.130 Britain and 
France cooperated in their attempts to prevent the annexation of Texas (1844‐5). 
The French and British legations frequently worked together in Mexico to place 
more pressure on the Mexican government to support their nationals’ claims, lower 
tariffs or protest against the imprisonment or murder of their subjects, and they 
frequently shared information sent from London or Paris. Beyond this open 
collaboration, Britain allowed France a free hand in Mexico and the River Plate: it 
did not oppose France’s interventions in 1838 and it did nothing to prevent the 
establishment of the Second Mexican Empire. 
This partnership was based on a commonality of interests. Britain wanted 
broadly liberal (on economic and religious matters) and stable governments in Latin 
America that encouraged trade and protected foreign nationals and their business 
interests. French policy was seen as a means to achieve these goals. Thus the British 
chargé d’affaires to Mexico wrote to Viscount Palmerston (1784‐1865) as regards 
the impending 1838 French blockade that “British interests will rather reap 
advantage than suffer injury” because it would “undeceive the Mexicans as to the 
power […] of other countries to enforce the observances of international law and 
conventions as regards to foreigners.”131 Britain had numerous grievances against 
the Mexican government, from the default on its loans raised in the 1820s to the 
destruction of property of various British mining companies and forced loans on 
British nationals.132 In short, it was hoped that a display of French naval power 
would compel the Mexican government to treat British interests with more respect 
in the future, and the British diplomat understood Mexico’s refusal to accept 
France’s ultimatum as “a temerity amounting almost to insanity, and ascribable to 
recklessness inspired by long impunity.”133 Lord Palmerston agreed with his chargé 
d’affaires and instructed him to “use your best endeavours to induce the Mexican 
                                                          
130 See Bock, Prelude to Tragedy. 
131 Ashburnham to Palmerston, 30 November 1837, disp., 63 marked ‘confidential’, FO 50/107. 
132 Examples are numerous, see Wellington to Pakenham, 17 March 1835, FO 50/90; Pakenham to 
Wellington, 8 March 1835, disp. 10; FO 50/91 and Palmerston to Pakenham, 15 November 1836, 
disp., 26, FO 50/97. 
133 Ashburnham to Palmerston, 7 November 1837, disp., 57, FO 50/107. 
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government to come to an amicable agreement with that of France.”134 It was the 
British minister plenipotentiary, Sir Richard Pakenham (1797‐1868), who negotiated 
the peace treaty between Mexico and France in 1839.135 
Palmerston followed the same course in the River Plate, although the length 
of the French blockade and its consequently greater deleterious effect on British 
trade meant that he put pressure on the French government to come to terms with 
Rosas short of their original demands. However, this was not because he disagreed 
with French naval intervention, but because this policy had failed. In 1839, 
Palmerston had urged the British minister at Buenos Aires to “persuade [the 
Argentine government] to accede without further delay to the demands made upon 
them by the government of France.” For Palmerston, French complaints were “not 
wholly destitute of foundation” and it was necessary to point out to Rosas “how 
vain it [was] to resist successfully so great a power as France.”136  
In 1843, the then British foreign secretary, Lord Aberdeen (1784‐1860), was 
similarly favourably disposed towards French interests and expressed his surprise to 
Robert Peel (1788‐1850) that the French had not been more aggressive. He could 
not “understand why the French have not been more desirous of interference [….] 
Their interest in the war, from the many thousands of French settled at 
Montevideo, must be very great”.137 Both Britain and France wished for peace in 
the region and the independence of Uruguay. Furthermore, French success could 
lead to the liberalisation of Argentine markets: British policymakers saw France not 
as a rival, but as a power pursuing a course congruous to Britain’s own interests. 
These shared foreign policy goals explain the Anglo‐French intervention 
(1845‐47) in the River Plate. As has been described above, the River Plate was in a 
state of near‐constant civil war and one of the aims of joint expedition was to end 
these conflicts, partially for humanitarian reasons and the protection of nationals, 
but also because war impeded commerce. The blueprint for British policy was 
outlined in James Murray’s 1841 ‘Memorandum on Trade’. For Murray, the export 
                                                          
134 Palmerston to Ashburnham, 15 September 1838, disp., 35, FO 50/112. 
135 Pakenham to Palmerston, 24 March 1839, disp., 22, FO 50/124. 
136 Palmerston to Mandeville, 6 February 1839, FO 6/68. 
137 Aberdeen to Peel, 27 November 1843, British Library, Peel Papers, Add MS 40454. 
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of industrial machinery to Europe was detrimental to Britain as the industrialisation 
of Europe would undermine Britain’s leading position as an exporter of 
manufactured goods. It was therefore reasonable to look “to the means of 
extending British trade with other parts of the globe.” Murray believed that Latin 
America would compensate for the loss of European trade, but the constant state 
of warfare prevented it from realising its potential. The solution was British 
interference in the affairs of Latin American states “on account of self‐interest, and 
as a means of self‐preservation”. Murray identified Uruguay as a paradigmatic case 
where British intervention could reap significant benefits. If Britain “would protect 
Montevideo against the animosity and rancorous spirit of [Rosas]” then it could 
secure, on the best of terms, its “subjects and commerce in the region”.138 The 
position of the British government over French intervention was that if France 
could secure these terms for Britain then so much the better.  
As has been noted, the 1861 Tripartite Convention launched a joint British, 
French and Spanish expedition to Mexico to demand that Juárez revoke the 
suspension of foreign payments. Britain refused to militarily support Louis‐
Napoléon’s intervention inland and withdrew its forces as soon as it became clear 
that French troops would march into the interior.139 Nonetheless, Palmerston did 
give unofficial approval. He wrote privately to Lord Russell (1792‐1878), then 
foreign secretary, outlining his view: “we should be glad if Mexico converted into a 
settled and well‐ordered monarchy; and that we should raise no objection to it 
being guaranteed by France”, a position he reiterated a month later.140 Palmerston 
went as far as preventing Russell from sending a dispatch to Austria that 
discouraged Maximilian accepting the Mexican throne: “as to the question as to 
whether it would be advantageous or not for us and for Europe generally that 
Mexico should be governed by monarch instead of being prey to republican 
anarchy I conceive that there cannot be any doubt Mexican monarchy would be 
advantageous to all nations having commercial relations with Mexico.” As regards 
France he continued, “though systematically and on national principles jealous of 
                                                          
138 James Murray, ‘Memorandum on British Trade’, 31 December 1841, FO 97/284. 
139 Russell to Wyke, 30 April 1862, disp., 52, FO 50/363. 
140 Palmerston to Russell, 13 August 1863; Palmerston to Russell, 11 September 1863, PRO 30/22/22.  
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the ambitious policy of France I feel no jealousy as to the proceedings of France in 
Mexico.”141 Just as in 1838 and 1845, Palmerston understood that France would not 
annex any territory, but it would attempt to impose settlements, or, in the case of 
Maximilian, create governments, that were compatible with British interests. 
Where these interests converged, as in Mexico and the River Plate, France and 
Britain’s relationship was one of imperial condominium.  
Conclusion 
French imperialism from 1815 to 1870, far from lacking a coherent doctrine, 
was founded upon liberal economic principles and favoured the promotion of 
French civilisation and the expansion of French commerce through a preference for 
informal influence over annexation. In this period, French overseas trade remained 
on an upward trajectory while its navy expanded. Algeria was seen as an 
exceptional case, and formal colonialism was to be avoided elsewhere on the globe, 
but it was a widely held view that French political, economic and cultural influence 
should be extended by informal means wherever possible and its strategic interests 
defended. These basic doctrines were shared in parliament by influential 
intellectuals and politicians such as Constant, Guizot and Thiers, all of whom 
considered themselves part of the “liberal project of representative government” 
supposedly opposed to imperialism. Louis‐Napoléon expressed similar views in the 
1840s and acted upon them later as emperor. The disagreements between Thiers 
and Guizot, or Thiers and Louis‐Napoléon, were not whether France should be an 
imperial power, merely where and how it should be an imperial power. 
That Latin America, and Mexico in particular, was a significant focus of 
French imperialism is explained by the following four factors. First, it was region of 
imagined, potential and real wealth. Mexico went into prolonged recession after 
the wars of independence. Precious metal production declined, as did its exports to 
France, but its famed riches under Spanish rule were reinforced by the popularity of 
Humboldt’s work and by writers who followed him, particularly Chevalier. It was, 
therefore, expected that with stability economic prosperity would return. A 
comparison was often made with Brazil. French exports to this monarchy had risen 
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from 20.7 million francs in 1849 to 53.4 million in 1860, whereas in republican 
Mexico, torn by civil war, French exports fell from 20.2 million to 12.3 million francs 
for the same years.142 Finally, Mexico’s strategic position across trade routes 
combined with its proximity to the United States ensured that it was seen as a vital 
area to prevent US expansion and to protect commerce with Latin America, which, 
as has been seen, was as important in terms of volume of exports as French trade 
with the United States. 
Second, like many places in the extra‐European world, Mexico was 
understood to be “semi‐civilised”; authority was not legitimately constituted. In the 
civilisational worldview of French policymakers intervention was a logical choice to 
shape Mexico in France’s image. However, what set Mexico (and the River Plate) 
apart, the third factor, was that imperialism could be prosecuted through local 
elites who sympathised with French political culture and French models of 
government, thus avoiding another colonial entanglement such Algeria and, it was 
hoped, advancing French goals relatively inexpensively. Latin America was not 
outside of civilisation, it was Catholic and its elites were steeped in Spanish political 
traditions and many were admirers of European, particularly French intellectuals, 
and they looked to European political and economic models which influenced their 
own visions for the emerging nation states. As a consequence, much greater 
autonomy, within the confines of imperial relationships, could be granted to those 
politicians who were willing to work with France than would have been afforded in 
Africa or Asia.  
Political conflicts in Mexico saw competing factions contest power and this 
meant that France could support one over another in times of civil war in order to 
further French ambitions. This was the case in 1838‐39 and 1862‐67. It was also 
true in the River Plate from 1838 to 1852 where the same strategy of supporting 
one faction over another was employed to secure French goals. Far from 
discrediting this policy, many critics concluded that its limited success was a 
consequence of insufficient forces. In essence, politicians such as a Thiers or Louis‐
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Napoléon agreed with the maxim that the efficiency of informal empire is 
proportionate to the amount of “wealth and power” committed to it.143  
The fourth and final factor was that the French conception of civilisation, 
and the interventions which were predicated upon it, was congruous with British 
interests. Furthermore, because French imperialism did not aim at territorial 
acquisition, Britain did not consider it a strategic threat. France, after 1830, could 
rely on British acquiesce and, more often than not, open cooperation and support. 
However, Britain, unlike France, was unwilling to commit forces on the scale of 
France. Aberdeen made it clear that “if I had twenty‐thousand British troops to 
spare, I would not send one of them [to the River Plate].”144 Britain disapproved of 
Rosas’ government, but this was “not sufficient reason to attempt his 
overthrow.”145 Similarly, while Palmerston sympathised with the French creation of 
the Mexican Second Empire, he ruled out any military commitment on the part of 
Britain to support it.  
France, therefore, and much more than Britain, intervened in the internal 
politics of Latin American states in order to further geopolitical and geostrategic 
goals, develop its commerce and promote French interests. In part this policy can 
be explained by the fact that French observers described a system of informal 
influence they believed Britain to have attained and urged France to secure a 
similar position. However, unlike Britain, they encouraged non‐economic 
(monarchy, pan‐Latinism and shared religion, open and partisan collaboration with 
local elites and intervention) means alongside commerce and finance in order to 
achieve it. This method of informal imperialism required collaborating elites and 
the subsequent chapters will explore the economic, political and cultural 
relationship between France and Mexico which not only gave Louis‐Napoléon the 
opportunity to fashion Mexico in the image of the French Second Empire, but, more 
importantly, led many members of the Mexican elite to embrace French 
imperialism as the only means by which Mexico itself could be saved from 
destruction. The Second Mexican Empire was, of course, a monarchy, and an 
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appreciation of the existence of a shared Franco‐Mexican discourse of monarchism, 
discussed in the next chapter, is essential to understand why supporters of 
Maximilian did not believe, as Thiers did, that their cause was a quixotic madness. 
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Chapter Two 
“Republics Descend into the Bloodiest Anarchy”:1 Monarchy and the Search for 
Order in Mexico 
 
Writing six months after the execution of Maximilian, the Emperor’s former 
minister to Paris and one of the most ardent supporters of monarchy in Mexico, 
José Manuel Hidalgo y Esnaurrízar (1826‐96), wrote: “[a] great enterprise has failed. 
But the catastrophe with which it ended does nothing to undermine the greatness 
of the [monarchical] system.” The Second Mexican Empire “had been defeated in 
the realm of facts, but not in the realm of justice or reason”. Hidalgo’s conclusion, 
that monarchy remained theoretically the best form of government for Mexico, 
despite its disastrous denouement in 1867, is illustrative of one of the central 
features of support for monarchy: the sheer persistence of the idea. 
After the fall of Iturbide, monarchy was only ever supported by a small 
section of the Mexican elite. As the foundation of a kingdom in Mexico lay at the 
heart of the French intervention in Mexico this fact has been cited as yet more 
proof of Louis‐Napoléon’s delusions.2 However, rather than dismissing monarchism 
in Mexico as inconsequential because it lacked widespread support, it may be more 
helpful to ask: why monarchism persisted in the minds of some influential Mexican 
politicians as the solution to the problems faced by Mexico after independence? 
After all, support for monarchy as a political system within which to achieve 
independence or autonomy from Spain was common to all Latin American 
countries; however, certainly by the 1860s, no other nation had politicians lobbying 
European governments for spare princes and princesses to replace republics with 
empires. Mexico was unique in that one of its foremost intellectuals, Alamán, tried 
to found a monarchy in 1846; its most powerful caudillo, Santa Anna, sounded out 
European courts over the same possibility in 1854 while he was president; and in 
1863 a former presidential candidate and a leading Mexican diplomat, Juan 
Nepomuceno Almonte (1803‐69), headed a regency government in preparation for 
the Second Mexican Empire, which he, amongst others, had called for. 
                                                          
1 Quote taken from ‘Gobierno’, El Sol (Mexico City), 27 April 1822, p. 182. 
2 Delmon, ‘Les acteurs de la politique impériale’, 77‐78. 
  84 
Monarchy, then, clearly mattered to some people. But the question remains 
why? The defeat of the Mexican Second Empire and the triumph of liberalism 
resulted in the reification of federal republicanism and obscured alternative 
political visions for the Mexican nation. However, as O’Gorman has argued, 
monarchy remained a viable option for political elites throughout the period 1820‐
67.3 Nonetheless, it was not the case that there was a monarchist party which 
consistently advocated for a monarchy throughout the period. Rather, monarchy 
was embraced at different times and by different people from different political 
backgrounds. In order to help explain why this was the case, section I of this 
chapter will address the legacy of the First Mexican Empire and the anti‐federal and 
anti‐republican arguments made in the early 1820s. Section II explores the 
endurance of these ideas in the 1830s, the attempts of conservative politicians to 
adapt monarchical constitutional theory within a republican framework and finally 
the monarchical proposals made in 1840 by the Mexican politician Gutiérrez de 
Estrada (1800‐67). 
A key reason why monarchy remained a viable option in Mexico was 
support for it in Europe. As will be discussed, the end of the First Mexican Empire 
did not discredit the idea of monarchy in Mexico, merely that a Mexican could be a 
monarch. Therefore monarchism in Mexico had an inherently transnational 
dimension: in order to establish an independent Mexican monarchy a European 
prince had to be found willing to take the throne, which in turn required a 
minimum level of European support. At the very least, a monarchy in Mexico would 
need the acceptance of whatever ruling house the monarch was chosen from and 
the consent of the major maritime powers of Europe. Mexican monarchists 
procured this diplomatic and material assistance twice (once in 1845‐46 and again 
with the second French intervention). This was possible because monarchism in 
Mexico had evolved as a shared and mutually constituted transnational discourse 
with contributions from Mexican and European, particularly French, thinkers. 
Indeed, the idea that the political problems of Latin American states stemmed from 
a renunciation of monarchical principles and the adoption of overly democratic 
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republicanism in nations that were not ready for such systems was widely held in 
monarchical Britain, Spain and France. Finally, a monarchy in Mexico was 
understood in geopolitical and imperial terms: it would further the interests and 
influence of the European power that created it. Section III will, therefore, explore 
European, especially French, views on monarchy in Mexico and how they were 
shaped by events in Mexico.  
I 
“A Throne that was Subject to Ridicule from its Inception”4 
The First Mexican Empire and the Legacy of Iturbide 
 Writing in 1857 the French minister to Mexico, Alexis de Gabriac (1811‐90), 
wondered “[w]hat to make of a people who have as the first of their heroes a man 
whom they shot?”5 In his question Gabriac had identified one of the great 
dilemmas in Mexican historical interpretation: in order to celebrate federal 
republicanism, it was necessary to denigrate the First Mexican Empire, whose 
emperor, Iturbide, was executed in 1824 despite the fact that Mexico gained its 
independence under his regime. According to Alamán, who was not himself a 
supporter of Iturbide, history had been reordered to the point whereby “the same 
generation that witnessed [Mexican independence] was able to be fooled in such a 
way that it came to believe the opposite of what it saw.”6 
In order to appreciate what Alamán meant, it is worth recalling that 
Mexico’s struggle for independence was fractious, often contradictory and resistant 
to simple schematic interpretation.7 The insurgent movement led by Miguel Hidalgo 
y Costilla (1753‐1811), a parish priest who issued the Grito de Dolores on 16 
September 1810, was seen by much of the creole elite as an insurrection dangerous 
to social order and thus rallied behind the Spanish government to defeat it. Hidalgo 
was executed in 1811, but the revolt continued under the leadership of another 
priest, José María Morelos (1765‐1815), who was executed in 1815. Iturbide, a 
creole officer in the Spanish royal army, fought against Hidalgo and Morelos 
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because, he argued, they were “a lawless band who harassed the country”, not in 
order to win independence but “to exterminate all the Europeans, to destroy their 
possessions, and to trample on the laws of war, humanity and religion”,8 a view 
echoed by Alamán.9  
Those creoles that did fight for independence prior to 1821, notably 
Mexico’s first president Guadalupe Victoria (1786‐1843), were as much opposed to 
the French usurpation of the Spanish crown in 1808 as they were in favour of 
independence. Constitutional liberals such as Zavala or Gómez Farías urged 
cooperation with the Spanish government after the proclamation of the liberal 
Spanish Constitution of 1812 in the peninsula, and during its forcible reinstatement 
in 1820. They initially favoured self‐government within the Spanish Empire, only 
opting for independence when it became clear that Ferdinand VII was not prepared 
to tolerate greater autonomy in the Americas. Finally, conservative sections of 
Mexican society, especially the army and the high clergy, were alarmed by the anti‐
corporatist direction of Spanish liberalism and began to see independence as the 
best means to prevent its implementation in Mexico.10  
It is with this last group that Iturbide is traditionally, if not wholly accurately, 
identified. Fearful for the fueros of the army and the church, many Spanish and 
creole elites in Mexico, who had previously supported Ferdinand VII, came to 
embrace the separatist cause, as exemplified by Iturbide’s dramatic transition from 
royalist soldier to liberator of the nation, announced by his Plan of Iguala on 24 
February 1821. This document was able to unite Mexicans of differing views behind 
the three guarantees of religion, independence and unity. Aside from the 
declaration of independence from Spain, the key points of the plan were: 
Catholicism as the sole state religion to the exclusion of all others; a constitutional 
monarchy under Ferdinand VII, one of his relatives or a monarch from another 
ruling house; and citizenship for all the inhabitants of the Mexican kingdom. These 
promises would be upheld by the Army of the Three Guarantees, led by Iturbide, 
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which entered Mexico City on 27 September 1821.11 The Treaty of Córdoba, signed 
on 24 August 1821 by the newly arrived viceroy Juan O'Donojú, reaffirmed the Plan 
of Iguala, although it was never ratified by Spain.12 Mexico thus achieved 
independence as a monarchy, albeit without a monarch. 
This has often been viewed as a conservative path to independence: “an act 
of counterrevolution”.13 However, Ferdinand VII refused to countenance the Plan of 
Iguala. The solution of Iturbide and his supporters was that he become emperor 
himself, but his nomination as emperor had been proposed by Gomez Farías, who 
went on to become the leader of the puro wing of liberalism in Mexico, and was 
initially supported by Zavala, later one of the most radical liberals of his generation. 
In short, the First Mexican Empire was neither liberal nor conservative, but rather 
represented a brief moment of consensus in Mexican politics, which was in favour 
of an autonomous or independent Mexico governed by a constitutional monarch. 
As Zavala later wrote, “Republican ideas were in their infancy: all seemed content 
with a constitutional monarchy”. Zavala concluded that he did not know at the time 
“what was the [form of government] best suited to a new nation that neither had 
republican nor monarchical habits. All were to be trials and experiments until a 
form was found suitable […] to the needs of the nation.”14   
Indeed opposition to the First Mexican Empire initially came not from 
liberals but from conservative politicians, known at the time as Bourbonists.15 This 
group included men such as Alamán and Francisco Sánchez de Tagle (1782‐1847) 
                                                          
11 ‘Plan de independencia de la América Septentrional Iguala, 24 de Febrero de 1821’ printed in 
Porrúa, Documentos, 200‐3. 
12 Anna, The Mexican Empire, 10‐11; Jaime Rodriguez, "We Are Now the True Spaniards" 
Sovereignty, Revolution, Independence, and the Emergence of the Federal Republic of Mexico, 1808–
1824 (Stanford: University Press, 2012), 257‐66. 
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Latin American Studies, 1985), 56. Florencia Mallon calls it a “conservative declaration of 
independence”, ‘Indigenous Peoples and Nation‐States in Spanish America, 1780‐2000’ in Moya, 
Oxford Handbook of Latin American, 285.  
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(Paris: P. Dupont and G. Laguionie, 1831), I, 172‐73. 
15 Rodriguez prefers the term “autonomists” to make clear that this group did not support Spanish 
colonial rule, but rather autonomy within the Spanish empire and later independence under a 
constitutional monarchy headed by a Spanish prince, True Spaniards, 273. 
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and centred around José María Fagoaga (1764‐1837), whose family was one of the 
wealthiest and most influential in Mexico. Bourbonists did not support Iturbide’s 
assumption of the crown and viewed this ‘usurpation’ as one of the causes of his 
downfall. Instead of a Mexican emperor, they favoured a Spanish prince.16 In the 
Spanish parliament they put forward their proposal for greater American 
autonomy. The plan divided Spanish America into three kingdoms (New Spain and 
Guatemala; New Granada; and Peru, Chile and Buenos Aires), and called for a 
Spanish infante, or someone appointed by Ferdinand VII, to rule them while 
retaining close ties to Spain. Essentially, it was an argument for a commonwealth 
and Canada’s relationship with Britain was cited as an example.17  
Bourbonists thus initially supported the Plan of Iguala, which called for 
exactly this, but it did not follow that they supported Iturbide once he became 
emperor. For conservative Mexican politicians and intellectuals, the legacy of the 
First Mexican Empire was threefold. First, Iturbide’s entry at the head of the Army 
of Three Guarantees on 27 September 1821 provided a good alternative date for 
the national commemoration for independence in contradistinction to the Grito de 
Dolores of 16 September 1810. The former signified ordered transition while the 
latter represented social revolution.18 Second, the Plan of Iguala was upheld as the 
foundational document upon which Mexican independence should have been 
constituted. This plan made no reference to a Mexican empire under a Mexican 
emperor. Rather, monarchy should have been established under a European prince. 
The plan had therefore been corrupted and worse, third, its non‐fulfilment resulted 
in the adoption of a federal republican constitution in 1824, a system which 
conservatives understood as inimical to Mexico’s political traditions and a root 
                                                          
16 Alamán, Historia de México, V, 427‐28; 449‐51; 458; 541; Doris Ladd, The Mexican Nobility at 
Independence, 1780-1826 (Austin: Institute of Latin American Studies, the University of Texas, 1976), 
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18 The conservative view of 27 September is discussed by Rodríguez Piña, ‘Conservatives Contest the 
Meaning of Independence’, 1846– 1855’. See also Christon Archer, ‘Death’s Patriots – Celebration, 
Denunciation, and Memories of Mexico’s Independence Heroes: Miguel Hidalgo, José María 
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cause of subsequent political instability. In short, Iturbide was a figurehead for the 
Plan of Iguala, who, once he became emperor, was a traitor to his own plan and 
responsible for the failure of the First Mexican Empire. Moreover, the ideal of 
constitutional monarchy under a European ruler was untarnished because it had 
never been implemented. 
This legacy meant that the federal and republican 1824 Constitution was 
viewed with suspicion by former Bourbonists, suspicions which were increased 
because of the association of the new constitution with the model of the United 
States. There were good historical reasons as to why a federal republic emerged 
from the debris of Iturbide’s empire.19 And it has been shown that the intellectual 
genealogy of the Mexican 1824 Constitution was primarily the Spanish Constitution 
of 1812 rather than that of the United States.20 It has been further argued that 
Mexicans, such as Alamán, who claimed the 1824 Constitution was in part based on 
the US one, were politically motivated and distorted the facts to undermine a 
system they criticised.21 However, while much of the 1824 Constitution was indeed 
transcribed from the Spanish Constitution of 1812, article four certainly was not: 
“The Mexican nation adopts for its government a representative, popular, federal 
republic.”22 Therefore, for opponents of the 1824 Constitution, the classical Spanish 
liberal tradition which inspired the document was somewhat irrelevant because the 
principal innovations were republicanism and federalism. The newspaper El 
Federalista may have carried histories of German, Swiss and Dutch federalism,23 but 
there was only one model in the Americas that had successfully enacted this form 
                                                          
19 See Rodriguez, True Spaniards, 325‐34 and Nettie Lee Benson, The Provincial Deputation in 
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of government: the United States. And it was not merely conservative critics who 
made the link between US federal republicanism and the 1824 Constitution, it was 
one made by its supporters as well. It was the US model that one of Mexico’s first 
republicans, Servando Teresa de Mier (1765‐1827), pointed towards.24 
Furthermore, prior to the ratification of the constitution, the Mexican Congress 
cited George Washington as the example to follow.25 And in a manifesto to the 
people the new president, Guadalupe Victoria, quoted part of Washington’s 
‘Circular to the States’ of 1783, concluding that it “summarised in a few words the 
elements of our social organisation.”26 
Mexico may have become a federal republic because of the failure of 
monarchy combined with long‐term historical factors that favoured federalism over 
centralism, rather than because of deliberate imitation of the United States, but 
this conclusion of twentieth‐century historians was not the analysis of Mexican 
critics in the 1820s. This is important because the conviction that federal 
republicanism was at best a pale imitation of the US Constitution, or, at worst, a 
deliberate imposition by Washington, and, either way, entirely unsuited to Mexico, 
lay at the heart of conservative attacks on Mexican liberalism and its constitutional 
ideas throughout the period under study. One of the earliest proponents of this 
argument was the newspaper El Sol, which was the principal paper of the 
Bourbonists from 1821 to 1822. It ceased publication during the empire of Iturbide 
and was refounded in 1823 as the organ of conservative elements of Mexican 
politics. Alongside its rival, El Aguila Mexicana, it was the most important and 
influential daily in Mexico City in the 1820s.27 The anti‐federal and anti‐republican 
arguments made in El Sol are worth discussing in detail because they laid out many 
of the central tenets of later conservative polemics against these systems. 
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 Long before a federal republic was widely discussed in public discourse as a 
possibility, El Sol ran a series of articles between 1821 and 1822 analysing the best 
form of government for Mexico. According to the editorials of the paper, and 
echoing the Declaration of the Rights of Man, the three key concerns for Mexico 
were “liberty, property and security”,28 which were best protected under a 
“moderate monarchy” with a “liberal constitution”.29 The paper did not argue that 
federal republicanism was an objectively bad form of government, merely that it 
was ill‐suited to Mexico’s political traditions and current needs. Sovereignty lay in 
the nation itself, and following the seventeenth‐century English thinker Algernon 
Sidney (1623‐83), the paper argued that the nation had the right to constitute 
whatever government was most appropriate.30 It was, therefore, necessary to 
examine different types of political organisation past and present.  
The paper espoused what can be described as an Aristotelian analysis of 
forms of government combined with a negative view of human nature. All 
governments had a propensity to descend into tyranny: people had “sometimes 
been victims of monarchical tyranny” and other times of “democracy”. However, 
most recent republics had collapsed into the “bloodiest anarchy” because it was 
necessary that people be “virtuous and obedient to the laws by conviction” 
otherwise “passions, pride and avarice” were unleashed and “the thirst for public 
positions, particularly those of high government […] created envy”. The result was 
civil war, first motivated by “rancour”, but then systematised into party political 
conflict. Monarchies, too, had resulted in “human misery” and “seas of blood” 
because invariably the monarch believed that the people existed for the dynasty 
and not the dynasty for the people.  
                                                          
28 Article two of the Declaration of the Rights of Man: “The aim of all political association is the 
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The solution was a “mixed constitution” which equated to “moderate 
constitutional monarchy”. Under this government the people were sovereign, the 
monarch depended on the people and enacted their laws, which were dictated by 
their representatives (ministers). The advantage of monarchy over a republic lay in 
the fact that it was harder for it to degenerate into despotism, and England was 
cited as the example to follow. Moreover, “what is constitutional government”, 
asked the paper rhetorically, “but a republic in fact if not in name?” The only 
difference was that under a monarchy the executive power was called a “king” or 
an “emperor” and, in a republic, “president”. However, while the former governed 
in perpetuity because of the hereditary principle, under the latter the head of state 
remained for no longer than the laws allowed, and in this requirement lay the seeds 
of a republic’s destruction: the problem of succession.31 Central to the Bourbonist 
argument was that republics led to civil conflict, as had happened in France from 
1792, and the result would inevitably be in Mexico what it had been there under 
Napoléon Bonaparte – military tyranny.32 
Constitutional monarchy, therefore, gave inherent stability to a polity, but it 
was not merely the perfection of the form which underpinned the argument. Unlike 
the United States, Mexico’s historical experience made republicanism impossible. In 
response to a federalist republican pamphlet,33 the paper argued that “the 
enlightenment and social virtues necessary for a federal republic […] do not exist in 
the Mexican nation.” Therefore Mexico would be best governed under a “moderate 
monarchy”.34 The paper was willing to admit that in its perfect, theoretical or 
“pure” form republican government was the most desirable. But, “where has there 
ever existed a people in which individuals sacrifice their private interests to the 
common good, the laws are perfect, their execution infallible, their application 
impartial, and those in power as faithful and impassive as the laws?” Such a 
republic, “more than Platonic”, was to be desired, but it had never existed, nor 
could it ever exist. In reality, republics were not “pure”, but mixed and, citing most 
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European republics from ancient Athens to modern France, the paper concluded 
that while many were, again, good in theory, they were all inherently impracticable, 
and certainly unworkable in Mexico. The only other republic to examine that held 
out some hope of stability was that of the United States. The editorial was not 
interested in whether the US Constitution was good or bad in itself, but merely 
whether it would be possible to establish it in Mexico. 
The answer was, predictably, no. A federal republic was deemed to be 
impossible in Mexico: “the reasons are so obvious, clear, simple and powerful [that] 
they are self‐evident”. Just in case they were not as obvious to the reader as to the 
author, the editorial outlined them. First and foremost, in order to adopt the US 
Constitution it would be necessary to divide Mexico into small, sovereign states, 
each with their own constitution, and then form a union to create a national polity. 
For El Sol such an idea was absurd. In the United States, the division had arisen 
naturally out of historical circumstances – namely the thirteen colonies had become 
states. In contrast, Mexico was a homogenous political entity and “it is chimerical 
and impossible to realise the idea of a republic in this Empire with the [US] 
constitution”.35 To those who argued for a centralised republic, the editorial stated 
that the US Constitution was inherently federal.  
The newspaper’s second argument against republicanism was that Mexico 
was not ready to go straight from absolute monarchy to a representative republic 
with a wide franchise. A year and a half of imperfect representative government 
was not enough to erase the habits, interests and opinions formed over many 
centuries. Amongst other things, religious tolerance and trial by jury would have to 
be introduced. Supporters of republicanism were naive: the stroke of a pen could 
not transform the traditions of an entire nation. Third, the paper maintained that 
Mexico lacked anyone of the stature of Washington, Jefferson or Adams to put at 
the head of government.  
The paper’s fourth and final point was that Mexico had nothing to gain from 
making the change to a republic from a monarchy, but much to lose. It would make 
“liberal institutions unstable”, the existence of government “precarious”, unleash 
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civil war and ensure the return of “despotism”. The “hereditary throne” was the 
“cornerstone” of a “great nation”. Countries that went from monarchies to 
republics removed this cornerstone and saw the rest of the edifice collapse. The 
editorial stated that for a monarchical nation to proclaim a republic was the same 
as proclaiming “social dissolution”. The argument was that without the legitimating 
force of monarchy, ambitious men would contend for supreme power and there 
would be “no order, no government, no society”. Constitutional monarchy was to 
the benefit of order, it gave “stability, consistency and firmness”. Those who looked 
to the United States were mistaken, its example was not applicable. Instead, they 
should look to the French Revolution if they wanted to know what would happen in 
Mexico: the “so‐called republic will be a true anarchy”.36  
It is important to note that few, if any, of these arguments had much to do 
with the actual details of the US Constitution. They were arguments against 
federalism and republicanism, and they would not be resolved by the happy fact 
that much of the 1824 Constitution was based on the Spanish Constitution of 1812. 
The fueros were maintained for the army and Church, Catholicism was still the sole 
religion and trial by jury was not introduced, but these were minor complaints in 
the Bourbonists’ larger argument, which at heart, putting to one side objections to 
federalism, was an argument against representative republican government.  
The direction of Mexican politics after 1824 did little to persuade those who 
supported the arguments of El Sol outlined above as to the merits of federal 
republicanism. In the mid‐1820s two factions developed in Mexican politics, the 
yorkinos and the escoceses, which were formed around Masonic lodges from which 
the groups derived their name. Broadly, the escoceses attracted conservative 
members of the creole elite while the yorkinos appealed to more radical, liberal and 
popular thinkers, such as Zavala, who were often not from the upper echelons of 
Mexico’s elite.37 This group had been formed with the encouragement of the first 
US minister to Mexico, Joel Poinsett (1779‐1851). Yorkinos gained the upper hand 
in Mexican politics, although they split between radicals and moderates in 1827. 
This division cost the former’s candidate for the presidency, Vicente Guerrero 
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(1782‐1831), the election, but these puros brought Guerrero to power in 1828 
through a revolt against the legitimately elected president. They advocated and 
enacted popular policies such as the expulsion of Spaniards,38 were more 
sympathetic to the United States than to Europe and were generally democrats and 
federalists. The escoceses were more pro‐Spanish and European and could be 
categorised as conservative liberals, although not on religious matters. Members of 
this group included former Bourbonists such as Alamán, José María Fagoaga and 
Francisco Sánchez de Tagle.39 
These lodges were loose political groupings and members changed political 
opinions over time; there was no straight path from the escoceses to the later 
Conservative Party. Nonetheless, the actions of the yorkinos – their revolt against 
the elected president, the expulsion of the Spaniards and, above all, their 
association with the United States – lived long in the memories of those who 
opposed them. Poinsett’s role in setting up the yorkinos and his close ties with 
them fuelled the suspicion that federal republicanism was an alien imposition. 
Again, some of this is retrospective propaganda to undermine the system, but 
Julien Schmaltz, an agent of the French government sent to Mexico, who was close 
to the leading members of the Bourbonist party, wrote in May 1824 that Miguel 
Ramos Arizpe (1775‐1843), who played a key role in drafting the constitution, had 
had federalism “inculcated in him by an American doctor [Poinsett], who […] is the 
true author of the constitutional plan” with the result that US institutions would be 
imposed on Mexico.40  
Poinsett had little, if any, influence on the adoption of republican 
federalism, but he did become a target of anti‐federal republican criticism. He took 
a partisan interest in Mexican politics, particularly the rivalry between the two 
Masonic lodges. Poinsett himself cast the conflict as a geopolitical one and argued 
that because Britain had aligned itself with the “aristocratic and monarchical party 
[the escoceses]” he was compelled to “seek friends” amongst the “democrats” in 
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order to “sustain the institutions of [Mexico]”. He claimed his policy was successful 
in promoting the interests of the United States and “liberal principles.”41 
Poinsett, therefore interfered in Mexican politics in order to pursue what he 
understood to be US national interests. The significance of this lies in the fact that 
the association of the yorkinos with Poinsett fuelled conservative suspicions of US 
attitudes towards Mexico more generally and thus formed the basis of an anti‐
American discourse that was reinforced by US expansion (discussed in chapters 
three and four), but existed independently of it. This provided an additional and 
powerful rationale for conservative politicians to reject what they understood as 
US‐style federal republicanism and look for alternative models influenced by 
European thought and examples.  
Poinsett was eventually recalled by Washington at the insistence of the 
Mexican government, but he remained the bête noire of conservative politicians. 
Alamán blamed Poinsett for the “hatred” that existed between the United States 
and Mexico as early as 1830.42 In a work published in 1834, Alamán concluded that 
the yorkinos under Poinsett’s direction were the “root of the so many of the evils 
experienced by the nation, and will be [the root] of those yet to come.”43  Years 
after his recall, Poinsett’s name remained shorthand for the pernicious influence of 
the United States in Mexican politics. One conservative newspaper attacked its 
enemies as “the liberal disciples of Poinsett” who worked to bring about the 
“hateful domination of an enemy race on our unfortunate country”,44 and 
highlighted “the disastrous mission of Poinsett” and claimed “the proximity of the 
[United States] is the true cause of all the misfortunes of our nation.”45  
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The two arguments detailed above, the unsuitability of a federal republic for 
Mexico and the association of this model with liberalism and the United States, 
became the cornerstone of conservative discourse in the 1840s and 1850s. 
Nonetheless, anti‐republican arguments had been laid down in El Sol in the 
immediate aftermath of independence, while Poinsett had provided proof for those 
who saw the malevolent hand of Washington behind federalism. What became 
tropes of conservative discourse were not only the consequence of “profound 
disillusionment”, to use Fowler’s phrase,46 with the political instability of post‐
independent Mexico, but also the outcome of more fundamental doubts about the 
viability of republicanism in Mexico, doubts which the volatility of the first decades 
of Mexican independence reinforced, rather than created.  
These fears had been expressed by Iturbide himself, who argued that 
Spanish colonialism meant Mexico was not ready for republican government.47 
Indeed, this was not in itself controversial: liberals like Mora and Zavala agreed that 
Mexican society did not conform to the liberal principles of the 1824 Constitution.48 
The difference between these men and conservative thinkers was that Mora and 
Zavala argued society must be transformed to fit the constitution, whereas 
conservative thinkers argued that it should be the other way round. However, if in 
1822 the arguments of El Sol could be characterised as “whatever happens will be 
for the worse, and therefore it is in our interest that as little should happen as 
possible”,49 the 1824 Constitution meant that the worst had already happened. It 
was therefore necessary, in the view of conservative politicians, to radically 
transform the political institutions of Mexico. 
II 
The Development of Monarchist Thought in Mexico after 1824  
The political instability of post‐independent Mexico not only confirmed El 
Sol’s worst fears, it exceeded them. From 1828 to 1834 Mexico had five different 
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presidents, three of whom came to power as the result of coups. Dissatisfaction 
with the 1824 Constitution led to its replacement with a centralist one in 1836,50 
but not before federalist revolts against this proposed change broke out across 
Mexico, including Texas, which permanently separated from the nation. Moreover, 
French intervention from 1838 to 1839 resulted in severe economic dislocation, 
while Yucatán seceded from Mexico in 1840. Governments under the new centralist 
constitution proved no more able than their federalist predecessors to maintain 
themselves in power against popular revolt in Mexico City or military revolts 
outside the capital.51 
The course of post‐independent Mexican politics had therefore done 
nothing to disprove the arguments of the Bourbonists. Two events precipitated by 
puro liberals had especially shaken conservative politicians and thinkers. First, 
Vicente Guerrero had been brought to power by a revolt culminating in the Parián 
riot in 1828, which saw street violence in Mexico City unparalleled in its recent 
history. Second, Gómez Farías came to power in 1833 and promoted a liberal 
reformist agenda, which was seen to attack the Church and the army. For 
conservative politicians the prospect of social violence combined with liberal 
reform, within a system that had lost all pretence of constitutional legitimacy, gave 
greater urgency to their arguments against federal republicanism.  
The arguments which came to be deployed against the 1824 Constitution 
had been outlined in El Sol as early as 1822. For many conservative thinkers these 
criticisms were still valid, but they were willing to continue the republican 
experiment subject to significant constitutional reform. The result was the Seven 
Laws of 1836, which transformed Mexico into a centralised republic. The 
importance of the 1836 Constitution to this research lies in the fact that many of 
the ideas that drove the overturn of the 1824 Constitution were monarchical in 
inspiration, derived from constitutional theorists such as Burke or Constant. It was 
hoped that what were perceived to be the problems of republicanism in Mexico 
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could be solved by the incorporation of elements of constitutional monarchy as well 
as restoration of centralised power to the national government. The failure of the 
Seven Laws to create stable and legitimate rule led some to conclude, or perhaps 
merely confirmed their existing belief, that republicanism was unworkable in 
Mexico. 
Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790) had been translated 
into Spanish and published in Mexico City in 1826. His thought, alongside that of 
Chateaubriand and Joseph de Maistre (1753‐1821), strongly influenced Alamán’s 
criticisms of the 1824 Constitution.52 Making direct reference to Burke, Alamán 
followed his indictment of the French National Assembly during the French 
Revolution and claimed Mexico had destroyed everything that had previously 
existed in order to found a government entirely alien to its historical experience,53 
echoing the argument El Sol had made for maintaining a monarchical regime in 
Mexico. Alamán similarly argued that US prosperity was a result of its institutions 
conforming to its historical inheritance from British colonialism and therefore no 
innate superiority should be ascribed to federalism, nor could it be readily 
transcribed to Mexico. Alamán’s main criticisms in the early 1830s, however, were 
of overly democratic representative government and a weak executive. He 
proposed strengthening the presidency at the expense of the legislature, 
introducing more restricted property or income qualifications for deputies in the 
lower house and making the upper house more independent by ensuring it was not 
elected in the same way as the chamber of deputies. Alamán further argued that 
seats in congress should be reserved for the professional classes, those in the army 
or Church or men who had followed a literary career, ideas which he later put into 
practice via an electoral law of 1846, discussed in chapter three.54 
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The majority of political theorists, like Burke or Constant, whom Alamán and 
his supporters were adapting for their own political vision of Mexico, were 
constitutional monarchists and thus many of the ideas that influenced conservative 
politicians were inherently monarchical. The attempt to square the circle of 
republican Mexico with monarchical institutions, i.e. to create a balanced or mixed 
constitution without a monarch, is most apparent in the Seven Laws. These acts 
incorporated many elements of conservative thought: deputies and senators had 
higher age and income or property requirements for eligibility to congress; 
executive power was strengthened and presidential terms were set at eight years; 
and a distinction was made between “Mexicans” and “Citizens of the Mexican 
Republic”. The latter status, which conferred the right to vote, required an income 
of 100 pesos per annum. Apart from the abolition of states and their 
transformation into departments administered by a centrally appointed governor, 
the most radical change was the introduction of a fourth power in addition to the 
legislative, judicial and executive: the Supreme Conservative Power.55 
The role envisaged for the Supreme Conservative Power was similar to that 
of a constitutional monarch. The body was to be composed of five members, each 
to be over the age of forty and with an income of at least 3,000 pesos and with 
previous ministerial, congressional or Supreme Court experience. It had the power 
to declare any law unconstitutional if petitioned to do so by one of the three 
branches of government. It could deem the president morally or physically 
incapable of retaining office if prompted by congress and it could suspend the 
Supreme Court or congress when it saw fit or if requested by the president. In 
extraordinary circumstances it could determine the will of the nation and restore 
any branch of government toppled by revolt.56 The aim was to provide an 
institution that would give stability to Mexican politics as an arbiter between the 
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various branches of government, similar to the neutral power of the crown 
envisaged by Constant.57 It was hoped that the institution would provide continuity 
and stability by moderating between competing factions and thus prevent, or at 
least moderate, the violent conflicts which had overturned a succession of 
governments in Mexico.58   
The author and defender of the Seven Laws, and the Supreme Conservative 
Power, was Francisco Sánchez de Tagle,59 a scion of one of the elite families of New 
Spain, and a leading member of the Bourbonist faction in the early 1820s.60 It is not, 
therefore, surprising that the analysis of Mexico’s problems in the 1830s matched 
those outlined by El Sol in 1821‐22. Sanchez de Tagle shared an elite worldview 
similar to that of Fagoaga or Alamán, and his Supreme Conservative Power was “a 
monarchist republic […] a monarchy without a prince”.61  
Alamán believed that the new constitution was “in general good” and in 
every way “very superior” to what had preceded it because it “put authority in 
respectable hands and [assured] the stability of public order on the bases of 
individual property”.62 Increasingly, the establishment of order was the principle to 
which conservative thinkers subordinated all others. The official government 
newspaper of the Bustamante administration claimed the government wished to 
free the nation from “the most ferocious anarchy” and guarantee it a “wellbeing 
that can only be enjoyed amidst order. This is not, nor has it ever been, a war of 
opinions; it is not about systems, nor even individuals; it is a war of civilisation 
against barbarism, of property against thieves, of order against anarchy.”63 The new 
constitution, however, proved no more effective than the old in creating stability. 
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The Supreme Conservative Power itself was later criticised by writers sympathetic 
to the views of those who created it because it lacked physical force to “make itself 
obeyed” and, recalling Alamán’s criticism of Iturbide, it thus “fell into ridicule from 
the day of its installation.”64  
Conservative members of the Mexican elite had supported constitutional 
monarchy at independence, many of the currents of thought they drew upon were 
monarchist, they blamed US‐style federal republicanism as the root of all Mexico’s 
evils, and they had seen their own attempts to modify the constitution by 
incorporating monarchist elements into Mexico’s political institutions fail to 
prevent further instability. In this context it is perhaps surprising that it was not 
until 1840 that monarchy was reintroduced into public discourse as a solution to 
the ills of Mexican society. In this year, José María Gutiérrez de Estrada published a 
pro‐monarchist pamphlet.65 Gutiérrez de Estrada was a respected member of the 
elite from Yucatán, who had briefly served as minister for foreign affairs in 1835. He 
was a friend and correspondent of Mora, who described him as a “man of 
progress”.66  
The immediate trigger for his arguments in favour of monarchy was his first‐
hand experience of the chaos of which El Sol had warned. He had returned to 
Mexico after four years abroad, but had been refused entry into Campeche, the 
main port of his home state, because it was in revolt against the national 
government. He then made his way to the capital and witnessed a puro federalist 
revolt, which temporarily captured the national palace and held the president 
hostage.67 Gutiérrez de Estrada witnessed directly “the effusion of blood”, when his 
father‐in‐law was wounded during street fighting,68 and the damage to the most 
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“noble buildings of the capital”. It was “twelve days of fire and scandal for the 
entire nation, as well as the world that contemplated in horror our crimes against 
morality, humanity and civilisation”.69 Writing in 1861, he noted that he had 
returned to Mexico in 1840 to find it “plagued by one of those violent crises” that it 
had passed through without cease since it was constituted as a republic.70 
For Gutiérrez de Estrada, the solution to these ceaseless “crises” was 
constitutional monarchy. The arguments against republicanism made by the 
Bourbonists were largely reiterated by Gutiérrez de Estrada, but Mexico’s recent 
past was used as evidence to demonstrate their veracity. The nation had 
experimented with “democratic, oligarchic, military, demagogic and anarchic 
[republics], so that all the parties, and always to the detriment of the nation’s 
honour and happiness, have tried the republican system under all possible forms.” 
It followed, then, in his view, that this type of government could not work in 
Mexico.71 Because of its Spanish colonial past, Mexico’s political culture was 
monarchical, not republican, and governments must conform to the present state 
of society.72 While all forms of republican government had been tried, he noted, 
there had not been an attempt at a “true monarchy in the person of a foreign 
prince.”73 The Empire of Iturbide did not count, but the Plan of Iguala could and 
should be fulfilled.74 Republicanism was clearly flourishing north of the border. 
However, it was not suitable for Mexico. Aside from its monarchical heritage, the 
nation was not ready for a form of democratic government which, since it had 
failed in a country as civilised and advanced as France, would certainly not succeed 
in Mexico. Gutiérrez de Estrada quoted a speech made by Chateaubriand in 1830: 
“the representative republic will be the future of the world, but its time has not yet 
arrived.”75  
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The arguments for monarchy were general and vague: republicanism in 
Mexico was unstable, monarchy would provide stability. Gutiérrez de Estrada 
identified one of the problems that the Supreme Conservative Power was intended 
to solve. He claimed that Mexico was divided into two parties equal in power that 
would be locked in incessant struggle, but for him this was a problem insolvable 
within republican institutions, whereas a monarch could mediate between them 
and create a national party.76 However, there was no mention of how the monarchy 
would be constituted or even which foreign prince would be called upon to rule. 
The only practical recommendation was that a national congress be called to 
debate the matter. But constitutional monarchy was a programme that was largely 
self‐explanatory and broadly liberal because Gutiérrez de Estrada’s model was 
France, namely the July Monarchy.77 
Gutiérrez de Estrada was known as a prominent Francophile,78 and his 
pamphlet was influenced by French history and politics. He directly quoted Odillon 
Barrot (1791‐1873), head of the “dynastic opposition” in the French Chamber of 
Deputies under the July Monarchy, as an example of how party conflicts did not 
lead to revolt, but were contained within a constitutional monarchy. Leading 
politicians like Thiers, La Fayette, Casimir Pierre Perier (1777‐1832) were cited and 
the July Monarchy’s (apparent) consolidation as a stable political entity impressed 
Gutiérrez de Estrada.79 After the July Revolution of 1830 France had not become a 
republic because, like Mexico, Gutiérrez de Estrada argued, its traditions were 
inherently monarchical.80 Mexican politicians of all persuasions had a vast array of 
comparative models to examine and with which to further their arguments. 
Monarchists were no exception: Gutiérrez de Estrada asked pointedly, who in 
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“Britain, France, Holland or Tuscany would exchange the situation of their 
respective country for that of the Mexican Republic?”81 
These examples were invoked in order to demonstrate that nothing could 
be more natural than monarchy, but the reaction to Gutiérrez de Estrada’s 
pamphlet in Mexico was almost universally hostile. Its impact was summed up by 
the wife of the Spanish minister to Mexico, Fanny Calderón de la Barca: “The whole 
world is talking [about it], and [it] seems likely to cause a greater sensation in 
Mexico than the discovery of the gunpowder plot in England.” Her prediction that 
“the consequences are likely to be disastrous for the fearless and public‐spirited 
author” was to be borne out.82 Public opinion railed against the pamphlet in the 
press, the president condemned it publically as seditious, as did prominent national 
politicians such as the santanista José María Tornel, and the publisher of the 
pamphlet was imprisoned.83 Mexico’s only public monarchist was thus forced into 
hiding before fleeing the country and spending the rest of his life trying to convince 
the courts of Europe rather than his fellow countrymen of the merits of a Mexican 
kingdom.84   
The virulence of the anti‐monarchical reaction is perhaps suggestive of the 
fragility of the republican ideal after years of instability in Mexico. In a letter 
commenting on the publication of Gutiérrez de Estrada’s work, the moderate liberal 
José Bernardo Couto (1803‐62) wrote “you cannot imagine what a hornet’s nest has 
been kicked with this. In public everyone speaks the language of the most exalted 
republicanism: some out of personal agreement, many from calculation and with 
ulterior motives. Very few who have pronounced an anathema against the poor 
writer have done so out of genuine feeling.”85 Since the fall of Iturbide, there was 
much political capital to be gained by denouncing groups associated with monarchy 
and Spanish colonialism more generally, as the 1827 expulsion of the Spaniards had 
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demonstrated. And those behind the most vitriolic responses to the pamphlet of 
1840 were in part motivated by a desire to present themselves as the ardent 
defenders of Mexican republicanism. 
Despite the reaction to the pamphlet, as has been demonstrated in section 
I, the sentiments of some of Mexico’s political elite were sympathetic to monarchy. 
The failure of the First Mexican Empire was a consequence of its Mexican emperor, 
not the ideas that lay behind monarchy. Moreover, in the conservative view, the fall 
of Iturbide directly led to the adoption of federal republicanism, which they 
understood as unsuitable for Mexico, inspired by the US example and promoted by 
the US minister Joel Poinsett. Furthermore, Mexico’s tumultuous political 
experience as a federal republic from 1824 did little to convert conservatives to 
republicanism, while the failure to find order and stability as a centralist republic 
from 1836 further discredited republican ideas, but crucially not the monarchical 
ones that lay behind many elements of the Seven Laws. Monarchy represented a 
shorthand solution to all the problems of republican government: a strong 
executive, a centralist government and a restricted franchise and thus embodied 
the solutions proposed by conservative politicians without making compromises 
within a republican framework. Gutiérrez de Estrada even claimed that one of his 
most violent critics, Tornel, had adopted monarchical principles, but without a 
monarch,86 certainly santanistas increasingly leaned towards authoritarian 
government.87 Gutiérrez de Estrada’s exile did not mark the end of monarchist 
support in Mexico; rather a group of conservative politicians put his call for a 
national convention to decide on the political institutions most appropriate to 
Mexico into action in 1845‐46, which will be discussed in chapter three. First, 
however, it is necessary to understand why many in Europe, and especially in 
France, understood monarchy as the best form of government for an independent 
Mexico.  
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III 
The View from Europe: The Monarchist ‘Party’ in Mexico 
As will be seen, the reappearance of monarchist ideas in 1840s Mexican 
public discourse influenced debates in Europe over the origins of Mexico’s 
instability and the means to solve these problems. But, in contrast to Mexico, the 
idea that monarchy was the form of government best suited to Spain’s former 
colonies, and Mexico in particular, was a constant refrain in European thought on 
Latin America. Moreover, many argued, monarchy was not only the solution to 
Mexico’s political problems, but a geopolitical opportunity that would benefit 
Europe, and especially the power most closely associated with the Mexican 
monarchy. Indeed, this rationale formed the basis of the Bourbon Restoration’s 
policy towards Latin American independence in the first half of the 1820s. 
Chateaubriand, who was foreign minister from December 1822 to August 1824, 
wrote: “the monarchical emancipation of the Spanish colonies by the generous 
influence of the eldest son of the Bourbons would have raised France to the highest 
degree of prosperity and glory. Such was the last dream of my mature years; I 
believed myself in America, but I awoke in Europe.”88 Chateaubriand’s plan, 
supported by Villèle, was for Spain’s former colonies to be constituted as 
independent kingdoms under Spanish infantes with French support. In short, France 
backed the Plan of Iguala, although not until two years after it had been 
proclaimed, by which time the First Mexican Empire had ceased to be.  
Chateaubriand was not alone in his belief that the “Spanish colonies” would 
have “much to gain by forming themselves into constitutional monarchies”.89 It was 
the view of numerous French (and British and Spanish) politicians, journalists and 
travel writers. If monarchists remained a persecuted or silent minority in Mexico 
after 1824, they found a much more sympathetic audience in Europe. It was the 
endurance of this vision overseas that ensured that in Mexico monarchy remained a 
viable alternative to republicanism.  
The British author Robert William Hale Hardy travelled across Mexico from 
three years from 1825 to 1828. In Mexico City he attended “tertulias” with, 
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amongst others, Mora. A favoured topic of conversation was the prosperity of the 
United States, which, Hardy’s Mexican hosts argued, proved the wisdom of 
adopting federal republicanism in Mexico. Hardy’s response to this claim was that “I 
have not yet been able to understand how [this] style of government and 
institutions can be made to apply to Mexico”. Governments should suit “the 
previous habits and education of the people”, British colonialism meant the United 
States “was nurtured in the lap of liberty” and independence served to confirm for 
their own benefit the “laws and customs of the mother country”. Mexico, on the 
other hand, “acted as if she were trying to make the clothes of a grown person fit 
an infant”. Hardy’s analysis was, therefore, exactly that of conservative politicians 
as outlined above, but it is his authorial aside that is most illustrative of European 
views: “Born in England as I was, and [raised] in the belief that its form of 
government is, of all others, the wisest, and the best for the nation […] I could not 
of course give my opinion in favour of the expediency of a federal government.”90  
Many in monarchical Britain, France and Spain shared this view. Of course, 
opinion was not universally in favour of this form of government, particularly in 
France, nor did it necessarily follow that support for monarchy in Europe would 
translate as advocacy for the same in Mexico. Few observers, however, made the 
distinction drawn by the Italian, Giacomo Beltrami (1779‐1855), author of one of 
the earliest accounts of independent Mexico published in France, who “was 
monarchical in Europe and republican in America”.91 And not all Bonapartes 
believed, as Joseph apparently did when supposedly offered the Mexican crown in 
1821, that “the throne you want to raise again cannot make you happy. Each day 
that I pass on the hospitable territory of the United States demonstrates to me the 
excellence of republican institutions for America; guard them amongst yourselves 
as a precious gift from providence […] imitate the United States”.92 Most agreed 
with the conclusion of the Prince de Polignac (1780‐1847) in a letter to Alamán, 
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who had spent time with the French legitimist politician in Paris, that “monarchical 
governments are generally more stable than [republican ones]”.93 
Many Europeans, therefore, shared the cultural assumptions of conservative 
interpretations of Mexico’s past, but for French observers and governments there 
were also geopolitical and imperial dimensions to monarchy in Mexico. As regards 
Spanish American independence, de Pradt argued that it did not matter whether 
the new states were monarchical or republican because “it is not by their form of 
government that they will be useful [to Europe], but as a consequence of their 
independence alone.”94 Nonetheless, in the preface to the work he wrote: “Duty 
and personal feeling have induced [me] to point out the dangers which arise to 
royalty and to Catholicism, from the prolonged struggle between Spain and 
America”. He wrote that he knew of no constitutions proposed in Latin America 
that mentioned monarchy; rather they were strongly republican and inclined 
towards the institutions of the United States, not Europe. He further warned that 
the impolitic policy of Spain would likely result in the end of royalism in its former 
provinces and that a republican Latin America would be a dangerous example to 
monarchical Europe.95  
Whether guided by de Pradt or not, the Bourbon Restoration’s policy of 
promoting monarchy in Mexico was underpinned by similar ideas. The French 
government hoped to develop French commerce by embracing the arguments for 
commonwealth that had been proposed in the Spanish parliament by Latin 
American deputies such as Alamán, which would, in theory, benefit France, Spain 
and the new states. The details were sketched out by several times prime minister 
and ultra Jean‐Baptiste de Villèle: “the commercial favours reserved to Spain would 
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more than compensate for what would have been lost in respect to sovereignty.” 
Success was predicated upon co‐opting the remaining royalist sympathisers in 
Spanish America: “[i]n all these countries armed parties exist which favour [Spain]. 
If the infantes should not find [...] submissive kingdoms, they would at least find 
realms that could easily be subjugated by the aid of [France’s] navy and credit.” 
Villèle wrote that the French government would permit the use of its forces for this 
purpose in anticipation of “commercial advantages”.96  
As noted in chapter one, France’s freedom to implement its strategies was 
limited in the 1820s. First, by the intransigence of Ferdinand VII, who refused to 
countenance anything other than the complete restoration of the Spanish empire in 
Latin America and, second, by British opposition to armed intervention in the wars 
of independence. Regardless of Spanish opposition, it is likely France had arrived at 
a solution which would have fulfilled the Plan of Iguala too late. By the time 
Chateaubriand and Villèle countenanced Bourbon kingdoms for Latin America the 
empire of Iturbide had already fallen in Mexico. The 1823 French invasion of the 
Spanish peninsula created widespread hostility towards France in Latin America 
because it was seen as a prelude to further intervention.97 Moreover, French forces 
in Spain ended constitutional government there and thus, according to the formerly 
Bourbonist paper El Sol, finished the party in Mexico: the ruin of “the constitutional 
system in Spain” meant that a Bourbon prince ruling in Mexico was an 
“impossibility” and therefore the party that had “desired it” dissolved.98  
Nonetheless, Mexico’s experience as a republic did little to dissuade many 
foreign observers that Mexico was inherently monarchical, and that monarchy had 
powerful support amongst elites (and invariably passive support amongst the 
majority of the population). In 1829, the Mexican diplomatic agent, Tomás Murphy 
(senior), reported that the sack of the Parián market during a revolt in Mexico City 
had been attributed in Europe to the failings of republican government. 
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Furthermore, “the defects of the system [were] so much worse” when applied to a 
people “accustomed to a completely different order of things” and whose religion 
and lack of enlightenment made them ill‐suited to republican government. He 
claimed this was a widely held view, even amongst those who previously had 
expressed hope Mexico would consolidate under “the adopted system”. Thus he 
feared that France and Britain would work “in secret” and “indirectly” to help Spain, 
“not for the reconquest of America, but for the consolidation of independence 
under the monarchical system”. Moreover, if the “wisdom of the Mexican people 
did not in its future conduct restore the credit” that had been lost because of the 
riot then this view of Mexico would gain more credence.99 
Murphy’s analysis of political opinion in France was accurate: French 
diplomats and commentators generally concluded that Mexico would be better 
governed under a monarchy. In addition, they reported the existence of a strong 
monarchical party, although publically there was no sign of one after 1824 until 
1846. This can be explained by the fact European diplomats generally preferred the 
company of Mexico’s conservative politicians. Schmaltz wrote that he had met in 
Mexico a wealth of “gentlemen” notable for their “honesty” and “enlightenment” 
amongst other qualities, but he had also known radical liberals whose “venality, 
presumption, audacity and political ignorance render them capable of the most 
shocking and extraordinary actions, without any regard or fear for the 
consequences”.100 Deffaudis wrote that of the hundred or so people who made up 
his social circle in Mexico “four fifths belong to the aristocratic party”.101  
In 1823 Schmaltz identified Alamán as the most important man in Mexico, 
and listed him alongside other monarchists, such as José María Fagoaga. Schmaltz 
knew these elite members of Mexican society personally and wrote letters of 
introduction to all of them for another French agent who was sent to Mexico.102 
Alamán and Fagoaga, moreover, were pro‐French, Schmaltz argued, because of the 
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positive view of France they had gained during stays in Paris, and as late as 1845, 
Mora, then in exile in Paris, wrote that they still retained a favourable reputation in 
France.103 Alamán had studied in Paris at the Collège de France and was introduced, 
at the salon of the Duke of Montmorency, a Bourbon prince of blood, to such 
luminaries of Parisian society as Madame de Stael, Benjamin Constant, 
Chateaubriand, La Fayette and Polignac. José María Fagoaga also mixed in this 
exclusive company with Alamán.104 Partially as a consequence of Schmaltz’s 
reports, which identified an influential monarchist party, the foreign ministry 
concluded “after everything that we have been able to learn about the state of 
Mexico, it is reasonable to assume that […] the social and religious state, the mores 
and the customs of the people […] call for a [monarchical government]”. The 
minister remained under the impression that the implementation of the Plan of 
Iguala was still possible. He hoped that an arrangement could be reached between 
Mexico and Spain and perhaps even a viceroy could preside over an entirely 
Mexican administration, which would regulate domestic affairs.105 
French observers generally concluded that politics in Mexico was the 
preserve of a small elite, Mexican society was backward and apolitical and popular 
support was therefore by no means a necessary requisite for governments or 
political institutions. Deffaudis reported to Paris that of the 150,000 to 200,000 
people that made up the population of Mexico City only 6,000 to 8,000 belonged to 
the “bourgeois class”. All the rest were “those which one calls ‘los leperos’, people 
who do not have regular employment, nor wives, nor legitimate children”. Outside 
of the cities, “the people of the countryside, which form the great mass of the 
nation, are essentially docile”. They viewed with “the most profound indifference” 
the continual changes in government. “The imitation of the institutions of the 
[United States] has been fatal to Mexico” because, unlike their northern 
neighbours, Mexicans had not been “raised in the constitutional school of England”. 
Similarly, federalism arose organically in the United States, but had been imposed 
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artificially in Mexico. As a result, Deffaudis argued, Mexico could not find stability in 
any government other than a monarchical one, and it should tend towards 
absolutism given the level of political education in the country.106  
The then French foreign minister, the doctrinaire liberal Victor de Broglie 
(1785‐1870), agreed entirely with this analysis: “that is to say, [on] the 
incompatibility of the form of its government with the character, the habits and the 
interests of its people”. Mexico’s “imperfect state of civilisation” meant 
republicanism and federalism were inappropriate. Indeed, in a crossed out section 
of the draft Broglie wrote that he had never considered the current system in 
Mexico as anything other than “one of those ephemeral and transitory situations” 
which, after “the convulsions of anarchy”, lead to the “calm and regular customs of 
a despotism more or less tempered”. In this respect Mexico was no different from 
all the other states of “Spanish America” and “monarchical power” was the “port” 
where “these states will repose after their long agitations”.107 
The belief that republicanism and federalism were anathema to Mexico’s 
historical circumstances and its present did not mean automatic sympathy with all 
the conservative views of Mexico’s elite. Nineteenth‐century liberalism in France is 
hard to categorise. Economic liberals, like Chevalier, were willing to support the 
(initially) politically authoritarian Second Empire,108 while Orléanists, such as 
Broglie, Thiers and Guizot, who all served as foreign minister, were constitutionally 
conservative and advocated a restricted franchise.109 Indeed, Zavala was briefly 
Mexico’s minister to France (1833‐34), the representative of Gomez Farías’ liberal 
government, and Broglie reported he was disappointed by Zavala’s “exaggerated 
liberalism” and his unswerving belief in federalism and “pure democracy”.110 The 
brief French flirtation with Mexican federalists during the 1838‐39 intervention, 
discussed in chapter one, was the high‐water mark of sympathy for their cause 
amongst French government observers. 
                                                          
106 Deffaudis to Broglie, 11 June and 15 July 1833, AAE, CP Mexique, 8. 
107 Broglie to Deffaudis, 24 November 1833, AAE, CP Mexique, 8. 
108 Sudhir Hazareesingh, From Subject to Citizen: The Second Empire and the Emergence of Modern 
French Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 184‐89. 
109 See Craiutu, Liberalism under Siege; Rosanvallon, Le Moment Guizot; Marina Valensise, François 
Guizot. 
110 Broglie to Deffaudis, 2 May 1834, AAE, CP Mexique, 8. 
  114 
France’s minister to Mexico from 1840 to 1846, Baron Alleye de Cyprey, was 
as dismissive of federalists in Mexico as Broglie had been. De Cyprey spent nine 
days with Gomez Farías in the immediate aftermath of the failed federalist revolt 
which had so shaken Gutiérrez de Estrada in July 1840 and concluded that liberal 
federalist ideas were impractical in Mexico.111 This is not surprising given that de 
Cyprey was an avowed proponent of monarchy in Mexico, who did not believe that 
“Spanish America had republican elements”.112 He frequently recommended 
European intervention in order to found a monarchy and believed that Mexicans 
were like children and therefore required a strong government. There was, he 
claimed, a monarchist party in Mexico, but it was badly directed and divided over 
who the candidate should be for the throne.113 
His belief that this party existed similarly stemmed from French diplomats’ 
contact with the narrow section of Mexico’s elite who favoured monarchy. De 
Cyprey knew Gutiérrez de Estrada,114 and expected his pamphlet would leave “deep 
roots” and produce a revolution in ideas, which would one day be realised.115 It 
confirmed what de Cyprey already thought to be true: “Mexico marches towards a 
monarchy”.116 In two long memorandums, de Cyprey took the time to outline how 
monarchy could be achieved in Mexico through military intervention.117 Although 
not as extreme as those of De Cyprey, views in Paris concurred that monarchy was 
an appropriate solution for Mexico. De Cyprey had sent a copy of Gutiérrez de 
Estrada’s pamphlet to Paris, where it was read by Guizot. The foreign minister 
complained that the writing was a “little difficult”, but it sketched a picture of the 
situation and needs of Mexico that Guizot believed “to be true”. He added that 
Gutiérrez de Estrada had resided long enough in Paris to leave behind him “good 
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memories and the reputation of a being one of those small number of men who are 
both learned and free of prejudice.” He was, therefore, a credit to his country.118  
This was not, of course, how the Mexican government thought of him, 
which was sufficiently worried by Gutiérrez de Estrada’s views that it reported them 
to its representative in Paris. The Mexican foreign minister noted that the author of 
the pro‐monarchy pamphlet would receive the punishment he merited and that the 
state would do everything in its power to prevent the evils that could result from 
his ideas. The president and the press had therefore condemned the monarchist 
arguments in order to “cut at its root this new pretext for civil discord”. It was 
further necessary to inculcate abroad “the unquestionable truth that [Mexico] 
would never permit the establishment of a throne, nor be governed by 
foreigners”.119    
In this latter cause Mexican governments were unsuccessful. French 
publicists echoed the views of Orléanist ministers and diplomats.120 An article 
published in 1842 in the Journal des débats, outlined this monarchist discourse. 
Mexico, ran the editorial, proved that “forms of government which succeed in one 
nation [i.e. the United States]” cannot “be imposed on another nation [i.e. Mexico] 
completely different by its traditions, political and religious education, and by its 
mores.” In 1824 Mexico had adopted an imitation of the US Constitution, the only 
difference being that Catholicism was the sole religion of state, but the impossibility 
of making this work was apparent from the start. Mexico had therefore gone 
through various systems, none of which had provided stability. The newspaper 
believed that there were many monarchists in Mexico, including Gutiérrez de 
Estrada, whose pamphlet was described, recalling Guizot, as tracing a “true picture” 
of Mexico. Finally, the article concluded that monarchy was the solution to 
Mexico’s problems.121  
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Indeed, foreign observers not only echoed the conservative interpretation 
of Mexican politics and history, in some cases they predated it. The Austrian writer, 
Isidore Löwenstern, travelled to Mexico in 1838 where he met, amongst others, 
Alamán.122 In his account he described Mexican politics and identified what he 
called a “conservative party” composed of the clergy and men “finally enlightened 
as to the abyss that the establishment of a democratic government has plunged 
[Mexico].” This party, within which he claimed Alamán was the most influential 
individual, contained “educated, but timid men”, who wished to see Mexico 
governed under a system “consistent with the needs of [Mexico]”. They were 
“timid” due to the fact that they were afraid to express their views, which, 
Löwenstern claimed, were to place Mexico under “foreign domination”, because 
they were “under the despotism of an unbridled mass”. It is, of course, anecdotal 
evidence, but the reaction to Gutiérrez de Estrada’s pamphlet suggests there may 
be an element of truth in Löwenstern’s belief that (what he called) the 
“conservative party” was afraid to express its views.123  
Löwenstern’s work demonstrates that the idea of monarchy, and even the 
idea of European intervention in favour of a monarchy, was part of French 
discourse on Mexico during the 1840s. His work concluded with a chapter that 
began: “the current state of Mexico cannot continue”. He argued the country had 
been destroyed by representative republicanism, Mexico had been founded as a 
monarchy and only a return to the Plan of Iguala could save the nation.124 Chevalier 
was largely in agreement with this conclusion. In a review of Löwenstern’s work he 
wrote that monarchy was the form of government best suited to Mexico. However, 
he argued that Löwenstern “seemed to be of the opinion that Europe should 
intervene to impose a monarch on Mexico”. This, he thought, “would be very 
difficult” and European intervention would face many obstacles. Moreover, a 
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European prince that presented himself in Mexico by “right of conquest” would be 
opposed by the local populace. Mexico, Chevalier argued, was independent and 
therefore it should “freely call to its aid a European prince”.125 However, far from 
demonstrating that Mexico was against monarchy, the treatment of Gutiérrez de 
Estrada “proved nothing”. To the contrary, there were strong monarchical elements 
in Mexico, which was like France on the eve of Napoléon Bonaparte’s 1799 coup 
against the Directory: all that was required was a great man to assume the role of 
“supreme arbiter of the destiny of the nation”.126  
The republican Mexican governments were right to be concerned about 
European opinion as regards monarchy in Mexico. Writing in 1861, Gutiérrez de 
Estrada published a letter written in 1840 that he “cherished dearly” from Baron de 
Cyprey. The French minister stated: “the picture you paint of the state of country is 
only too true [….] The remedy that you propose is the only one that can save 
[Mexico]. You have been a prophet”. He pointed to the work of the explorer, 
Eugène Duflot de Mofras (1810‐1884), who had been sent by the July Monarchy to 
the North American Pacific coast on an exploratory mission and wrote in his report, 
referencing Gutiérrez de Estrada, that monarchy was the sole remedy for Mexico’s 
problems.127 Gutiérrez de Estrada quoted at length the Journal des débats article of 
13 September 1842 discussed above.128 He argued that the idea for monarchy was 
not a “French idea”; rather, it “belonged entirely to Mexico; it is all Mexican”.129 As 
this chapter has shown, this is only partially true – monarchism in Mexico was a 
shared transnational discourse. However, Gutiérrez de Estrada was right in a sense 
– it was enough of a Mexican idea for the viability of monarchy to be seriously 
entertained in Europe. If the Mexican monarchist was persecuted in Mexico he was 
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at least feted by some men of influence in France, and the realisation of his dream 
would not have been possible without this intellectual context.  
Conclusion 
For monarchists in Mexico, the importance of Iturbide’s reign lay in the non‐
fulfilment of the Plan of Iguala. For conservatives, this, rather than the Grito de 
Dolores or the 1824 Constitution, was the foundational document of Mexican 
independence. The failure to found Mexico as a monarchy under a European ruler 
was a missed opportunity to constitute the nation in its appropriate form, and an 
explanation for contemporary problems. However, it was not until the 1840s, first 
by Gutiérrez de Estrada, and then, as will be discussed in the next chapter, by 
conservatives led by Alamán, that this argument was made in public discourse. In 
the previous decade, politicians like Alamán had hoped to achieve order and 
stability by adapting monarchist constitutional ideas to Mexican republicanism. The 
result was the Seven Laws of 1836, but this centralised constitutional framework 
proved no more effective in creating stability in Mexico than the federalist 
constitution of 1824. The conclusion these politicians drew from this was not that 
monarchist ideas were unworkable in Mexico, but that republicanism in Mexico was 
inherently unstable which came back to one of the central charges made against 
republicanism by El Sol in 1821‐22: the problem of succession meant that factions 
competed for power and resorted to extra‐constitutional means to secure it.  
The European monarchies provided powerful alternatives models: if 
republicans could point to the prosperity of the United States then monarchists 
could cite Britain and France. Moreover, monarchists in Mexico drew on European 
examples of, and were encouraged by European sympathy for, monarchy. It was a 
project of only a small section of Mexico’s conservative elite, as the liberal 
Porfiriato writer Justo Sierra Méndez (1848‐1912) noted, “[t]here were monarchists 
in Mexico, but there was no monarchical party”. Monarchists, with the exception of 
the “most naive and honest of them”, Gutiérrez de Estrada, “all hid themselves, 
including, Alamán, the most conspicuous”.130 Regardless of this limited support, the 
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idea proved remarkably durable: monarchy in Mexico was not purely a French 
imposition of the 1860s. 
French observers, particularly those tied to the Bourbon Restoration or the 
July Monarchy, understood monarchy in Mexico in geostrategic terms and saw it as 
a way to further French influence and interests. This is apparent in the arguments 
made by Chateaubriand, Villèle and de Pradt. Aside from the geopolitical 
importance of monarchy in Mexico, it necessarily had a transnational dimension in 
that it required foreign support, without which it would have remained in the 
realms of ideas and never have had the opportunity to be defeated, as Hidalgo y 
Esnaurrízar put it, in the “realm of facts”. As will be seen, one important factor 
which helped to promote monarchy in Mexico from idea to French government 
policy was a pan‐Latinist worldview, which placed Mexico on the front line against 
invading Anglo‐Saxon hordes unleashed by US expansion in Texas and the US‐
Mexican War. The formation of this pan‐Latinist interpretation in Mexico and 
France forms the basis of the next chapter.  
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Chapter Three  
The French and Mexican Response to the Texan Revolt (1835-36) and US 
Expansion: Towards Pan-Latinism 
 
Louis‐Napoléon had presciently warned General Élie Frédéric Forey (1804‐
72), commander of the French reinforcements sent to avenge the 1862 defeat at 
Puebla, that: “[t]here will be no lack of people who will ask you why we are going to 
deploy men and spend money in order to found a strong government in Mexico.” 
His rationale, he explained, was that the United States would soon seize the entire 
Gulf of Mexico and threaten the Antilles and South America. This was contrary to 
the interest of France, but, continued the emperor, “if Mexico preserves its 
independence, and maintains the integrity of its territory, if a stable government is 
created with the assistance of France, we shall have restored the strength and 
prestige of the Latin race on the other side of the ocean.”1 The task of publicly 
defending the regime’s Mexican policy fell, amongst others, to the emperor’s 
economic adviser, Chevalier. He identified the same two principal motives: “to put 
up a barrier to the imminent invasion of the entire American continent by the 
United States” and to “save from irreparable ruin not only Mexico, but also the 
whole Spanish branch of Latin civilisation in the New World.”2  
As noted in the introduction, international historians have tended to play 
down pan‐Latinism as a factor in explaining the French intervention.3 In a separate 
historiographical field, cultural and intellectual historians have focussed on the 
professed goals of Louis‐Napoléon and Chevalier quoted above, particularly their 
implications for the idea of “Latin America”. In an influential argument, John Leddy 
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Phelan associated pan‐Latinism with the imperialism of the French Second Empire.4 
For Phelan, though Chevalier never used the words “l'Amérique latine”, he provided 
the ideological framework and “spelled out the idea of Latin America”. Phelan 
believed the term “Latin America” first appeared in the Revue des race latines in 
1861, a publication which was part of a wider doctrine of “Latin regeneration [that] 
was a creation of the Second Empire.”5 However, Arturo Ardao and Miguel Rojas 
Mix have demonstrated that the term “Latin America” was used earlier than Phelan 
claimed. Ardao identified the term in a poem by a Colombian diplomat and 
intellectual resident in France, José María Torres Caicedo (1830‐89), published on 
15 February 1857 in a French‐based Spanish language newspaper, while Rojas Mix 
located it in a speech delivered in France by Chilean politician Francisco Bilbao 
(1823‐65) in June 1856.6 
The 1850s French context is considered key to the emergence of the idea of 
Latin America and pan‐Latinism for two reasons. First, the US‐Mexican War (1846‐
48) revived fear of US aggression among both Latin American and French 
commentators. Therefore pan‐Latinism and the idea of Latin America were 
constituted primarily in opposition to a US or an “Anglo‐Saxon” threat: Torres 
Caicedo’s poem called for Latin American unity in the face of US expansion,7 
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Bilbao’s speech warned of “fragments of America falling into the Saxon jaws of the 
hypnotising boa”,8 and, as we have seen, Chevalier claimed that a US invasion of 
the American continent was imminent. Second, Louis‐Napoléon’s regime is 
considered to mark a new, aggressive phase in French imperialism.  
Chevalier played an important role in the articulation of pan‐Latinist 
discourse, and he was influential under the French Second Empire, particularly as 
an economist. He was an expert on Latin America, who had travelled in Mexico, 
published various works on the continent and, as noted in chapter two, believed 
that monarchy was the solution for Mexico’s problems. A collection of his various 
articles was published under the title Le Mexique ancien et modern (Paris: L. 
Hachette et Cie, 1863) in which he articulated and defended the ideas behind the 
French intervention.9 However, it does not follow from this, as some have argued, 
that pan‐Latinism was: “an ideology composed to legitimate […] the expansionist 
policy of Napoléon III. His chief ideologue was Michel Chevalier.”10 If nothing else, 
Chevalier had argued for the ideas behind the French intervention at a time when 
the thought of a Second Bonapartist Empire in France was preposterous for the 
majority of the political class, but, more importantly, there were many in France 
and Mexico who shared Chevalier’s views on Mexico in particular and the role of 
France in the “Latin” world in general. 
Heeding Koselleck’s warnings against a “new nominalism”,11 this chapter will 
argue that the focus on published texts that explicitly deal with “Latin civilisation” 
and “Latin races” in the Americas has meant that historians have ignored earlier 
expressions of the ideas that underpin these terms and the extent of their diffusion. 
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By analysing French and Mexican reactions to the Texan revolt (1835‐36) and its 
subsequent US annexation (1845) through diplomatic correspondence, newspapers, 
the writings of publicists and journalists, and the speeches of politicians, this 
chapter will show that of these ideas can be identified earlier than the 1860s: they 
date back at least to the 1830s. This approach brings together intellectual history 
and international history. Moreover, pan‐Latinism was a transnational discourse, 
with contributions from French and Mexican commentators (amongst others). 
Indeed, the readiness of conservative politicians in Mexico to adopt pan‐Latinist 
language and ideas may call into question the argument that initial proponents of 
the idea of “Latin America” tended to be liberals “who claimed to be waging a pro‐
democracy crusade against the ‘aristocratic’ conservatives controlling many of the 
continent’s governments.”12 First, however, early expressions of French pan‐Latinist 
ideas will be analysed below. 
I 
Early Franco-Mexican Relations: A “Confraternity”? 
An axiomatic principle of Chevalier’s pan‐Latinism was that there was a 
natural affinity between “Latin” races which extended to the former Spanish 
colonies in America. However, Chevalier did not invent this idea: it was present 
during France’s earliest dealings with the new states of Latin America. It was hoped 
that this shared culture would ameliorate France’s diplomatic relations with 
Mexico, which, as discussed in chapter one, were rarely cordial. As has been seen, 
many French observers held negative views of the Mexico’s population and 
politicians and therefore doubted the nation’s ability to constitute a stable 
republican government.13 What is interesting about these negative stereotypes of 
Mexicans, which were typical of the European prejudices of the era, is that they 
coexisted alongside a concurrent discourse that projected a different view of the 
Mexican race.14 This alternative representation placed it within a southern and 
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Catholic tradition, which France belonged to, and thus a natural affinity would 
compel Mexico towards French civilisation. Chevalier’s use of the term “Latin” to 
express this idea is unusual, although not exceptional, in the 1830s and 1840s. 
Chevalier explained what he meant by the word: it was the “community of ideas, of 
sentiments and of mores, of origin and of belief that today binds us to these 
countries”.15  
This affinity based on a shared culture was an assumption common to many 
French diplomats, journalists and politicians in the first half of the nineteenth 
century. In 1825 the minister for the colonies and the navy informed one diplomatic 
agent that there were in Mexico “a great number of men who have conserved a 
sentiment of preference for the French”. This was a consequence of a “very great 
similarity of character, of tastes, of practices, of mores, of habits; and even more 
powerfully still by the conformity of religion.”16 The French agent, Schmaltz, 
reiterated this view in a despatch to Paris. Just as in Spain where France had been 
preferred to the “English”, in Mexico where Spanish “mores, customs and 
prejudices” and “the same conformity of spirit, character and religion” existed, 
France would similarly be privileged.17  
The economic rationale that underwrote arguments for recognition of 
independence and improved commercial relations were often tied to cultural 
assumptions. The French newspaper Le Constitutionnel noted French commerce 
had increased after the wars of independence as a result of a partiality for French 
goods because the “Spanish colonies were attracted towards [France] by a 
conformity of tastes, of religion and of sympathy.”18 The commercial agent of the 
Mexican government at Bordeaux, Gallo, argued that the development of economic 
ties between France and Latin America would be “easy” because “the French, of all 
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the Europeans, are those whose character and interests coincide the best with the 
character and interests of [Latin Americans].” Their predilection for the French was 
so marked that French language and French literature were almost “the only 
[which] can be cultivated there”. French education would make “[Latin] Americans” 
the “zealous partisans [of France]”.19 For this reason it was argued that French 
commerce could rival Britain’s. 
The premise of a preference for political and commercial relations with 
France based on a shared culture was a leitmotif for French diplomats serving in 
Latin America. The French consul and then interim chargé d’affaires in Mexico from 
1829 to 1832, Adrien Cochelet, believed that French relations with Mexico would 
improve after recognition because of “our language, our character and our 
mores.”20 Similar claims were made about other Spanish Americans: Charles 
Lefebvre de Bécourt (1811‐96), French minister to Buenos Aires, wrote “by our 
character, by our language, by our religion we have better relations with South 
Americans than the citizens of the [United States]”.21 The July Monarchy’s 
recognition of Latin American states in 1830 was justified by Molé in a report to the 
King in similar terms: “[t]he identity of our religion, the affinity of our language, the 
ease of our mores, have for a long time earned us a very marked preference of 
affection over all other peoples. This preference is primarily an undeniable gage of 
the political influence that we are destined to exert in America.”22 This theme was 
further emphasised by Deffaudis in a letter of introduction to the then Mexican 
president Anastasio Bustamante: “the lines of friendship that have formed between 
France and Mexico [are because of] the likeness of our languages and customs as 
well as the similarity of our religion.”23 While Molé and Deffaudis never used the 
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word “Latin”, the implication was clear: France held a privileged position as regards 
the former Spanish American colonies by virtue of a shared culture.24 
Chevalier’s identification of Anglo‐Saxons with Protestantism and Latins with 
Catholicism was also a political division, which informed the French debates on 
monarchy in Mexico. He claimed that the United States’ historical circumstances 
made it well suited to democracy. Catholicism, on the other hand, tended towards 
monarchy and the anarchy of the former Spanish American colonies proved the 
impracticality of republicanism in states with a Catholic tradition.25 As has been 
seen in chapter two, this was an assumption shared by some Mexican politicians, 
who argued Mexico was not ready for US‐style federal republicanism, and this view 
informed Gutiérrez de Estrada’s monarchical arguments. For de Cyprey, the 
Mexican monarch would have to be from France because the “French and Catholic 
element” was “the one that could best be assimilated to the Mexican element.”26 
He believed that Mexicans preferred “the allure of the French, the irrepressible and 
careless vivacity of our nation, our love of light and lively pleasures. In a word, they 
truly sympathise with the French.”27 There was a “confraternity” between the 
French and the Mexicans because Mexico was drawn towards France by religion 
and a “similarity of language.”28  
II 
Texas: A Conflict of Races 
On its own, this assumption of “confraternity” may not have amounted to 
much, but US expansionism was increasingly seen in racial terms by French 
observers, and by the mid‐1840s a sympathy with the southern, Catholic race 
provided the rationale for an anti‐US and pro‐Mexican foreign policy that shared 
the same goals as Chevalier’s and Louis‐Napoléon’s pan‐Latinism. This policy was 
outlined in three speeches of 1845 and 1846 delivered by Guizot.29  
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Guizot identified “two distinct races [in the Americas], the English race and 
the Spanish race”. He argued it was in the interests of France “that neither of these 
two races be destroyed or absorbed by the other […] that the Spanish race, the 
southern Catholic race, maintains in the New World its importance […and] that it 
does not fall under the yoke of, and that it is not devoured by, the Anglo‐American 
race.”30 Guizot’s image of the southern Catholic race enslaved by the north would 
become a trope of the most virulent pan‐Latinism of the 1850s and 1860s. How, 
then, had France’s Protestant foreign minister come to the conclusion that the 
concerted policy of France should be to prevent the expansion of the United States 
to save the Catholic south? 
Guizot, like many European observers, worried that the enormous US 
acquisition of territory in the first half of the nineteenth century upset the regional 
and global balance of power. In 1821 Mexico occupied an area approximately equal 
to that of the United States, and its population was roughly two‐thirds of its 
northern neighbour. However, with the end of the US‐Mexican War the United 
States acquired over 1 million square miles of additional land and its population 
increased to three times that of Mexico.31 The US was now a transcontinental 
power with access to the Pacific. In contrast, Mexico lost nearly half its national 
territory. Through waging war, the United States fashioned a momentous 
transformation of international power.32 
French observers had watched these events unfold with unease and 
concluded that the “American enemy” was real. The “republican” and “Protestant” 
US may have been at odds “with the French [Second Empire] in its very essence”,33 
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but the legitimist ultras of the Bourbon Restoration and the politically conservative 
doctrinaires of the July Monarchy were able to find fault with US democracy before 
the 1850s.34 France’s 1833 refusal to indemnify the US for shipping losses during 
the Napoleonic War, despite agreeing by treaty to pay 25 million francs in 1831, 
saw the nations threaten each other with war.35 Incidents such as this did much to 
create an undercurrent of hostility in France towards the United States.36 However, 
it was the geostrategic implications of US aggression that most worried diplomats 
and policymakers in Paris.37  
Through their dispatches to the foreign ministry, French diplomats in the 
Americas consistently warned Paris that Mexico would not be able withstand US 
expansionism. As early as 1830, Cochelet reported the opinion of Alamán that Texas 
would “pass to the North Americans” because (Cochelet quotes Alamán directly): 
“[w]e [Mexico] are too weak to successfully oppose their invasion.”38 Cochelet 
explained four days later that there were 9,000 to 10,000 “North Americans” in 
Texas “almost always in conflict with the Mexican authorities” and that it was an 
incidental question whether Texas would be taken by payment of an indemnity or 
by force of arms because it had already been invaded by American colonists.39 
Alamán, along with other Mexican leaders, was worried about Texas. 
Cochelet, or Alamán, may have exaggerated the number, but the US population 
there heavily outnumbered Spanish speakers: in 1830 there were 7,000 Americans 
to 3,000 Tejanos and by 1836 there were 35,000 to 3,500.40 A colonisation law of 
1830, discussed in more detail in section III, drafted by Alamán, had been designed 
to slow the tide of immigration from the United States, but proved unenforceable 
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because of the weakness of the Mexican government.41 The 1835 victory of 
centralism in Mexico was the occasion for a revolt in Texas, which began as a 
federalist one, but the colonists soon called for complete independence.  
This revolt confirmed French views on the weakness of Mexico. Santa Anna, 
who in 1835 was serving as president, led Mexico’s army against the insurgents. 
However, he was defeated and captured at the battle of San Jacinto in April 1836 by 
Texan forces. Having learned of these events, Deffaudis commented, “everyone is 
persuaded that Texas is definitively lost to Mexico”. He then went on to report a 
speech of Branch Tanner Archer (1790‐1856), Commissioner of Texas to the United 
States, who claimed that in “fifty years’ time the English language would be 
dominant everywhere on the American continent to the Isthmus of Panama”, a 
prediction that Deffaudis considered to be extremely likely, if perhaps in “a slightly 
more distant future”.42  
Deffaudis was not alone among French diplomats in documenting the 
pivotal role of Texas in what was increasingly seen as the inexorable rise of the 
United States. An unsigned 1838 memorandum on Texas for the then foreign 
minister, Molé, discussed the merits of recognising the nascent republic and 
reported: “they [the United States] fear nothing and already dream of the conquest 
of Mexico. It went on to summarise the process of US expansion: “[the United 
States] coveted [Texas] just as they had formerly coveted Louisiana before they 
bought it, and as they had wanted the Floridas before they invaded it, and just as 
they now covet the rest of the continent”. The report concluded that further 
expansion was inevitable: “The encroachment of, and colonisation by, the Anglo‐
American race are events that have long been foreseen and in truth would be 
difficult to prevent.”43 
Two decades before the 1850s, US expansion at the expense of former 
territories of the Spanish empire was understood as a conflict between two races. 
Eugène Maissin (1811‐51), a French naval officer who accompanied Baudin on a 
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short visit to Texas after the conclusion of the naval blockade of Veracruz in 1839, 
put the battle of San Jacinto in the following context: “it has been the first decisive 
encounter of the two predominant races in America and it has given the advantage 
to the Anglo‐Saxons.”44 Frédéric Gaillardet (1808‐82), a writer who would become 
the editor of the most widely distributed French language newspaper in the 
Americas, the Courrier des États-Unis, published a series of letters on Texas, after 
travelling through the new state in early 1839, which shared this conclusion. In the 
first letter, Gaillardet informed his readers that the US colonists “constitute[d] the 
first act of collision […] between the two English and Spanish races who share the 
Americas.”45 
For Dubois de Saligny (1809‐1888), who travelled with Gaillardet, and was 
France’s first diplomatic representative to Texas as well as later head of the French 
legation in Mexico during Louis‐Napoléon’s intervention,46 this racialised conflict 
was a foregone conclusion: “the Mexican republic is doomed [….] the day is less 
distant than generally supposed in Europe when the Spanish race as a nation will be 
dispossessed by the Anglo‐American race.”47 This was also the view the interim 
French chargé d’affaires in Mexico, who argued that the struggle between Mexico 
and the United States was “not one of principles” that could be settled by a 
compromise between the protagonists; rather, it was a conflict of “race against race 
and no one can doubt that the final victory must rest with the Anglo‐
American[s].”48 
Informed French opinion that had viewed the conflict over Texas at first 
hand saw it as a racial one, the outcome of which was clear, but there were 
different interpretations of this conclusion. Some observers saw the United States 
as the vanguard of a civilizing mission in North America. Its acquisition of new 
territories would lead to the development of previously worthless land and 
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therefore provide new markets for France.49 However, an alternative interpretation 
was to see US expansion as a geopolitical threat. This was the interpretation of pan‐
Latinists in the 1850s and 1860s, but it was also the editorial line of the Journal des 
débats and was developed in response to the Texan revolt, which began in 1835.  
Broadly, the paper saw Mexico as weak, the loss of further Mexican territory 
to the United States as a constant danger and the United States itself as an 
inherently invasive power. The incorporation of Texas into the Union would 
“singularly flatter the vanity of American democracy” and the United States would 
expand its southern borders “without difficulty and piece by piece.”50 Another 
editorial warned: “[the Texan revolt] compromises the equilibrium of the world 
because it assures the Anglo‐American domination of the entire new hemisphere. It 
threatens the industrial interests of Europe because as a consequence it must 
throw Mexico into anarchy”.51 And, in 1839, the paper published the clearest 
expression of what became pan‐Latinist policy: “[w]e belong to the same branch of 
civilisation. France is the leader and guide of the southern peoples of Europe and 
America, all of those Latin races which have been least effaced by the Germanic 
invasion.”52  
The Journal des débats occupied a privileged position under the July 
Monarchy. It was the ministerial paper par excellence and was partially funded from 
the fonds secrets, governmental money bestowed by the July Monarchy upon 
sympathetic publications. While it cannot be said to represent exactly the policy of 
any given ministry, it was particularly partisan to the doctrinaires (especially Guizot 
and de Broglie), was rarely critical and would not consistently publish a non‐
governmental line.53 Chevalier was the economics editor and a frequent 
contributor.54 The 1839 editorial quoted above is unsigned, but may well have been 
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written by Chevalier given the closeness in language and ideas, but the authorship 
is less important than the views it expresses. Such an articulation of pan‐Latinist 
ideas in 1839 demonstrates not only that it was possible to construct a role for 
France as defender of Latin civilisation in the Americas more than a decade before 
the imperialism of Louis‐Napoléon, but also that it could be done in a mainstream 
periodical close to the views of the French government. 
In an 1837 letter to a Mexican politician, Chevalier outlined what was to 
become French policy over Mexico. “The situation of Mexico distresses me”, he 
wrote. Mexico possessed everything necessary to be a powerful state, but it was 
falling into dissolution. Furthermore, the conquest by the United States had already 
begun; the taking of Texas was the first step. “I strongly believe”, he continued, 
“that the integrity, the strength and the independence of Mexico is important to 
the equilibrium of the world”. France had an interest there, not the selfish interests 
of other cabinets, but that “great and civilizing interest which habitually regulates 
the foreign policy of France.”55 
In this letter, Chevalier lamented the fact that European governments, and 
especially France, did not understand the importance of Latin America and above 
all Mexico. In fact, however, as has been outlined above, many French observers 
did share his concerns. Indeed, part of Louis‐Napoléon’s argument for a canal 
through Nicaragua rested on the idea that it would lead to “Central America 
[becoming] a flourishing and powerful state, which will establish a balance of power 
[…] and […] prevent, by backing Mexico, any further encroachment from the 
north.”56 Rather than a canal to its south, Guizot looked to Mexico’s north: he 
hoped to achieve the same goal of strengthening Mexico by developing Texas as a 
bulwark against further US expansion, which would in turn protect Mexico from 
further loss of territory. Britain shared France’s desire to prevent annexation and 
the two governments acted in concert to achieve their goal by privately 
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encouraging Texas to oppose annexation to the United States, while at the same 
time urging Mexico to recognise the independence of its former territory.57 Guizot 
partially justified this course of action because of France’s commercial interests in 
the Texan republic. However, the main rationale was what he termed France’s 
“political interest”. In a speech of 12 January 1846, Guizot mirrored the racialised 
language of French diplomats: an independent Texas would be “a means to prevent 
in North America […] a conflict of two races, Spanish and Anglo‐American, and the 
absorption of one by the other.” This would also preserve a “number of 
independent states in the New World, and, by consequence, maintain a certain 
equilibrium between these states.”58  
French responses to US expansion were varied and Guizot’s opposition to 
the annexation of Texas attracted significant criticism, particularly from opposition 
politicians such as Thiers, who saw the geostrategic implications of US expansion in 
a different light: the aggrandisement of the United States could benefit France by 
challenging British power. Thiers, therefore, attacked Guizot’s policy in the 
Chamber of Deputies. Thiers noted that the United States had grown in population 
and power since independence, but this was not something to be feared. It had, in 
fact, been the secret plan of France inaugurated by Louis XVI when “he founded the 
United States” and continued by Napoléon Bonaparte when he “knowingly and 
voluntarily gave Louisiana [to the United States]”. Thiers denied that America could 
become “a rival or an enemy of France”.  
He ridiculed Guizot’s belief that the “Spanish race” was threatened by the 
“Anglo‐American” one because the United States had neither Britain’s naval 
strength nor its pretensions to global dominance. Thiers could understand Guizot’s 
worries over America if France had retained Canada or Louisiana, but the only 
French colonies were Martinique, Guadeloupe and a “few other insignificant 
possessions.” Fears of the United States were misplaced: “who threatens theses 
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colonies? Where are they placed? [...] in the middle of an English archipelago.” 
Britain was France’s rival, not the United States, and a challenge to British 
hegemony was therefore beneficial to France.59  
From the perspective of the immediate material interests of France, Thiers’ 
criticisms were pertinent. France, as Guizot himself admitted, had only a small 
volume of trade with Texas in the 1840s and only a few colonies in the Caribbean. 
This demonstrates the importance of representing the conflict in North America in 
terms of race. By casting France as the defender of the “Spanish race, the southern 
Catholic race” Guizot placed his policy in a wider geostrategic context, where the 
aggrandisement of the United States did threaten French interests. This was what 
Guizot termed France’s “political interest”, but for Thiers the aggrandisement of the 
United States was not a threat, thus for him there was no reason to support Mexico 
by preventing the annexation of Texas.60 
However, in a pan‐Latinist worldview US expansion was inherently 
detrimental to France. This was made clear in Chevalier’s early conceptualisation of 
the discourse: “the superiority which formerly belonged to the Latin family, has 
passed into the hands of the Teutonic race [….] The people of the Latin stock must 
not, however, stand idle in the coming struggle, or the case will go against them by 
default”.61 Chevalier outlined the centrality of Mexico in this global conflict in an 
1840 article that argued against the claim that US expansion could benefit France.62 
Chevalier, like Guizot, argued that the balance between the two forces in America 
had been disturbed by the Texan revolt: “South America, with Mexico, is like 
southern Europe, Catholic and Latin; North America belongs to a Protestant and 
Anglo‐Saxon population. But today the equilibrium is broken.” He warned that the 
“Catholic and Latin flag […] will be replaced or conquered by the Anglo‐Saxon 
standard” and that “one of the most beautiful jewels [Mexico] in the Catholic and 
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Latin crown [will] fall into the hands of the invading Anglo‐Saxons.”63 While Guizot’s 
language was less alarmist than Chevalier’s, his goal was the same and his policy 
was predicated upon a conception of an unequal struggle on the North American 
continent between two races where the sympathies of France lay with the 
southern, Catholic peoples. In short, it was pan‐Latinist in all but name. 
France and Britain’s attempts to prevent the annexation of Texas were 
unsuccessful. In 1845 the former Mexican territory was incorporated into the Union 
and the next year Mexico’s politicians were forced reluctantly into a war with the 
United States by the bellicosity of public opinion and the determination of Polk to 
provoke a conflict.64 The US‐Mexican War confirmed the assumptions of French 
diplomats. Because France had broken diplomatic relations with Mexico in 1846,65 
the Spanish minister Salvador Bermúdez de Castro (1817‐83) acted as French 
chargé d’affaires and it was left to the secretary of the French legation to report on 
the war from Havana. He believed that the Americans were “a rising people” who 
had invented a new way to make war: “annexation”. What the United States had 
done in Texas they would repeat in Alta and Baja California to achieve their long‐
held ambition of reaching the Pacific Ocean.66 Once war had broken out he 
informed Guizot that it meant “nothing less than the complete annihilation of the 
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Mexican nationality”.67 The French consul in Havana was even more pessimistic: 
“the Anglo‐Saxon race is going to reign in Mexico as it does in Delhi” and “I am 
convinced that Mexico has ceased to be”. For the consul, the incorporation of Texas 
into the Union was part of “a conquest that in a half century will finally be 
complete.”68  
The worst fears of the Journal des débats were confirmed by the US‐
Mexican War. An editorial rhetorically asked: “[w]ould the possession of Texas, 
Florida and Louisiana satiate the ambition of the “Anglo‐Saxon race?” 
Unsurprisingly for a paper that had railed against US expansionism for the past 
decade the answer was no, and the article expressed the concerns Louis‐Napoléon 
used to explain French intervention in Mexico fifteen years later: the United States 
would go as far as Panama and even threaten the Antilles.69 This view was shared 
by many French commentators, such as Gabriel Ferry (1809‐52), a French writer 
who had spent some time in Mexico. He wrote in the Revue des deux mondes that 
the US‐Mexican War had shown “how little the Spanish race, if left to itself, is in a 
position to offer serious resistance to the Anglo‐Saxon race.” It was left to Europe 
to correct this “default of equilibrium”.70  
It is within this context of widespread views of Mexico as a southern 
Catholic nation with a natural affinity for France and threatened by “Anglo‐Saxon” 
invasion, that pan‐Latinist ideas were able to flourish in the 1850s and 1860s. It also 
explains why the first published arguments for pan‐Latinist policies after the US‐
Mexican War were not written by Chevalier. In an 1849 work, Benjamin Poucel 
(1807‐69) argued that it was necessary for France to “balance the material power of 
the Anglo‐Saxon race in America by a serious alliance with the Latin race.”71 Poucel 
was responding to the situation in the River Plate, but Hippolyte Du Pasquier de 
Dommartin (1819‐unknown), claimed, as regards Mexico, and following Chevalier’s 
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pan‐Latinist analysis closely, “the observer, who follows the movement of people 
on a map of the world, is struck by three great facts: the state of stagnation of the 
Latin race […] the maritime progress of the Anglo‐Saxon race […] and finally the 
military advance of the Slavs”. This situation had “worried [Dommartin] for a long 
time”; he felt France’s traditions and interests were threatened, even its language. 
In North America, the only barrier to the ambitions of the United States was a weak 
Mexico, which “represents the Latin and Catholic race”. He called on “our men of 
the same blood, of the same mores, the same religion” to rescue Mexico.72 Phelan 
and Rojas Mix argue that pan‐Latinism was an ideology composed to legitimate the 
“expansionism” of Louis‐Napoléon, but, unless they were particularly prescient, 
Poucel and Du Pasquier de Dommartin cannot have been writing tracts to justify 
the imperialism of the French Second Empire before it was founded. Certainly they 
were not expressing ideas new to the 1850s, nor, as will be seen below, were they 
exclusively French ideas. 
III 
The View from Mexico  
In a published letter to the US Whig politician Henry Clay (1777‐1852), the 
liberal theologian William Ellery Channing (1780‐1842) wrote, “Some crimes, by 
their magnitude, have a touch of the sublime; and to this dignity the seizure of 
Texas by [US] citizens is entitled. Modern times furnish no example of individual 
rapine on so grand a scale. It is nothing less than the robbery of a realm.”73 
Channing’s analysis echoed that of most Mexican observers, and his letter was 
quoted by the Mexican monarchist Hidalgo y Esnaurrízar, who then summarised the 
anti‐Americanism that had developed in conservative thought from 1820 to 1867. 
“Since 1824”, he wrote, “when the United States planted the republican seed in 
Mexico”, Washington had always sympathised with, and given help to, “the party 
that was able to do the greatest evil [puro liberals]”. Moreover, the “Monroe 
Doctrine, so unnatural, has served as the pretext to completely isolate Europe from 
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America” and was declared on the principle that “Manifest Destiny” was to 
“dominate the entire continent of America”. Those in Europe who had opposed 
French intervention in Mexico would soon realise that one day everyone would 
“bow their heads before the United States”, but by the time they did it would be 
too late to do anything about it.74 
In fact, as has been seen, many in France shared these fears, and the same 
concerns lay at the heart of conservative discourse in Mexico throughout the period 
under study. It has already been shown in chapter two that conservative politicians 
in Mexico believed that from the 1820s onwards the United States played a 
partisan and destabilising role which favoured federalism and liberalism in Mexican 
politics. This was one strand of the conservative anti‐American discourse in Mexico, 
which was reinforced by another: US expansion. In this view, far from a model 
republic of liberty which the former Spanish colonies should imitate, the United 
States was an aggressive power, hostile to Latin America and Mexico especially. The 
Texan revolt convinced many in Mexico of the veracity of this interpretation over a 
decade before the US‐Mexican War. 
From its inception Mexico had been wary of US ambitions. As early as 1821 
a government commission on foreign relations warned that the United States might 
strip Mexico of its northern territories.75 In a speech to Congress, Iturbide claimed 
“our country is in danger […] it is threatened on all sides […] it has both external and 
internal enemies”. One of these threats was “on the side of Texas” where “our 
neighbours feel an interest”.76 However, Mexican attempts to secure and govern its 
far northern territories, which would help neutralise the US threat, were hindered 
by the weakness of the Mexican state, which was marked by political instability, 
fiscal insolvency and military weakness.77  
Early Mexican views of the United States were ambivalent. Although the 
United States was the first nation to recognise Mexican independence, it took 
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another three years before it sent an accredited minister, Poinsett, who had 
instructions to purchase Texas. Therefore relations were rarely cordial and Mexican 
politicians were acutely aware of US territorial ambitions.78 In 1826, the British 
chargé d’affaires published a work by the former Spanish minister to Washington, 
Luis de Onís (1762‐1827). This was one of the earliest and most influential accounts 
in Spanish of Mexico’s northern neighbour. Onís warned that Anglo‐Americans 
“looked with disdain or contempt on all the other nations” and that their rapid 
success in the New World had engendered “vanity and arrogance” and a belief that 
they were “superior to all other men”.79 The conduct of Anglo‐American colonists in 
Texas, the US volunteers who joined the revolt and the material aid they received 
from within the United States convinced many Mexicans that Onís had been right. 
Texas was an immediate cause of concern for Mexican politicians even 
before the events of 1835‐36, but in the 1820s many had hoped that Mexican‐US 
relations would be mutually beneficial. In 1824, Tornel warned that if Mexican 
“recklessness” excited “rivalry with [the United States]” then “our western borders 
will be overrun with the same violence as the waters of the Missouri”, but the 
United States were Mexico’s “natural allies” because Washington’s policy towards 
Latin American independence had been more favourable than that of major 
continental European powers. However, Tornel came to share Alamán’s negative 
view of Poinsett’s involvement in Mexican politics, and Texas played a major part in 
forming this opinion. In the immediate aftermath of the revolt, he argued, far from 
being the “natural allies” of Mexico: “[f]or more than fifty years […] the prevailing 
thought in the [United States] has been the acquisition of the greater part of the 
territory that formerly belonged to Spain, particularly that part which today belongs 
to the Mexican nation.”80 Tracing the roots of US expansionism and depicting it as 
an inherently invasive power, the arguments in Tornel’s interpretation of US‐
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Mexican relations in 1837 would have been familiar to a reader of the Journal des 
débats.  
In order to stem the tide of US migration to Texas, Alamán drafted a law in 
1830 which aimed at limiting Anglo‐American colonisation. In the proposal for this 
law, he outlined his distrust of the United States. From its inception it had 
expanded at the expense of European powers and indigenous tribes. In place of 
armies, battalions and invasions, the United States sent colonists, which gradually 
outnumbered those already in the territory and undermined the authority of the 
state. Once this stage had been reached, and this was the stage Texas was at in 
1830, the diplomatic assault began. In the name of protecting settlers and their 
interests Washington pushed the other power towards a “transaction as onerous 
for one side as it is advantageous for the other.” The loss of Texas would then 
endanger states “from New Mexico and Chihuahua to San Luis [sic] and 
Guanajuato”. Central to Alamán’s proposals was the idea of increasing the number 
of Mexican settlers in Texas and encouraging European immigrants “whose religion, 
language, customs and habits are in opposition to those of the United States.” The 
aim was to form a barrier against further US encroachments. Without immediate 
and energetic action, Alamán concluded, “Texas is going to be lost to [Mexico]”. 
Moreover, once this happened it would prove impossible to reconquer. Everything 
that Alamán predicted came to pass: events in Texas demonstrated to him the 
“insatiable” nature of the “invasive genius” of the “Anglo‐Saxon” race, which 
wished to extend itself across the whole continent of “North America.”81  
This conflict with the United States was frequently represented as one 
which threatened Mexico’s existence: “[i]n a word, [US aggression] will leave 
[Mexico] without a country”.82 It was thus a “war of race, of religion, of language 
and of customs”.83 For conservative politicians, Poinsett and US‐style federal 
republicanism were linked to Mexican liberals as part of a plan to destabilise 
Mexico in order to “tear [it] apart with continuous convulsions so that we never 
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consolidate ourselves under any system [of government] and remain in perpetual 
weakness”, while [the US government] advanced their plans to seize Texas.84 These 
charges against Mexican liberals were given credence by the open admiration of 
some of them for the United States.85 Indeed, Zavala supported the federalist revolt 
in Texas and became the vice‐president of the Texan republic.86  
The US threat led some Mexican politicians to look to Europe for support in 
preventing further US expansion. Tornel’s work concludes with a discussion of 
Britain and France, to whom he appeals to stop the march of the “Colossus of the 
North.” As regards France, Tornel wrote, “the character of the French people has so 
many points in common with that of our own, the advantages of a reciprocal trade 
are so marked, and her interests in maintaining the balance of power both in the 
old and the new worlds so great, that she cannot very well make an exception in 
her magnanimous and humane policy, by abandoning Mexico to a doubtful state.”87 
In 1824 Tornel called the United States a “natural ally”; in 1837 it threatened the 
“political existence” of Mexico, the fate of which would be as sad as Poland’s.88 This 
journey was representative of the disillusionment of many Mexican politicians,89 
but it was particularly acute amongst more conservative sections of the elite 
because US expansion was linked to Mexican liberalism by a pernicious plan to 
export the “exotic flowers” of federalism and pure democracy that would weaken 
Mexico in order to facilitate the eventual absorption of the entire nation.90  
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IV 
Monarchism, Anti-Americanism and Pan-Latinism 
Anti‐Americanism was, then, a well‐trodden path for many Mexican 
politicians. It is within this context that the resurgence of monarchical ideas, which 
looked to Europe for protection and inspiration, needs to be placed. Chapter two 
outlined how Gutiérrez de Estrada saw the July Monarchy as a model to end the 
anarchy of Mexican politics. He also argued for monarchy in geopolitical terms: a 
means to stop the progress made by the “Anglo‐Saxon” race in Texas. He warned 
that if Mexico did not act soon then “the flag of the [United States]” would be 
unfurled above the national palace while Protestant services would be celebrated in 
the “splendid Cathedral of Mexico”.91 
The reaction to his pamphlet meant that Gutiérrez de Estrada spent the rest 
of his life in exile. However, his ideas resonated with some in Mexico and the most 
open identification in the 1840s with Europe as a means to safeguard the 
independence of Mexico in the face of US aggression came from monarchists, who 
restated and developed the ideas of Gutiérrez de Estrada and combined them with 
a strong current of anti‐Americanism. Fanny Calderón de la Barca had written in 
1840 “[it is claimed that] many distinguished men here hold the same opinions [as 
Gutiérrez de Estrada], but their voices, even were they to venture to raise them, 
could not stem the tide of public indignation.”92 By 1846, however, monarchists 
were prepared to incur the wrath of public opinion in order to promote their cause.    
One man who came to identify with Gutiérrez de Estrada’s views and, 
according to one source, had held them since 1832, was Mariano Paredes y 
Arrillaga (1797‐1849).93 Paredes was strongly pro‐clerical, anti‐democratic and 
nostalgic for the order and stability of the colonial past.94 The liberal Guillermo 
Prieto (1818‐97) wrote: “his admiration for the Spanish system was profound and 
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his hatred of the mob was insuperable.”95 He shared conservative contempt for 
federal republicanism and advocated a regime dominated by the army, clergy and 
propertied classes.96 On 14 December 1845 he issued a pronunciamiento against 
the moderate liberal government, but what separated this revolt from the many 
others that had gone before was that the plan called for an “extraordinary congress 
with full powers to constitute the nation without any restrictions”.97  
Although monarchy was not explicitly mentioned, Gutiérrez de Estrada’s 
plan was in effect being put into action. Paredes was in secret communication with 
Alamán and, backed by Madrid, the Spanish minister to Mexico, Bermúdez de 
Castro, who wished to see Mexico become a monarchy and helped to compose the 
Plan of San Luis Potosi (the manifesto for Paredes’ revolt against the government). 
Nonetheless, Paredes’ supporters included staunch republican santanistas such as 
Tornel. He was, therefore, cautious about openly proclaiming monarchical 
intentions, although he was equally reluctant to rule out publicly a change in 
governmental system.98 In order to prepare public opinion for the possibility of 
monarchy a newspaper, El Tiempo, was set up. Partially funded by money provided 
by the Spanish government, the paper was associated with various individuals, 
particularly Alamán, who would become influential figures in the Conservative 
Party, and, later, many were supporters of the French intervention and the Mexican 
Second Empire.99 
 Initially, the paper espoused familiar arguments: recent Mexican history 
demonstrated the inadequacy of the various forms of government, and the 
inherent instability in Mexican politics, since independence. The solution was that 
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“political institutions” should conform to the current state of society and politicians 
should stop pretending that society could be compelled to conform to institutions. 
These were, admitted the editorial, “essentially conservative principles”.100 El 
Tiempo ridiculed the belief that reforms would accustom Mexican society to 
republican institutions: If Mexico had lost Texas and was about to lose California, if 
Yucatán had separated from Mexico, if there was no economy, credit, resources, if 
morality and disorder had entered the administration, if there were revolts every 
year and scandals every day, “this is nothing, this only happens while the 
institutions acclimatise. Under the current system only the first five hundred years 
are bad. After that it is another thing”. The paper argued further that “liberty can 
exist under a constitutional monarchy the same as in a republic” and “we are 
capable of preferring the monarchical institutions of Britain and France to the 
republican institutions of Venice.”101  
It was not, however, until 12 February 1846 that the paper declared itself 
openly in favour of monarchy. An editorial entitled ‘Our Profession of Faith’ 
outlined the newspaper’s “political principles”. Independence was a glorious and 
necessary fact, and the Plan of Iguala promised a prosperous future uniting all 
sections of Mexican society. However, as discussed in chapter two, the plan had not 
been enacted and the First Mexican Empire had fallen. In its place, “the [United 
States] began to build another kind of empire” through its books, its ideas, its 
representatives and its deceptive prosperity (deceptive because Mexican liberals 
had attributed US prosperity to federal republicanism) directed and encouraged 
republican ideas. Failing to take into account the differences of “origin, religion and 
history”, Mexican politicians had made the mistake of thinking that the best route 
to prosperity was to “throw ourselves into the arms of the [United States], slavishly 
imitate its institutions and follow its perfidious advice.” The “absurd” 1824 
Constitution had therefore been adopted, and with disastrous consequences. By 
1846 the results were clear: a disorganised administration, a ruined economy, 
enormous debts, “barbarians pushing back the borders of civilisation”, Yucatán 
separated, the United States occupying Mexican territory and the state unable to 
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protect itself militarily. If Mexico continued down this path it would lead to “not 
only ruin, demoralisation, anarchy, but also the entire dissolution of the nation, the 
loss of our territory, our name, our independence.” 
The solution was “representative monarchy”, the “promises and Guarantees 
of the Plan of Iguala.” This in turn would develop commerce, protect industry and 
give impetus to the intellectual activity. There would be “no other aristocracy than 
that of merit”. In this ideal state there would be a strong army, distant provinces 
would be protected, Church property would not be threatened and Catholicism 
would be the only religion tolerated. The paper did not want a “reaction”: 
“[c]onservative by character and conviction, we ask protection for all legitimate 
interests whatever may be their origin.”102 As will be seen in chapters four and five, 
monarchist, and conservative arguments more generally, developed significantly in 
the next decade to incorporate economic development as well as administrative 
reform, but the concerns of the 1840s were not dramatically different to those of 
the early 1820s. Fear of US aggression, however, as well as its perceived political 
and cultural influence on Mexico, gave the polemics an urgency lacking in earlier 
manifestations of monarchical arguments – in the 1840s monarchy was a solution 
to an immediate and external existential threat.  
There were numerous articles expressing belligerent anti‐Americanism, 
which normally incorporated one or more of the following familiar arguments: i) 
the United States had deliberately exported federal republicanism in order to 
weaken Mexico; ii) some liberals in Mexico had worked, and were working, with the 
United States to destroy Mexico; iii) the United States was an inherently aggressive 
power that used immigration to weaken the national government’s hold on distant 
territory and this was a prelude to annexation; iv) the “Anglo‐Saxon” race was the 
implacable “enemy” of Mexico and its “race”; v) the Protestant US aimed at 
destroying Catholic Mexico.103 Taken collectively, this meant that war against the 
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United States was a “national war” and at stake was the existence of the Mexican 
nation. If the United States triumphed then “we will be its slaves, and our religion, 
customs and language will end with the current generation”.104   
For El Tiempo, Mexico was faced with the question “to be, or not to be” as a 
consequence of its political instability and the US threat.105 The paper thus argued 
that Mexico needed to restore its reputation in Europe in order to secure alliances 
against the United States.106 It was in Europe’s interest, ran another editorial, for 
Mexico to “increase [its] forces in order to resist the [United States]” because it 
could not view with indifference the “immense” increase in power that the 
“turbulent American democracy” would acquire by absorbing Mexico. Europe’s 
political influence, its commercial concerns and the equilibrium of the world 
necessitated a “counterweight” to the United States.107  
The Journal des débats played a role in this discussion. An article published 
on 12 January 1846 in this newspaper argued, as conservative Mexicans had done, 
that Poinsett introduced federalism into Mexico in order to make its later conquest 
by the United States easier, and also claimed that “private correspondence and 
reliable travellers tell us that all the honest men in [Mexico] regret [the absence] of 
royal power and wish to see it reconstituted in the hands of a foreign prince.”108 El 
Tiempo translated this article and commented that “thus was opinion in Europe 
before either the plan or the result of [Paredes’ revolt] were known’.109 The paper 
delighted in an interpretation of Mexican events that mirrored its own. 
As with Gutiérrez de Estrada, the editorials of El Tiempo saw the western 
European constitutional monarchies, especially France, as paradigms. Just as in 
Europe, constitutional monarchy in Mexico would result in a meritocracy where 
“the democratic element is everything, the aristocratic nothing.” The evidence for 
this argument was that the leading statesmen of France, such as Guizot, Thiers, 
Perier and Villèle, had, an editorial argued, all come from humble backgrounds. 
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Moreover, it was pointed out that change to representative institutions would not 
be radical: in Britain and France the parliamentary system corresponded to the 
upper and lower houses of Mexico.110 Finally, critics of El Tiempo had deliberately 
confused their ideas with the monarchies of Austria, Prussia and Russia, not France, 
Britain and Belgium which were the true models. The paper quoted a speech by 
Guizot at length.111 
Anti‐US invective was part of Mexican public discourse after the Texan 
revolt and in the run up to the US‐Mexican War, but what separated El Tiempo from 
its peers was that they synthesised anti‐Americanism into an argument against all 
forms of republicanism in favour of monarchy and orientation towards Europe.112 
As Justo Sierra noted later, “the [conservative] politics at the time of Gutiérrez de 
Estrada […] had no other desire than to implant [in Mexico] what [had been done] 
in France, our intellectual mother.” This was the apogee, he continued, of the 
constitutional system under the house of Orléans, which seemed as though it would 
endure and “[Mexican] thinkers” were “fascinated by its prestige”. They admired its 
leading statesmen: Guizot, Thiers, Victor de Broglie and Molé were named amongst 
others. Those who wanted a monarchy in Mexico were, then, “liberals in what 
pertained to civil liberty, and to a certain extent to political freedom” as well. Sierra 
concluded that what they were searching for in constitutional monarchy was the 
guarantee of “certain rights to life, property and liberty”, which they did not think 
could be safeguarded in Mexico while the president was not outside or above party 
disputes.113 Sierra’s analysis was correct: conservative thinkers argued that these 
rights were respected when society was ordered, but when they were not the result 
was social dissolution. Good and bad elements existed in all societies and the art of 
government was to suppress the latter in order to protect the former, but in 
Mexico all respect for authority had broken down and thus so too “the conservative 
power of order”.114 It was this collapse of order that monarchy would address.  
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The details of how the monarchy would be constituted were vague because 
monarchy was a programme in itself. Although, as has been seen, criticisms of the 
1824 Constitution were legion, at heart they rested on two elements: a weak 
executive within a federal republic. This is what Alamán meant when he described it 
as “a monstrous graft of the US Constitution on to that of [the Spanish Constitution 
of 1812]”.115 The same point was made by El Tiempo: the Spanish Constitution of 
1812, following French revolutionary influence, gave too much power to the 
legislature, making it the “origin of all power”, whereas US‐style republicanism 
required a strong executive.116 As discussed in chapter two, the constitutional 
reforms of the 1830s had been attempts to solve such concerns, but they had 
proved unsuccessful. A monarchical regime was attractive because, in theory at 
least, it unravelled, at a stroke, all of these perceived problems. Congress would be 
elected on a restricted franchise: party divisions would be moderated by an 
impartial ruler, who would be a powerful head of state at the helm of a centralist 
administration. Finally, it was argued that only under a monarchy could corporate 
bodies, key elements of society, such as the church and the army, be protected, 
while order would be restored.117  
El Tiempo stressed the disorder, anarchy and chaos in post‐independence 
Mexico. In the newspapers view, there was no respect for authority, the rule of law 
had broken down and factions contended for power, but the power they fought for 
had lost all legitimacy and social order had collapsed. Some insight into the vision of 
those who supported Paredes is given by the electoral law which was drawn up in 
order to choose the deputies who would make up the constituent congress. 
Reported to be the work of Alamán, it was distinctive, although it had antecedents 
in the previous electoral system used in Mexico in 1821 and the 1843, and was 
influenced by the ideas of Burke. The main innovation was that the makeup of the 
congress would be organised by class as defined by occupation. In total there would 
be 160 deputies, which would be consist of 38 landowners, 20 merchants, 14 
miners, 14 industrialists, 14 literary professors, 10 magistrates, 10 public 
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administrators, 20 clergy and 20 military.118 It was an attempt to impose order, to 
accord each valuable section of society its proper place. 
The majority of voters were excluded from the electoral process. The 
franchise was based on income, although it varied for different classes, and some 
representatives were elected directly, others indirectly. In this sense it was trying to 
correct one of the major defects identified by Iturbide in the system used for the 
1821 congress: it did not take into account that “[the number of] representatives 
ought to be in proportion to the civilisation of the represented”. He explained that 
three or four individuals could be selected from among one hundred “well‐
educated citizens”, whereas among a thousand without education “scarcely one 
man can be met with of sufficient ability to know what is conducive to public 
welfare”.119 The system drawn up in 1846 is, then, at least illustrative of what was 
meant in practice by not being educated enough to enact democratic republican 
government.120 Nonetheless, it would be dangerous to extrapolate too much from 
this electoral experiment because the law was designed to elect a congress that 
would in turn vote for a monarchical government, therefore it necessarily required 
that a narrow section of Mexico’s elite be returned who might plausibly support 
this. And in bringing about this composition one of its architects judged it successful 
in that the deputies were, according to Bermúdez de Castro, predominantly made 
up of “sensible people” who belonged to (what he called) the “conservative 
party”.121 
Many of those elected played a prominent role in Mexican conservatism and 
later supported Maximilian,122 and “a great part of the affluent classes subscribed 
to [El Tiempo]”, but its open support for monarchism “caused a profound 
sensation” and the “entire press, without exception […] rose against [its] ideas”.123 
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Paredes was forced to drop monarchy partly because of its controversy and 
unpopularity amongst his own supporters, such as Tornel. Naturally, republican 
papers, such as El Siglo XIX, El Monitor Republicano and the newly formed 
ministerial, but republican, La Reforma, railed against any attempt to change the 
political institutions of the country,124 but even later monarchists, such as Juan 
Nepomuceno Almonte and Antonio Haro y Tamariz (1811‐69) were at this time 
openly against the ideas expressed in El Tiempo.125 Paredes, in an ultimately 
unsuccessful bid to retain power, pronounced himself in favour of republican 
government in a speech of 6 June 1846 to the new congress. The next day El 
Tiempo announced it would cease publication because it could not continue to 
support the present government, but did not wish to oppose it during a time of 
war.126 
In 1846, anti‐Americanism alongside monarchist ideas combined to create 
the most concerted attempt to found a monarchy in Mexico since the Plan of 
Iguala.127 The failure of this plan, Duflot de Mofras argued, was greatly to the 
detriment of French interests because it would result in the US conquest of Mexico. 
He argued in 1847 that for “monarchical and Catholic France” the “annihilation of 
people of Latin origin […] to which [France] is tied by the double line of language 
and religion” would be disaster. The solution was to support those Mexicans, like 
Gutiérrez de Estrada and Paredes, who wanted to found a monarchy.128  
Many Mexican conservative politicians accepted the geostrategic and 
geopolitical rationale that underpinned pan‐Latinism. Increasingly, they turned 
towards France for inspiration for their political projects. Alamán had looked to 
Spain for help to found a monarchy in 1846, but in the 1850s attention turned to 
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the French Second Empire. Mexican conservatives realised that Spanish power was 
limited and identified France as the strongest “Latin” and Catholic nation. 
Buenaventura Vivó, Santa Anna’s minister to Spain during his 1853‐55 dictatorship, 
pointed out that France was the “first” power of the “Latin race” in Europe and it 
had “greater sympathies for Mexico and the Spanish‐American people than any 
other nation, and was better able to make these sympathies effective.”129  
This was part of a shift in Mexico in the 1850s from a pan‐Hispanic 
conception to a pan‐Latinist one. Poucel’s pamphlet, discussed above, introduced 
the category of “Latin” more widely into the Mexican conservative press. The 
pamphlet was a précis of Chevalier’s ideas and cited the more celebrated author 
numerous times. It was translated in El Correo de Ultramar and reprinted from this 
Parisian paper in El Orden in Mexico City.130 The newspaper of the Conservative 
Party, El Universal,131 had picked up on it earlier and analysed it in a series of six 
editorials. Although the paper argued that reducing the races of the Americas into 
two categories was overly simplistic, the geopolitical and geostrategic argument of 
Poucel largely fitted the paper’s own understanding of the international context.132 
Identification with the Latin race became increasingly common in 1850s Mexican 
conservative discourse. For example, an 1854 editorial predicted a great future for 
the “Latin race […] to which we belong by our origins and to which we are bound by 
indestructible sympathies.”133  
Conservatives also agreed with the argument that more authoritarian 
government was better suited to Latin races. An 1855 pamphlet argued that 
liberalism was successful amongst “Teutonic” races, but amongst the Latin race, “to 
which we belong”, the Conservative Party represented the ideas that would be 
most successful.134 By the late 1850s, “Latin” was used interchangeably with 
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“Hispano‐American” or “Spanish American” in the semi‐official newspaper of the 
Conservative Party, La Sociedad.135 The newspaper was contacted in an open letter 
from the editor of the French journal the Revue des races latines. In an editorial 
following on from the publication of this letter, La Sociedad described the “Revista 
de las razas latinas” as dedicated to the interests of “the Spanish American 
people”.136 
Perhaps the most striking example of anti‐Americanism combined with pan‐
Latinism in conservative Mexican discourse is provided by José Ramón Pacheco, 
Santa Anna’s minister to France from 1853 to 1855. Pacheco argued that the United 
States was an expansionist power which threatened Mexico and Central America as 
far as Panama as well as Cuba. The Monroe Doctrine was not a fraternal policy in 
the interests of the other American republics; rather, it was a project which aimed 
at exclusive domination and allowed the United States to act with impunity. New 
Orleans was the “Algiers” of modern times, filibusters were its pirates. 
Furthermore, in the struggle between the forces of order and “socialists” or 
“communists” the radical democracy of the United States supported the latter. This 
was not, then, merely a question of the independence of some “half‐forgotten 
republic”, but rather a crisis for the civilised world as a whole which was threatened 
by these “new Goths and Vandals”. Mexico was on the frontline of this struggle and 
France must take an interest in its survival.137 In private conversations with the 
French foreign minister, Pacheco argued that France had a duty to protect Mexico 
because it was “the most powerful [nation] of the Latin peoples”. Moreover, 
Pacheco associated liberalism with the violence of the French revolution and 
warned that this would be unleashed across the American continent by the “Anglo‐
Saxons.”138 This is one of the first examples of an argument for French intervention 
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in Mexico made at a government level in pan‐Latinist terms, and it was made by a 
Mexican in 1853.139 
It was not only Santa Anna’s diplomats who interpreted the 1850s 
international context through the prism of pan‐Latinism and looked to France to 
support “Latin” races in the Americas: this was a view shared by many in the 
Spanish speaking world. El Correo de Ultramar, which was later edited by Torres 
Caicedo,140 believed that there was a struggle between the “Latin” and “Anglo‐
Saxon” races in the Americas. The former needed to unite and work with Europe in 
order to safeguard its borders from the US threat, an argument the paper claimed it 
had made consistently for the last six years. Louis‐Napoléon’s mission in America 
was the same in the West as it was in the East: “to sustain the weak against the 
strong”.141 The paper had earlier argued that, although “Latin America” should be 
free from interference, Europe was necessary to maintain the balance of power and 
the Monroe Doctrine was an absurd fiction which aimed at US dominance..142  
Periodicals published in Madrid such as the Revista española de ambos 
mundos and La América made similar arguments warning that the Latin or Hispanic 
race faced extinction in the Americas.143 In the former, the Spaniard Francisco 
Muñoz del Monte (1800‐65) lamented Europe’s inability to prevent US expansion: 
“in vain Guizot […] proclaimed the solemn commitment to prevent the annihilation 
of the Latin race”.144 The Cuban‐Spanish creole Francisco de Frías y Jacob (1809‐77) 
warned Louis‐Napoléon that the “triumph of the United States” would signal the 
end of the Latin race and, as its guardian, France’s duty was to support the forces of 
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order in Mexico against the United States.145 The Chilean Ambrosio Montt (1830‐
99) identified Louis‐Napoléon as the most powerful sovereign in Europe and asked 
rhetorically: “does he […] try to ensure the independence and integrity of the Latin 
republics of America so threatened by Anglo‐Saxon democracy?” The answer, sadly, 
was no, he did not “harbour any such ambitions”.146  
In France authors such as Chevalier, Poucel, de Fossey and Ferry had 
warned, in similarly pan‐Latinist language, that the absorption of Mexico by the 
United States was imminent.147 An 1856 article by the journalist Félix Belly (1816‐
88) in the Revue contemporaine, one of the first anywhere to use the term “Latin 
America”, wrote that “the suzerainty of the entire New World is claimed by an 
invading republic” which “threatens the independence of its neighbours, the 
autonomy of the Spanish race and the commercial freedom of the globe.”148 
Writing in 1855, Jean‐Jacques Ampère (1800‐64) believed the United States to be 
an expansionist power, and Mexico to be more under threat than Cuba.149 Such 
anti‐Americanism was not, then, merely the minority view of publications such as 
the Revue des races latines,150 but was shared by Mexican conservatives, French 
diplomats, the foreign ministry in Paris and many French, Spanish and Latin 
American publicists. 
As has been shown, fear of the United States had been a preoccupation in 
French thought and was frequently expressed in pan‐Latinist terms. In a virulently 
anti‐American article, Alphonse de Lamartine (1790‐69) wrote that the idea behind 
French intervention in Mexico was “great”: far from being motivated by petty 
monetary concerns, or even the protection of French nationals, the policy “was for 
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the salvation of America and the world.” Lamartine argued that the United States 
threatened “all the capitals of civilised South America.” Therefore France must 
“anticipate events [and] protect the Latin race” by defending Mexico, not merely 
for its own interest, but for that of Europe as well.151 This argument was the first of 
Chevalier’s two “motives of general policy” for the French intervention: a 
“European, universal interest” to place a “barrier to the imminent invasion of the 
entire American continent by the [United States].”152 
Sara Yorke Stevenson (1847‐1921), who grew up in Paris and moved to 
Mexico during the French intervention and Second Mexican Empire, describes in 
her memoirs how these pan‐Latinist views were commonplace amongst the 
political class in Paris. Lamartine and Chevalier were frequent visitors to her 
guardian’s house and their assumptions, she wrote, were largely those of the elite 
at the time. Moreover, “[n]one seriously doubted the possibility of occupying 
[Mexico] [….] The only point discussed was, [would it be] worth it?”153 
Contemporaneously with these expressions of pan‐Latinism in France, monarchical 
or authoritarian ideas gained currency in Mexico, and for those who supported 
them it was argued that Mexico’s salvation lay in an intimate connection with 
Europe, especially France. 
Conclusion 
As has been demonstrated, the geostrategic goals of Louis‐Napoléon’s and 
Chevalier’s pan‐Latinism not only predated the 1860s by at least three decades, as 
did the assumptions that underpinned them, but also these were widely shared in 
France and in the Spanish‐speaking world. Moreover, the only difference between 
the policy of Guizot and Louis‐Napoléon was the means by which it was to be 
achieved. For Guizot this was “by the sheer weight of [France’s] influence alone”,154 
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whereas for Louis‐Napoléon it was by the force “of French arms.”155 And here the 
context is crucial: had Guizot, even with British support, strongly opposed Texan 
annexation it would have meant war with the United States. Louis‐Napoléon’s 
intervention, coming as it did during the US Civil War, faced no such constraints. 
North Africa was also cast as a Latin empire and “l’Afrique Latine” came to 
describe the area of former Roman provinces under French rule or influence. 
Patricia Lorcin argues that pan‐Latinism in Algeria was “a multidirectional process 
whose disparate components came together gradually” and that “it was not a 
predetermined justification for colonization; rather it was engendered by 
circumstances of conquest and colonization.”156 As with North Africa, it can be 
argued that pan‐Latinism in America was also a discourse whose varied 
components came together gradually. The idea of an affinity between France and 
the former Spanish American colonies dates back at least to the 1820s and once US 
expansion began to be seen as a conflict of two races after the Texan revolt the two 
principal constituents of the pan‐Latinist discourse were already in place. It was 
therefore not an “ideology” composed to legitimate the French “expansion” of the 
Second Empire, as Phelan and Rojas Mix claim, but a discourse that emerged in the 
1830s and only became mobilised behind a specific foreign policy in the 1860s. The 
consequence was that it became more coherently articulated through the 
propaganda of the regime’s apologists. Rather than indulging in short‐term desire 
for a Latin empire, Louis‐Napoléon was instead implementing a long‐held French 
geostrategic vision.  
From the Mexican perspective, anti‐Americanism developed immediately 
after independence, particularly over Texas. A particular interpretation of the 
United States’ relationship with Mexico became embedded within conservative 
discourse, which maintained that Washington had a pernicious and partisan 
interest in Mexican politics. This formed the basis of arguments for orientating 
Mexico towards Europe and, in no small part, underpinned the rationale for 
                                                          
155 Louis‐Napoléon to Forey, 14 July 1862, AN, 400AP/62.  
156 Patricia Lorcin, ‘Rome and France in Africa: Recovering Colonial Algeria’s Latin Past’, French 
Historical Studies, 25 (2002), 327. See also Michael Greenhalgh, ‘French Reliance on the Roman Past 
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monarchy. However, unlike the French proto‐pan Latinist discourse, the majority of 
Mexicans did not openly associate with French interests or pan‐Latinist ideas, nor 
did they call for French intervention, until the 1850s – it was Spain that furnished 
the funds to support El Tiempo.  
It would take the catastrophic defeat of the US‐Mexican War, combined 
with the increased polarisation of Mexican politics, for Mexican conservatives to 
openly identify the future of the Mexican nation with that of the French Second 
Empire. In the 1850s Mexican conservatism consolidated into a more coherent 
body of thought articulated by those who now identified openly as “Conservatives” 
and associated themselves with what they called the Mexican Conservative Party. 
In part, this development of Mexican conservatism was influenced by international 
events, particularly the 1848 revolutions and the creation of the French Second 
Empire. As will be discussed in the next chapter, Mexican conservatives 
sympathised not only with the geostrategic implications of pan‐Latinism, but also 
with what they believed to be the “conservative principles” at the heart of the 
French Second Empire. Moreover, in order to protect these in Mexico, and to 
safeguard Mexico from further US expansion, Mexican conservatives began to call 
for European intervention, as will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Four 
“The Western Question” 
 
Introduction 
A distant war fought on the northern shores of the Black Sea would seem to 
have little importance for the future of Mexico. However, for the newspaper of the 
Conservative Party, El Universal, the Crimean War (1854‐56) had implications for 
the very existence of the Mexican nation: if Russia defeated Britain and France then 
“Europe would lose its independence under the iron sceptre of the Tsar, and [Latin] 
America would lose its own under the despotic heel of the sons of Washington.”1 In 
the Crimean War, Mexican conservatives had found the perfect analogy to 
articulate the necessity of an alliance with western European nations in order to 
prevent US expansion and preserve their own political power prior to the French‐
backed Mexican Second Empire. This they termed “the western question” because 
“with the exaggeration of the democratic principle, the United States arrives at 
demagogic absolutism; Russia, with the exaggeration of the opposed principle, 
arrives at tyrannical absolutism; and both nations seek to impose on the world […] a 
tyranny that equally rejects civilisation.”2 For this reason, after defeating Russia, the 
“allied powers” which “march at the front of world civilisation” must “transport 
their forces to the New World” in order to prevent the “unlimited expansion” of the 
United States.3 
This continued fear of US expansion was the backdrop to which the 
consolidation of Mexican conservativism in the 1850s took place. As chapter three 
has shown, this was not new to Mexican politics, but the disastrous defeat in the 
US‐Mexican War and the consequent loss of nearly half of Mexico’s national 
territory confirmed the worst fears of conservatives. The Conservative Party, 
founded in 1849 by Alamán, represented itself as the true national party in 
contradistinction to liberal moderados and puros because, its members claimed, 
liberals sympathised with the United States and its political institutions – federalism 
                                                          
1 ‘La Guerra de oriente’, El Universal, 3 December 1854, front page. 
2 ‘La Guerra de oriente’, ibid., 3 December 1854, front page. 
3 ‘La alianza anglo‐francesa. – Sus principios y su influyo’, ibid., 12 January 1855, front page. 
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and republicanism –  institutions which liberals wished to see triumph in Mexico. 
The question then, for the Conservative Party, was not merely how to establish a 
state based on conservative principles,4 but also how to construct a nation that 
could prevent further territorial losses. 
In their search to found a strong, stable and centralised government that 
would achieve both these aims, Conservatives in the 1850s drew upon international 
events and transnational ideas. The Mexican Conservative Party was formed in part 
to contest local elections in 1849 followed by presidential elections in 1850. 
Previously disdainful of democratic politics, this engagement with the ballot box 
was partially inspired by events in Europe after the 1848 revolutions, particularly 
the example provided by Louis‐Napoléon, who was elected president of the Second 
Republic in November 1848. Conservatives in Mexico, however, failed to replicate 
the electoral success of Louis‐Napoléon, but his transition from prince president to 
French emperor provided another model that could be adapted to Mexican politics: 
the Conservative Party supported Santa Anna’s dictatorship (1853‐55) and the 
caudillo’s return to power was compared to Louis‐Napoléon’s 2 December 1851 
coup d’état and the foundation of the French Second Empire a year later.  
Santa Anna’s rule, however, was short lived: he was overthrown by the 
revolt of Ayutla (1854‐55), which brought to power a new generation of puro 
liberals with anti‐clerical aims. The result was the liberal 1857 Constitution, which in 
turn led to the War of Reform between a de facto Conservative government at 
Mexico City, headed by Félix María Zuloaga (1813‐98) and then Miguel Miramón 
(1832‐67), and a de jure Liberal government led by Juárez at Veracruz.5 This 
polarisation of Mexican politics was also a geopolitical struggle. In 1859 the United 
States recognised Juárez’s Liberals, while France, Britain and Spain maintained that 
the Conservatives at Mexico City were the legitimate government. Moreover, 
Conservatives believed that US support for Juárez contributed to their eventual 
defeat in 1861, and the inability of Conservatives to defeat their opponents saw the 
                                                          
4 The principles that underpinned Mexican conservatism are outlined in the introduction, 20.  
5 The term “Liberal”, with a capital “L”, is used here to denote the Mexican Liberal Party which 
contested power with Conservative Party during the War of Reform and fought against the French 
intervention and the Second Mexican Empire. 
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identification with European ideas turn into a call for European arms to support 
them in their struggle against what they saw as the twin threat of Mexican 
liberalism allied to US expansionism – what many Conservatives termed the 
“western question”. 
This chapter will analyse the impact of the threat of further US 
expansionism on Mexican conservative thought. It will then place Mexican 
conservatism within the international realignment of political ideologies prompted 
by events in 1848,6 whereby so‐called parties of order sought to appropriate 
elements of political and economic modernisation to establish secure regimes in 
the face of revolutionary challenges.7 US involvement in the War of Reform will 
then be explored to see to what extent it led to Mexican Conservatives to call for 
European intervention. Finally, the French interpretation of the ‘western question’ 
will be evaluated to see to whether Paris agreed with the claims of the Conservative 
Party that the continuing rise of US power posed as much of a threat to Europe as it 
did to Mexico. 
I 
 “Always the Americans”:8 The US Threat to Mexico 
In a letter of 1860 to the French foreign minister, Édouard Thouvenel (1818‐
66), the representative of the Mexican Conservative government in Paris, Hidalgo y 
Esnaurrízar, wrote that the civil war which raged between the Conservatives and 
the Liberals could not be considered merely as a conflict between two parties 
disputing power. Rather, it was a struggle between a party that fought for 
independence and national territory of Mexico against one that had no support 
other than the “sympathy of the United States”, a nation whose people, “by 
education and political system”, were “the irreconcilable enemy of the Latin race, 
and the Catholicism which it professes.”9 Hidalgo y Esnaurrízar was a well‐known 
                                                          
6 On the revolutions of 1848 see Axel Körner (ed.), 1848: A European Revolution? International Ideas 
and National Memories of 1848 (London: Macmillan, 2000). On the impact of 1848 in Latin America 
see Thomson, The European Revolutions of 1848. 
7 An approach followed as regards post‐1848 European governments by Christopher Clark, ‘After 
1848: The European Revolution in Government’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 171‐97. 
8 ‘Siempre los Americanos’, El Orden, 23 October 1853, front page. 
9 Hidalgo y Esnaurrízar to Édouard Thouvenel, 12 May 1860, AHGE, Francia, L.38; e. 558. 
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monarchist and supporter of French intervention, who was later appointed as the 
Emperor Maximilian’s minister to France. Looked at in isolation, his letter could be 
dismissed as evidence only of a desperate appeal, in language designed to flatter a 
French audience, on behalf of an ailing Conservative Party on the point of defeat by 
Juárez’s Liberals. However, as chapters two and three have shown, Hidalgo y 
Esnaurrízar was making an argument that conservative Mexican politicians, 
intellectuals, journalists and writers had advanced, in one form or another, from 
independence onwards. A point made by La Sociedad, which from 1856 replaced El 
Universal as the principal organ of the Conservative Party:10 “[s]ince the first days of 
independence, truly right‐thinking men knew that with time the expansionist spirit 
of the Anglo‐Saxons had to be fatal to the Latin […] race of America.”11  
The end of the US‐Mexican War in 1848 did not mark an end to the threat of 
further US expansion. Franklin Pierce (1804‐69) and James Buchanan (1791‐68) 
served as presidents from 1853 to 1861 and were elected on expansionist tickets, 
and both coveted Mexico’s northern states.12 There was widespread support for 
their policies and many in the United States categorised Mexicans alongside the 
United States’ indigenous population in a racial hierarchy.13 An article in The 
Democratic Review expressed from a US perspective the fears outlined in La 
Sociedad above: “the Mexican race now see, in the fate of the aborigines of the 
north, their own destiny. They must amalgamate and be lost, in the superior vigor 
of the Anglo‐Saxon race, or they must utterly perish.”14 Most US policymakers and 
diplomats shared these racist and ethnocentric biases towards Mexico,15 which in 
                                                          
10 Miguel A ngel Castro and Guadalupe Curiel, Publicaciones periódicas mexicanas del siglo XIX, 1856-
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12 Walter Johnson, River of Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton Kingdom (Cambridge, 
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14 ‘The War’, United States Democratic Review, 20 (1847), 100. 
15 Hietala, Manifest Design, 153.  
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turn increased the disdain of Conservative politicians, who witnessed these 
attitudes first hand, for the United States.16  
Pierce’s foreign policy goals as regards Mexico were to move the US border 
with Mexico southwards, to purchase significant territory beyond this revised 
border and to secure favourable transport rights across the Isthmus of 
Tehuantepec. Ominously for Mexico, Pierce stated in his inaugural address that his 
administration would not be held back by “any timid forebodings of evil from 
expansion”.17 The Sale of La Mesilla (known in the United States as the Gadsden 
Purchase), ratified in 1854, saw the United States pay $10 million for 29,640‐square 
miles of additional Mexican territory. The US minister, James Gadsden (1788‐1858), 
charged with securing Pierce’s foreign policy goals, made it clear to the 
Conservative Mexican foreign minister, Manuel Díez de Bonilla (1800‐64), that the 
southern and westward migration of US citizens was unavoidable. To oppose it 
would only encourage it, and all Mexico could do was to “conciliate and harmonize, 
what was not to be diverted; [sic] overawed or crushed”.18 Fearing that the United 
States would take by force what Mexico could not defend, and faced with acute 
financial difficulties at home, Santa Anna accepted a treaty which, in these 
circumstances, he considered favourable.19 
Although this marked the last acquisition of Mexican territory by the United 
States, it did not end the desire to obtain more, which increased under Buchanan. 
He outlined his vision to the Senate: “it is beyond question the destiny of our race 
to spread themselves over the continent of North America, and this at no distant 
                                                          
16 El Universal frequently translated, published and commented upon US articles expressing views 
towards Mexico inspired by the ideas of Manifest Destiny. For example, on The New York Herald, 
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– su porvenir’, 28 April 1853, front page. 
17 Franklin Pierce, ‘Inaugural Address’, 4 March 1853, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/index.php 
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18 James Gadsden to Manuel Díez de Bonilla, 14 and 29 November 1853 in Manning, Diplomatic 
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day […] nothing can eventually arrest its progress.”20 In preparation for this, 
Buchanan’s secretary of state instructed the US minister to Mexico, John Forsyth 
(1821‐77), to purchase from Mexico much of its northern territory.21 Forsyth 
informed the Conservative Mexican foreign minister Luis Gonzaga Cuevas (1800‐
67), that, regardless of whether Mexico sold these lands or not, “great natural 
causes in steady operation and progress, [will] diminish the Mexican value, and 
weaken the Mexican tenure […] until, in the end, they may pass from her 
possession.”22 In a despatch to Cass, Forsyth made his own views on US expansion 
clear: “I am, of course, a believer in […] 'Manifest destiny'. I believe […] that our 
race, I hope our institutions, are to spread across this continent and that the hybrid 
races of the West must succumb to, and fade away before, the superior energies of 
the white man.”23 Nonetheless, for Buchanan destiny was not working quickly 
enough. He advised Congress at the end of 1858 that the United States should 
“assume a temporary protectorate over the northern portions of Chihuahua and 
Sonora”. A year later Buchanan was even more direct, requesting that Congress 
authorise him to intervene militarily in Mexico.24  
Conservatives, then, had ample demonstrations of the hostile intentions of 
the United States and the racist attitudes that lay behind them. What set the anti‐
American discourse of the Conservative Party apart from previous decades, 
however, was that the US threat was increasingly seen as one posed not only to 
Mexico, but to Latin America as a whole. Moreover, expansionism in the 1850s was 
not merely the preserve of the US government. Two additional factors ensured that 
the United States was represented as engaged in war against the entire Latin race 
in the Americas: filibusters and Cuba. 
Filibuster expeditions launched from the United States increased Mexican 
fears of US aggression. Mexican politicians were well aware of the dangers posed to 
                                                          
20 James Buchanan, ‘Message to the Senate on the Arrest of William Walker in Nicaragua’, 7 January 
1858, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=68291 (accessed 4 October 2014). 
21 Lewis Cass to John Forsyth, 17 July 1857, in Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, IX, 234‐38. 
22 John Forsyth to Luis Gonzaga Cuevas, 18 March 1858, in ibid., IX, 971‐76.  
23 Forsyth to Cass, 4 April 1857, in ibid., IX, 902‐9. 
24 James Buchanan, ‘Second Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union’, 6 December 
1858; James Buchanan, ‘Third Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union’, 19 December 
1859. The American Presidency Project: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/index.php (accessed 4 
October 2014). 
  164 
nearby states by the recruitment of volunteers on US soil to overthrow the legally 
constituted sovereign authorities. Over three quarters of the soldiers who fought 
against Mexico in the Texan revolt from January to March 1836 had crossed the US‐
Mexican border after the insurrection had begun in October 1835.25 William Walker 
(1824‐60) began a long filibustering career with an expedition into Baja California in 
1854. The Mexican authorities also had to contend with sporadic raids from the 
United States led by a liberal Mexican, José María Jesús de Carvajal (1809‐74), but 
using largely US citizens as soldiers, and two expeditions made up of Frenchmen 
recruited in California.26  
Regardless of Washington’s disavowal of these expeditions, many Mexican 
politicians considered the United States complicit in them either by acts of 
commission or omission. The then Mexican minister to the United States, Almonte, 
argued in a despatch to the foreign minister that until the United States punished 
these “adventurers” severely and garrisoned California properly, US and foreign 
nationals would continue to organise and arm themselves for attacks on Mexico. 
Almonte went as far as to warn that “in my view, even the President of the United 
States [is] involved” in these filibuster raids, and, for this reason, Mexico should not 
rely for its security on the promises of friendship from the US government, which, 
Almonte argued, Washington ignored when convenient.27  
The most significant filibuster expeditions, however, were directed towards 
Cuba and Nicaragua.28 Nicaraguan liberals had asked Walker and his mercenaries to 
help them in their civil war against conservatives. In 1856, having won the civil war, 
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Walker executed his opponents and set himself up as president.29 Walker’s policies 
while president, according to his own third‐person account, were to dispossess the 
Spanish and indigenous population and place “a large proportion of the land [...] in 
the hands of the white race.”30 The diplomatic recognition of his government by the 
Pierce administration in May 1856, combined with clashes between locals and US 
citizens in Panama,31 fuelled anti‐US sentiment throughout the Spanish‐speaking 
world.32 
US designs on Cuba similarly increased tensions between Spain, its former 
colonies and the United States, which in turn had ramifications for Mexico.33 In the 
1850s US ambitions towards Cuba were made clear through the publication of the 
Ostend Manifesto (a document signed in 1854 by US diplomats, including 
Buchanan, that advocated the acquisition of Cuba by purchase or war), an attempt 
to buy the island from Spain for $100 million, and filibustering expeditions launched 
from the United States. The importance of this for Mexico lay, first, in the alarm the 
United States’ aggressive attitude towards Cuba caused in Europe, calling the 
attention of the France, Britain and Spain to the western question. And, second, 
Mexican Conservatives saw US attempts to procure Cuba as part of a wider policy 
pursued at the expense of the Latin race, which increased the threat to Mexico of 
further US attacks and led to calls for hemispheric unity. La Sociedad warned: “Our 
neighbours do not distinguish between Cuba and our own territory. Both are the 
objects of their avarice [….] It falls to the Latin race in America to fend off the 
danger”.34 
As with previous decades, it was not only territorial expansion that alarmed 
conservatives. They were worried by Washington’s support for Mexican liberals. In 
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part this stemmed from the argument, outlined in chapter two, that the United 
States had deliberately exported federalism to Mexico in order to weaken it. El 
Universal wrote that the result of US influence was loss of territory, internal 
anarchy and the constant threat of external danger: “the error of 1824 [the federal 
constitution] inevitably led to the bitter ignominy of 1847 [when US troops 
occupied Mexico City].”35 La Sociedad continued in a similar vein on a hemispheric 
scale: “The Spanish American nations, notwithstanding their monarchical traditions 
and their Catholic religion, committed the shameful error of taking [the United 
States] as a model”. In so doing they condemned themselves to thirty years of 
anarchy and civil war.36 This was far from a new argument, but it was given 
renewed impetus by the US‐Mexican War. Liberals were appalled by the US 
invasion, and the majority of puros urged the government to reject any peace 
negotiations in favour of continuing the war; however, a minority worked with the 
United States during the occupation and advocated the establishment of a 
protectorate over Mexico. 37 El Universal took advantage of this fact and proclaimed 
that liberals were traitors, a charge frequently reiterated in the conservative press, 
which represented the Conservative Party as the true defender of the Mexican 
nation.38 US support for liberals, combined with the continual threat of US 
expansion, was an important element in the self‐definition of the Conservative 
Party. 
It is worth emphasising that not only did Washington back liberals, but they 
did so in full awareness of the polarising effect their policies had in Mexico during 
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the 1850s. James Gadsden noted that the “Church‐Army‐Conservatives” look with 
“deep mistrust, I might say, hatred towards the [United States].” For Gadsden, the 
liberal revolt which resulted in the end of Santa Anna’s dictatorship, was “a most 
signal triumph” for the United States.39 According to Gadsden’s successor, during 
the War of Reform, the Conservative government at Mexico City would “sooner fall 
than treat with the detested Yankees”.40 Buchanan made his views plain in his 
Annual Message to Congress in 1858: The United States should intervene militarily 
in Mexico because a Conservative victory in the War of Reform was against US 
interests.41 The defeat of Mexican Conservatives had thus become official US policy. 
This was not disinterested support for the cause of liberalism; rather, a course of 
action calculated to secure US expansionist aims. William Churchwell (1826‐62), 
charged with reporting on which faction Washington should recognise in Mexico 
during the War of Reform, concluded that, as long as the United States did not 
“despoil Mexican territory”, Juárez’s Liberals would look to the Washington as a 
“virtual Protector [...] and as if she were sub‐divided and erected into sovereign 
States of the Union.”42 On this advice, Buchanan recognised the Liberal government 
at Veracruz.43  
As has been well documented, Juárez’s government at Veracruz worked to 
secure US recognition in order to help raise loans in the United States and, more 
importantly, to secure a treaty that would provide immediate financial aid.44 The 
result was the 1859 McLane‐Ocampo Treaty which, in return for $4 million, gave 
favourable transit rights to the United States.45 Buchanan envisaged the treaty as a 
means to annex Mexico’s northern territory without having to secure authorisation 
from Congress. The treaty, had it been ratified, would have allowed the United 
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States to “trespass Mexican sovereignty at will” and turn a temporary presence into 
a permanent occupation because it permitted the United States to intervene 
without the consent of the Mexican government if the lives or property of US 
citizens were endangered in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec.46  
For Conservatives, that Liberals were willing to come to such an 
arrangement with Mexico’s national enemy was further proof of their complicity 
with Washington, but the final event that confirmed to Conservatives the extent of 
the Liberals’ collaboration with the United States occurred in March 1860. Two 
naval vessels purchased by the Conservatives were intercepted and captured by the 
US navy as they steamed to attack the liberal‐held port of Veracruz at the same 
time as General Miramón’s Conservative forces approached from land.47 The Diario 
Oficial del Supremo Gobierno, the official newspaper of the Conservative 
government, denounced the incident and argued that the United States was a 
“barbaric and savage nation”, which had abrogated the universally accepted 
conventions of international law, whose civilisation was founded entirely on money 
and whose principles were based solely on its own material interests. Worse, it had 
intervened in Mexico’s internal affairs as a result of the “outrageous treachery of 
the men of Veracruz, who did not hesitate to accept foreign help in order to achieve 
the triumph of principles that the nation detests.”48 Without naval support, 
Miramón abandoned the siege of Veracruz and by January 1861 Liberals had 
defeated Conservatives and Juárez took Mexico City. 
That the United States was a factor in the inability of conservative politicians 
to consolidate their political system from 1821 to 1855 is unlikely, and whether US 
support was a significant cause in Juárez’s victory in the civil war is an open 
question,49 but such was the interpretation of the Conservative Party. Moreover, 
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Washington threatened to expand further at Mexico’s expense and appeared 
hostile to Latin America in general, particularly because of filibusters. In addition, 
conservatives had long held US federal republicanism as anathema to Mexico’s 
traditions, customs and religion as well as deliberately exported in order to weaken 
Mexico, but, while conservatives had always accused liberals of working with the 
United States, the War of Reform saw the Liberal government at Veracruz in open 
collusion with the United States, receiving diplomatic and military assistance, and 
thus this confirmed Washington was hostile to the political projects of the 
Conservative Party. It is within this context, in which Mexican Conservatives 
understood the state that they wished to construct upon conservative principles 
was threatened by an external power, that the consolidation of their ideas and their 
calls for European intervention, discussed below, needs to be placed. 
II 
“This Beautiful Cry, ‘Reaction’”:50  
Mexican Conservatism and the European Revolutions of 1848 
As noted in the introduction, the collapse of the French Second Empire, the 
defeat of France in the Franco‐Prussian War and the dominance of French 
Republican historiography created a black legend around Louis‐Napoléon. The 
judgements of his contemporary critics endured and Karl Marx (1818‐83) provided 
the epitaph for the last Bonapartist regime at its inception: “the first time as 
tragedy, the second time as farce”.51 Marx, however, showed less disdain for 
historical repetition in Mexico. In an 1854 letter, in which he claimed that Mexicans 
were merely degenerate Spaniards, he nonetheless noted that “the Spanish have 
produced no talent comparable to that of Santa Anna.”52 Had Marx followed 
Mexican affairs closely he might have been more reserved in his praise for the 
caudillo. At the time of his letter, Santa Anna, the self‐proclaimed Napoleon of the 
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West, was serving for the fifth and final time as Mexican president. His new 
government “had decided to follow the same path as the Emperor of the French.”53 
And the press that supported Santa Anna’s ascent to power praised Louis‐Napoléon 
as the man who had defeated socialism in France,54 and saw the French Second 
Empire as a paradigm for Mexico. 
From independence conservatives had argued that the solution to Mexico’s 
endemic internal instability and external weakness was the application of their 
principles. As has been seen in chapter two and three, for some prominent 
politicians, such as Alamán, constitutional monarchy provided the answer. But 
conservatives were pragmatic: monarchy under a European prince was merely one 
way of implementing their programme.55 They explored a range of alternative 
possibilities through articles in El Universal, first published on 16 November 1848 
and edited by many of those who had been associated with El Tiempo, including 
Alamán. Editorials in this periodical drew on conservative arguments of the 
previous decades and argued for a strong, centralised government based on order, 
religion, economic prosperity, and support from the property‐owning classes.56  
What distinguishes Mexican conservative thought after 1848 is the 
importance of European events and models to conservative ideas, which resulted in 
major changes in previously held positions on topics such as popular sovereignty or 
the course of revolutions. Initially, however, post‐1848 Europe merely provided 
conservatives with a new vocabulary with which to attack their enemies. The 1848 
revolutions were seen as France in 1793 writ large and inspired by the same ideas: 
Émile de Girardin (1802‐81) and Pierre‐Joseph Proudhon (1809‐1865), “socialists” 
and “communists” respectively according to El Universal, were admitted into an 
unholy pantheon alongside Diderot, Jean‐Jacques Rousseau and Robespierre. The 
newspaper’s analysis of the February revolution in France, and subsequent events 
in Europe, initially fell into the framework of conservative thought as outlined in 
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chapters two and three. Events in Europe were cited as proof that sovereignty of 
the people was a dangerous doctrine, elections should, as Alamán’s 1846 electoral 
law had outlined, be based not on universal manhood suffrage, but on class defined 
by occupation (both for the electorate and the elected) and revolutions brought to 
power radicals who were intent on destroying governments and endangering 
property.57 Therefore Britain was identified as the model of constitutional 
government and the only nation which had avoided these evils.58 
However, analysis in the newspaper quickly changed because of the course 
events in France. Rather than demonstrating what the newspaper had argued, and 
what conservatives had long believed, that universal manhood suffrage was 
inherently incompatible with good government, the election of Louis‐Napoléon as 
president of the Second Republic was seen as the triumph of conservative 
principles. France wanted to overturn the false revolutionary doctrines and, 
inspired by this example, a reaction was sweeping across Europe.59 This had 
important implications for Mexico, which had been both “spectator and actor in the 
great revolutionary drama”.60 As had happened in France, it was imperative in 
Mexico that “THE PARTY OF ORDER ORGANISES ITSELF”.61 It was hoped that the 
newly formed Conservative Party would fulfil this role as the party of order in 
Mexico, an aspiration which appeared to become a reality when Conservative 
candidates secured impressive results in the Mexico City council elections of July 
1849.62  
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Indeed, so dramatic was the Mexican Conservative Party’s conversion to 
democracy on the back of Louis‐Napoléon’s example in France, and Conservative 
success in municipal elections in Mexico, that Alamán claimed he now favoured 
direct and popular elections. Realising, however, that this was not possible in the 
current circumstances, he proposed indirect primaries and secondaries, with 
elections for the former based on the election law of 1841, which gave the right to 
vote at this stage to all adult male Mexican citizens over the age of eighteen.63 This 
model could not have been further removed from the electoral law he had 
authored in 1846, discussed in chapter three, or the Seven Laws he had supported, 
discussed in chapter two. For its part, El Universal had gone from depicting direct 
universal franchise as the root of all evil in recent history to criticising liberals in 
congress who refused to back this system, and thus betrayed their own liberal 
principles.64 
Conservatives hoped that their presidential candidate, the independence 
leader Nicolás Bravo (1786‐1854), would repeat their local success nationwide in 
the 1850 presidential election. However, the moderate liberal candidate Mariano 
Arista (1802‐55) was victorious, with Bravo in third place.65 Conservatives’ flirtation 
with democracy therefore resulted in ambivalent conclusions. On the one hand, the 
Conservative Party had some success in local elections, and Louis‐Napoléon’s 
victory in France had convinced them that conservative principles could be 
supported by the masses. On the other hand, they had not been able to translate 
local success nationwide and had been defeated in the presidential election. It was 
therefore necessary to find a figure, like Louis‐Napoléon, who could rally popular 
support. There was only one man in Mexico with such appeal: Santa Anna. 
Again, France provided inspiration. Louis‐Napoléon’s 2 December 1851 coup 
d’état and the foundation of Second French Empire in November 1852 was not 
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interpreted in the conservative press as a military despotism.66 Rather, Louis‐
Napoléon had saved France and lessons for Mexico were apparent. France occupied 
a key position in world affairs: it had been the centre of the revolutions that swept 
across Europe, but it remained a “beacon of modern civilisation” that “set the tone 
for the whole universe”.67 Fortunately, the “civilised world” seemed destined to 
follow France in its “return to the right path” as well as in its mistakes. Louis 
Napoléon was the embodiment of this path and France was now the “theatre of 
reaction, and the shining focal point from which the lights of religious and social 
truths were again spread.”68 
This happy outcome, however, had by no means been certain in the analysis 
of European events which served as a parable for Mexico. The revolutions of 1848 
had destroyed peace in Europe and resulted in “absurd” doctrines and disastrous 
theories of government. France especially had been on the edge of an abyss 
because the “red party” wanted to turn it into a “theatre of horrors”.69 
Nonetheless, the revolutions of 1848, and the Second Republic itself, had never 
enjoyed popular support. El Universal identified two forces in France. The first 
consisted primarily in secret societies formed in Paris, with branches in some 
provincial cities, and were essentially socialist. They were small in number, but they 
made up for this by their political activism. The second force was conservative, its 
motto was “God, patria and family” and it comprised almost all the remainder of 
the nation. It had immense power, but was undermined by a “lamentable apathy 
and indifference that characterises this part [of the population] everywhere in the 
world.”70   
It was this latter force that Louis‐Napoléon had energised. His election as 
president of the Second Republic was proof that the people were opposed to the 
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“new and exotic institutions that had been imposed on them”, the language 
echoing the conservative argument against liberalism in Mexico. The explanation 
for this was simple: Louis‐Napoléon represented the “monarchical principle” and 
his opponent, Louis‐Eugène Cavaignac (1802‐57), the “republican”. France 
demonstrated the key conservative argument: “systems of government must 
conform to the character and customs of a nation”. 71 They elected the Prince‐
President because he represented a principle the people loved (monarchy), 
because they feared “socialists” would return France to the horrors of 1793 and 
because he represented not only monarchy, but “military monarchy” – “the most 
energetic principle in the repression of disorder” and the most effective means to 
save the nation from “socialist barbarism”.72 
The lessons were obvious: “every country, every nation, every people that 
have felt the shameful effects of liberalism […] can take France as a beautiful 
example to imitate.” In this view, Louis‐Napoléon’s success was because he had 
enacted a programme in France that the Mexican Conservative Party had outlined 
for Mexico.73 And the result in France was that the emperor had re‐established 
confidence, restored order, brought peace, secured property, increased France’s 
credit, regenerated the sciences and developed commerce and industry; in short 
the benefits Conservatives argued would result in Mexico with the application of 
their ideas.74  
Conservatives also drew conclusions from Louis‐Napoléon’s election as 
president in 1849 and the plebiscites of December 1851 and November 1852 that 
confirmed his seizure of power and the creation of the Second Empire. In its 
editorial El Universal wrote that this was the “final defeat of the democratic idea, 
vanquished on its own ground and by its own weapons.”75 The lessons learned from 
Louis‐Napoléon’s rise to power would be applied in Mexico. As outlined in chapter 
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three, the political vision of Paredes, and the monarchical conspirators who 
supported him, was elitist. Those who supported him aimed at curtailing the 
democratic nature of Mexican republicanism and the constituent congress, which it 
was hoped would vote for monarchy, was elected on an extremely restricted 
franchise. What the French Second Empire demonstrated was that, properly 
managed, mass participation in politics could be a legitimating force for 
conservative regimes. Louis‐Napoléon supposedly said “do not fear the people, 
they are more conservative than you”.76 Whether or not this was actually one of his 
aphorisms, the implied marriage of direct democracy with authoritarianism was an 
experiment the Mexican Conservative Party was willing to try with Santa Anna as 
president in 1853.  
For these Conservatives, the French case also proved that Mexico needed a 
dictator to restore order. Louis‐Napoléon presented “[Mexico] with an example of 
his heroic valour” and showed that [n]othing [was] easier than to save a country 
destroyed by factions”.77 El Universal concluded that while parties and assemblies 
could destroy a nation, only an individual could save it. This was a thinly veiled 
reference to the plan to bring Santa Anna to power. In case the didactic nature of 
the editorial was lost on the reader, the paper asked rhetorically who did not see 
the parallels between France since 1848 and Mexico? Mexico, like France, had been 
ruled “by a miserable minority, whose power only consists in the indifference and 
apathy” of the majority and had been deprived of light and almost of hope. Mexico, 
therefore, required “a saviour” like Louis‐Napoléon.78  
Those who brought this “saviour” (Santa Anna) to power identified his 
government with an international “reaction” that “today is in operation, as much in 
Europe as in America, in favour of conservative principles.”79 In a private 
conversation with the French minister plenipotentiary, André‐Nicolas Levasseur 
(1795‐1878), Alamán made it clear what these principles were: “they are those of 
your illustrious sovereign […] principles of order, of justice and of religion”. Santa 
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Anna’s foreign minister explained further what this meant: “It is upon your country, 
it is upon your sovereign, that we base all our hopes for the future, we want to 
model our political institutions on those of France.” Alamán added that “[w]e would 
even like to follow [France’s] example to the point of establishing a hereditary 
monarchy”, but, failing that, “we would like [Santa Anna] to have [an emperor’s] 
authority and strength.”80  
The orientation of Santa Anna’s regime towards France saw Levasseur 
notice a distinct improvement in his relations with Mexican politicians. The French 
minister was the sole representative of the diplomatic corps invited to a political 
banquet held by Tornel, who had been previously been seen as hostile to France,81 
in February 1853, at which the only toast to a foreign sovereign was to the Emperor 
of the French. General Uraga (1810‐85) toasted Louis‐Napoléon at a similar banquet 
held at the end of the same month. Yet another banquet in March saw the 
santanista General Lombardini (1802‐53), the interim president charged with 
ensuring Santa Anna’s return to power, toast the French sovereign again to the 
exclusion of all others. Levasseur reported these incidents to demonstrate the high 
regard for Louis‐Napoléon and support for the French Second Empire in Mexico.82  
The first overt manifestation of this propensity for the French model was a 
press law of 25 April 1853.83 Alamán had asked Levasseur to send him a copy of the 
French 19 February 1852 press regulations, which the legation provided along with 
laws passed 11 August 1848 and 11 August 1849. After consulting the documents, 
Alamán sought Levasseur’s approval of the law.84 Press censorship was a key 
Conservative policy because it was considered as “one of the first necessities for 
the establishment of good government.85 The moderate liberal paper, El Siglo XIX, 
criticised the law for being an imitation, but El Universal responded that the law 
was not a copy, and, even if it was, plagiarism did not undermine it. In France, as in 
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Mexico, the periodical press had been an obstacle to the solid foundation of 
“peace, order and public tranquillity.”86  
 Elements of the Conservative Party’s programme were enacted in the early 
months of Santa Anna’s rule. Federalism was revoked and states were renamed 
departments with governors appointed from Mexico City. An advisory council of 
state replaced Congress and Santa Anna appointed all ministers who were only 
answerable to him. Finally, the army was enlarged and reorganised.87 Levasseur 
approved of these measures, claiming that the council of state was made up almost 
entirely of Conservative Party members, who wanted, in lieu of a hereditary 
monarchy, a strong, almost despotic, centralised power, which was, in Levasseur’s 
words, “the only [government] appropriate for Mexico.” He thus praised Santa 
Anna’s initial legislation as “wise” and “firm”.88 With the blessing of Alamán, Santa 
Anna had been granted extraordinary dictatorial powers for one year in 1853. A 
pronunciamiento of 17 November 1853 in Guadalajara called for his powers to be 
extended indefinitely and was adopted by enough communities for Santa Anna’s 
council of state to declare that this represented the will of the people.89 A year 
later, Santa Anna made the distinctly Bonapartist move of holding a plebiscite on 
whether he should continue in his extraordinary powers.90  
However, for Conservative Party apologists the death of Alamán in June 
1853 marked the end of their influence over the government of Santa Anna.91 
Levasseur agreed: Alamán’s death was a significant loss for Santa Anna, but also for 
Levasseur himself because the former Mexican minister of foreign affairs had 
shared exactly his own opinions, including a complete agreement over the political 
institutions appropriate to Mexico. Moreover, Levasseur felt there were no other 
Conservative politicians equal to Alamán in ability.92 Conservatives did still support 
Santa Anna’s regime, but Alamán’s death, followed shortly afterwards by Tornel’s, 
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ensured that the General’s domestic programme departed significantly from what 
was envisaged in the first half of 1853.  
Santa Anna’s dictatorship may have deviated from the domestic 
Conservative Party programme, but Bonilla, a Conservative, replaced his friend 
Alamán as foreign minister and tried to put into practice the foreign policy 
principles they had outlined seven years earlier in El Tiempo (see chapter three), 
namely to orientate Mexico towards Europe. El Universal, which was the organ of 
the Conservative Party and by extension the foreign ministry under Alamán and 
Bonilla, argued that in order to avoid another “Yankee” occupation of Mexico City, 
Mexico needed to look to Europe, and base itself, as Europe did, in conservative 
ideas because this would lead to the formation of an “alliance of conservative 
principles between […] the nations of the old and new world”.93 This reaction in the 
Americas and Europe was motivated by the same beliefs, but in Europe it was 
merely a question of “wellbeing” whereas in Mexico it was more urgent because it 
was also one of “existence” as a result of the US threat.94  
The worldview of the Conservative Party was subordinated to this US threat. 
In his conversation with Levasseur, Alamán had explained that in order to construct 
the Mexican state along the lines of the French Second Empire it was necessary to 
have “the sympathy of Europe and in particular the support of France, and when 
we have accomplished our work of regeneration we will still need the support of 
our friends to conserve it because we are constantly threatened by [US] invasion.” 
Was not, Alamán asked, the extension of US power over all of Mexico and perhaps 
as far as Panama” a danger for Europe too? This was a serious question for Britain 
and Spain, but France was key to Mexico’s future: “[w]e are convinced that if [Louis‐
Napoléon] desires to save us, he can do it, he can assure our independence and 
contribute to the development of our power, which would become a counterweight 
to the United States.”95 In short, Alamán summarised in 1853 what would become 
French policy in 1862. 
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Alamán and Bonilla had argued for the foundation of a monarchy in 1846 
and this remained a possibility under Santa Anna’s dictatorship. The British minister 
to Mexico reported that Santa Anna would readily renounce power if a monarch 
could be found to rule Mexico.96 Gutiérrez de Estrada wrote that Santa Anna 
wanted to restore the empire of Iturbide, but he would have abdicated in favour of 
a European monarch if one could have been found to take the throne.97 In 1854 
Gutiérrez de Estrada wrote privately to Lord Aberdeen that he had been entrusted 
with a “confidential matter” of grave importance for the future of Mexico, 
presumably finding a monarch so Santa Anna could step down, and requested an 
interview to discuss it further.98 Aside from the search for a monarch, European 
intervention in almost any form was called for. Santa Anna asked the Prussian 
minister to Mexico for military officers to train the Mexican army and, if that was 
not possible, for 5,000 to 6,000 troops to be sent instead.99 
The rationale for European intervention in Mexico rested on the 
conservative interpretation of the United States’ role in Mexican history discussed 
in chapters two and three combined with its continued expansionist aims outlined 
above. Bonilla restated these in a letter to the then French minister to Mexico, 
Alexis de Gabriac. New to the discourse of anti‐Americanism in the 1850s was the 
fact that the United States harboured filibusters, but more importantly Bonilla now 
argued that US ambition was not limited to destabilising Mexico: Washington 
wanted to export its radical democracy across the Atlantic. It supported the “rebels 
of Hungary”, the “reds of Italy”, the “socialists of France” the “disloyal subjects of 
Spain” as well as the “scum of Mexican politics”. As the Ottoman Empire was to 
Russia, so was Mexico to the United States, and it was in France’s interests to enter 
into an alliance or mutual agreement in order to “contain” the United States and 
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maintain the balance of power in the Western Hemisphere,100 views reiterated 
numerous times in El Universal.101  
The revolt of Ayutla (1854‐55) forced Santa Anna into exile (again) and his 
dictatorial regime was replaced by a reformist liberal one. The subsequent War of 
Reform ensured Conservatives were fighting for their political survival as well as 
their ideas. This resulted in an increasing number of appeals for foreign support. El 
Universal was so symbolic of the Conservative Party that its offices were destroyed 
in 1855 when liberal forces entered Mexico City.102 It was replaced by La Sociedad, 
which continued its foreign policy line. An 1856 editorial entitled ‘La intervención 
europea’ gives the tone of its views. Europe had brought civilisation to the Americas 
and the two regions were intimately connected. Since independence, Spanish 
American politics had followed the “old continent” for good and bad because it was 
the “our progenitor and teacher of civilisation.” This was followed by the usual 
accusations of US hostility, which required Europe to intervene in order to maintain 
the independence of the “Spanish race”, the balance of power and bring order and 
prosperity to Mexico.103  
From 1858 to 1860, the Conservative government at Mexico City was even 
more desperate to procure European aid, and preferably intervention, to support 
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its cause than Santa Anna had been. From Mexico City, the French minister, 
Gabriac, forwarded petitions for French intervention to the Quai d’Orsay. One, at 
the behest of Ignacio Aguilar y Marocho (1813‐84), a former minister and councillor 
of state under Santa Anna, asked for the support of France in order to prevent “the 
ruin of [Mexico] and its fall into the hands of the United States.” It cited the 1857 
Constitution as opposed to the political, moral and religious senses of all Mexicans 
and asked for European intervention to restore the principles of order.104 Another 
petition asked for forces to pacify the country,105 and, when president, Zuloaga 
requested 5,000 to 6,000 French troops to support his government.106  
As has been seen, both Liberals and Conservatives looked abroad for 
material aid in their domestic conflicts. However, the triumph of Juárez and, 
subsequently, of liberal historiography ensured Conservatives remained traitors to 
the patria while Liberals saved it from foreign oppression, but in the 1850s the calls 
of both factions for foreign intervention proved what Mariano Otero (1817‐50) had 
written in 1848: there were two parties in Mexico which “defend the same idea: 
that of our own incapacity to govern ourselves.”107 On their own terms, 
Conservative fears were justified: the victory of Juárez in 1861 meant that army and 
church fueros could never be restored, Catholicism was no longer the established 
religion of state and a federal republic increasingly tied economically to the United 
States became a reality. Alphonse Dano (1819‐92), Levasseur’s interim 
replacement, wrote of Alamán that “the most skilful thing he did in his life was the 
timing of his death”.108 In one sense he was right, had the founder of the 
Conservative Party lived another eight years he would have seen that the future 
was everything his histories of Mexico had warned against. The last chance Mexican 
Conservatives had to overturn this liberal triumph was to secure the European 
intervention they had long argued for. 
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III 
“The European Party and the American Party”:109 
The French Response to the Western Question 
Historians maintain that Louis‐Napoléon intervened in Mexico at the behest 
of a small clique of Conservative Party émigrés in Paris and as a result of poor 
information provided by the agents of the Quai d’Orsay in Mexico.110 Leaving to one 
side the questionable premise that the success of an imperial project need be 
predicated upon an accurate and in‐depth understanding of the political and 
economic conditions of a country, Section II has demonstrated that calls for 
European intervention were not the dreams of a few isolated Mexicans in exile, but 
lay at the heart of the anti‐liberal programme. Numerous santanistas, monarchists 
and republicans in the Conservative Party advocated European intervention in one 
form or another and instructed their representatives in France to work to secure it. 
This section will evaluate the evidence for the hypothesis that Louis‐Napoléon 
“failed to understand completely the reality of Mexico, and, misled as much by his 
diplomats as by the Mexican Conservatives in exile”, blundered into an ill‐advised 
intervention is correct.111 
Certainly the diplomatic despatches of French agents in Mexico consistently 
favoured the Conservative Party. As has been seen, Levasseur described himself as 
entirely in agreement with Alamán on all matters political and diplomatic, while his 
successors, Dano, Gabriac and Dubois de Saligny, were equally sympathetic to the 
Conservative cause. The latter two are especially implicated by historians as 
diplomats who misled Paris as to the situation in Mexico in close collaboration with 
individuals who had dubious connections to financial reclamations France hoped to 
secure from the Mexican government.112 However, in advocating French 
intervention they merely reiterated what nearly every French representative to 
Mexico had proposed since France recognised Mexican independence in 1830. 
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That they were in favour of the Conservatives can be explained by the fact 
that they believed the Conservative political programme to be the most 
appropriate to Mexico. Like Mexican Conservatives, they understood democratic 
federal republicanism to be the cause of Mexico’s endemic instability. The solution 
was a strong, limited franchise and centralist government, or, better still, a 
monarchy under a European prince. Forsyth’s description of Gabriac to the US 
Secretary of State was, excepting the hyperbole, accurate: “This gentleman […] has 
been the open [and] active partizan of the [Conservative Party....] His head is filled 
with dreams of a European protectorate, to be followed by a Mexican kingdom or 
Empire.”113 Gabriac had close relationships with the principal Mexican Conservative 
politicians,114 frequently gave them advice, constantly promoted their cause to 
Paris and even went as far as recommending, against the advice of the rest of the 
diplomatic corps and much to the annoyance of the French foreign minister, that 
French nationals in Mexico pay Miramón’s government a forced loan.115 Indeed, 
Miramón’s administration took the unusual step of sending Louis‐Napoléon a letter, 
signed by prominent members of the Conservative Party, celebrating Gabriac’s six 
years in Mexico and praising his conduct.116 Gabriac’s sympathies, then, were not in 
doubt and he did, whether deliberately or not, represent the Conservative cause as 
more likely to succeed than it in fact was. 
The Quai d’Orsay, however, viewed Gabriac’s efforts on behalf of the 
Conservatives as unenthusiastically as it had done all calls for intervention in 
Mexico since 1838. The French foreign minister, in response to a despatch detailing 
the possibility that Conservatives would request French troops to defeat the 
Liberals, instructed Gabriac to decline any overture of this nature.117 In 1859, the 
then French foreign minister, Alexandre Colonna‐Walewski (1810‐68), warned the 
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French minister in Mexico that he must show strict neutrality in the internal 
disputes of the nation.118 A few months later, the foreign minister further 
admonished Gabriac for his partisanship towards Conservatives: France had no 
obligation or desire to support the Conservative government against the Liberals at 
Veracruz.119  
Saligny did not arrive in Mexico until the end of 1860, just in time to see 
Mexico City fall to Juárez’s Liberals. In his first despatch to Paris he wrote that 
information about the state of the country was difficult, if not impossible, to 
acquire, but one thing was incontestable: “Miramón does not occupy more than 
two important places, Mexico City and Puebla. The rest of the country is controlled 
by his enemies, who are concentrating their forces, which number 25,000 to 30,000 
men, as quickly as possible in order to attack the capital.” Saligny reported that 
Miramón, without money, starved of resources of any kind, betrayed or abandoned 
by his generals, retaining, with difficulty, some thousand or so discouraged and 
demoralised troops, whom he was unable to pay and who deserted his cause each 
day, would not be able to prolong much longer an impossible struggle. “Success”, 
concluded Saligny, would require nothing less than a miracle and miracles had 
become “extremely rare.”120 It is hard to discern in this précis of Conservative 
fortunes which element of it was seized upon as proof by Louis‐Napoléon or his 
foreign minister that a French expeditionary force on behalf of the Conservative 
cause would result in inevitable triumph. 
It was not, then, the pro‐Conservative sympathies of French diplomats or 
their misrepresentation of the Party’s fortunes which convinced Paris to intervene 
in Mexico. The Quai d’Orsay was, however, more receptive to the view that US 
expansion needed to be prevented. Just as Mexican conservatives had always 
presented their political programme as a response to external threats as much as a 
solution to the internal problems of Mexico so too did French diplomats present 
their recommendations to the Quai d’Orsay. Chapter three has shown that de 
Cyprey consistently argued for European intervention in support of monarchy 
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partially because he believed that without this form of government Mexico would 
be lost to US expansion. His successor, Levasseur, supported Alamán’s ideas in 1853 
not only because of shared principles, but because “republicanism and federalism 
would achieve the ruin of [Mexico] and deliver it to the [United States].”121 Dano 
made the exact same point and argued that monarchy was essential for the survival 
of Mexico.122  
Gabriac was no exception to this trend and in him Mexican Conservatives 
found a kindred spirit and a fellow advocate for the western question. Placing 
Mexico in the context of the Crimean War, Gabriac warned “Mexico seems to have 
become the Constantinople of America”. He argued that if it fell into US hands it 
would be difficult to prevent their complete domination of the hemisphere. 
“Masters of this immense territory”, he asked rhetorically, “will they not dictate the 
law to Europe?”123 Gabriac agreed with the ideas of the Aimé‐ Louis Victor du Bosc, 
marquis de Radepont (1810‐89), who had served as a military attaché to the US 
army during the US‐Mexican War and had settled in Mexico afterwards. In a plan 
submitted to the Quai d’Orsay, Radepont, claiming to speak on behalf of the “most 
eminent men in Mexico”, argued, just as Bonilla had done in his letter to Gabriac, 
that the United States was a radical democratic power that gave asylum to the 
revolutionaries of Europe. Radepont added the Crimean analysis: US foreign policy 
was the same as Russia’s in Europe and Asia, worse, filibusters were used openly to 
advance its expansionism, and Mexico was the Ottoman Empire of the west. “The 
Spanish population, or the Latin race of the New World”, knew that the “Anglo‐
Saxons” were their implacable enemies. Only a monarchy, he argued, could save 
Mexico from internal disorder and inevitable conquest. During a trip to Paris, 
Radepont was granted an audience with the emperor and was able to discuss his 
ideas on two separate occasions.124 
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In light of the US threat French diplomats concluded that the Conservative 
Party was the only one that could save Mexico. They argued, like Mexican 
Conservatives, that the Church and Catholicism were the most significant barriers 
which could prevent US expansion.125 As Guizot had done with the River Plate in the 
1840s, Gabriac divided Mexican politics in the “European Party” (Conservatives) and 
the “American Party” (Liberals).126 In his view, the so‐called “reaction” was an 
expression of “conservative politics and conforms to the interests of Europe in 
America”. It was contrasted with the ideas of federalism, which had led to religious 
persecutions and disorder, and had been supported for “forty years by the agents 
of Washington in Mexico.”127 The 1857 Constitution was a series of “social and 
political paradoxes” formed from “socialist, demagogic and irreligious” ideas that 
would further ruin Mexico.128 Gabriac accused the US representatives, Gadsden and 
Forsyth, of aiding Liberals and pointed out to Paris that Liberals were pro‐
Washington.129 He argued that the recognition by Washington of Juárez’s 
government had proved his warnings correct.130 The McLane‐Ocampo Treaty 
provided yet more evidence of US ambitions and the complicity of Liberals with the 
United States, which would irrevocably damage European interests.131 
In Gabriac’s view the United States aimed at the complete exclusion of 
Europe from Mexican affairs either through direct annexation or indirect 
domination, which would destroy the hemispheric and, one day, global balance of 
power.132 Gabriac secured a copy of a despatch from the US minister, Forsyth, 
which he forwarded to the Quai d’Orsay as proof of US designs on Mexico. In the 
despatch the US representative outlined his own support for Manifest Destiny, his 
attempts to secure territorial concessions and his view that Mexico was the 
“battleground for the maintenance of American supremacy in America, a theatre 
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for the practical illustration of the value and virtue of the Monroe Doctrine.”133 For 
Gabriac, this would be a disaster both economically and politically. US industry 
would soon compete with Europe’s and its control of precious metals would 
exacerbate financial crises,134 while it would export its political doctrines 
internationally to the detriment of the European social order. Even if the United 
States did separate into various republics, “these Anglo‐Saxon societies all aimed at 
the same goal: the enslavement of Southern America to the yoke of their material 
interests”. US policy in California and Texas demonstrated what awaited these 
conquered people – “the Latin race there was harried like the Indian”.135  
In a conversation with the newly arrived Prussian minister, Gabriac found a 
fellow anti‐American who outlined the imminent danger facing Europe. Baron Emil 
von Wagner (1825‐99) had just arrived from the United States and argued it was 
motivated by nothing more than “fever for the dollar”. This material culture made it 
“the most disgusting country in the world, and the country that glories the most in 
being disgusting.” The Prussian minister argued that Buchanan wanted to create a 
balance between the slave South and the free North by conquering Mexico. The 
consequences of the McLane‐Ocampo Treaty would be ruinous for Europe. It was 
therefore more urgent each day that Europe make Mexico the centre of a policy 
that would create an equilibrium in the Americas. The only way to do this would be 
if Louis‐Napoléon, in concert with the other powers of Europe, established a 
monarchy in Mexico.136 
US diplomats similarly represented Mexico as a site of geopolitical contest. 
They warned of imminent European intervention and advised Washington that 
Mexico was a battleground between European principles (monarchy) and US 
institutions (federal republicanism).137 Gadsden recognised that Conservatives 
represented their cause as analogous to that of the Ottoman Empire and wrote that 
they were hoping to turn Mexico into “the Turkey of Europe” in order to gain 
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French support.138 Forsyth pointed out that Liberals were pro‐Washington and their 
success was in the interests of the United States.139 The Conservative Party, on the 
other hand, “looked to the continent of Europe for the means, material and 
political, of its subsistence”. Therefore United States should back the Liberals and 
“[i]n the present demoralized condition of Mexico […] no course can be adopted 
but one that will give the [the United States] an effective but indirect 
Protectorate.”140 These were not only the arguments of Democrats: the moderate 
Republican paper The New York Times supported the McLane‐Ocampo Treaty and 
argued European influence in Mexico must be opposed at all costs: “if our 
Government goes back of [sic] the Monroe doctrine, there is a chance at last that a 
barrier may be placed to the Anglo‐Saxon wave. If it be established, a sad future 
opens upon liberal Republican institutions in America.”141  
As has been seen, the Quai d’Orsay had given no encouragement to the 
various interventionist schemes of its agents prior to 1861, but it did make it clear 
that further expansion of the United States was antithetical to the interests of 
France. Although more sober in their analysis of US ambitions, French foreign 
ministers agreed throughout the 1850s that the United States was an ambitious 
power that wanted to expand. The then French foreign minister, Édouard Drouyn 
de Lhuys (1805‐81), wrote to Levasseur that the “interests of our policy make us 
strongly desire that Mexico be independent and prosperous.” He opposed the 
Gadsden Purchase and argued that it was necessary to support Santa Anna’s regime 
as far as possible in establishing its prestige because it worked to check the 
ambitions of the United States and improve relations with Europe.142 Gabriac’s 
forwarding of Forsyth’s despatch which outlined the US diplomat’s support for 
Manifest Destiny had “particularly caught [Walewski’s] attention”.143 Walewski had 
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already warned that the fall of Santa Anna meant Mexico had been plunged into 
complete dissolution which provided the United States “with new opportunities for 
aggrandisement”.144 He feared Mexico might cease to exist, and warned that the 
War of Reform threatened the independence.145  
France had hoped that the combination of internal divisions within the 
United States, Mexican opposition to its attempts to secure more territory and 
diplomatic pressure from Britain, France and Spain would be enough to prevent US 
expansion. However, by 1860 it was clear that a Washington alliance with Juárez’s 
Liberal government would at best result in US hegemony or, worse, further 
annexation. Saligny’s instructions from the French foreign ministry stated that “the 
United States, already masters of the provinces which formerly belonged to 
Mexico” worked towards new “territorial acquisitions”. The recognition of Juárez’s 
government at Veracruz was part of this process because the Liberals, unlike 
Conservatives, were willing to sell concessions to the United States in return for 
Washington’s support. The interest of France, like all other European powers, was 
that Mexico did not lose its independence and therefore “our sympathies” are for 
Miramón’s government which had shown itself “more anxious to preserve the 
integrity of the national territory”.146 This was a reiteration the Quai d’Orsay’s 
analysis of Mexican affairs outlined a month earlier: “Nothing, unfortunately, 
confirms the doctrine of Manifest Destiny more than the current state of Mexico 
[….] The successive absorption of its provinces by the United States has already 
begun and will continue”. In this analysis, the United States had been reluctant to 
annex territory too early because of the dangers it posed to the Union, but it had 
worked to fuel civil war in Mexico in order to weaken it and had allied itself with 
Juárez to further this goal. The anarchy which now reigned in Mexico was the 
pretext Washington would use to occupy it. Buchanan’s message to Congress of 19 
December 1859 demonstrated beyond doubt that this was the policy of his 
administration.147 
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As discussed in chapters two and three, fear of US expansion had concerned 
French diplomats since the 1830s, an interpretation frequently expressed in French 
public discourse.148 However, this fear was not only voiced by pan‐Latinists or 
French imperialists. In a letter to Lord Clarendon (1800‐70), Palmerston wrote “I 
have long felt inwardly convinced that the Anglo Saxon Race will in Process of Time 
[sic] become Masters of the whole American Continent North and South” and 
Britain “ought to delay [this] as long as possible.” However, Palmerston believed 
there was little Britain could do. Treaties could not prevent the US advance because 
it would continue through “the indirect agency” of filibusters “in alliance with the 
[United States]”. “In short”, he concluded, “Texas over again.”149 Clarendon held 
the same view: “unless Britain and France are prepared to occupy Central America 
and Mexico with a large land force and to have their fleets to support it in both 
oceans we may be sure that sooner or later those countries will be overrun and 
occupied just as have been Louisiana, Texas, and California added to the Union.”150 
These two leaders of British foreign policy understood the expansion of the United 
States to be detrimental to the interests of Britain, but impossible to stop without 
extraordinary measures. It was partially for these reasons that Palmerston privately 
supported Louis‐Napoléon’s attempt to establish the Second Mexican Empire.151  
Indeed, there was nothing controversial about intervention in Mexico from 
a British perspective; the first European power to argue for it was Britain, not 
France. In the British view, Mexico was, to use an anachronism, a failed state. It had 
been riven by civil war and instability since independence. The current division of 
the country between two parties was the most recent, and the most anarchic, 
demonstration of this. The British government proposed a cease fire that through 
the mediation of Britain and France be agreed between Liberals and Conservatives 
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for a period of six months during which a national assembly would be convened in 
order to constitute whatever form of government the nation wished.152 France 
agreed to the British proposal, but it was rendered irrelevant by Juárez’s refusal to 
accept mediation.153 However, France had reservations because Washington’s open 
sympathy for Juárez. The French foreign ministry maintained, echoing the language 
of Guizot over Texas discussed in chapter three, that France had an “incontestable 
interest in maintaining the independence of Mexico [and] delaying the invasion of 
this vast market by the [United States] to the detriment of Europe”, but it would 
not countenance any policy that would prejudice French relations with Washington. 
The report remarked that France had for a long time received numerous requests 
from the Mexican Conservative Party to lead a European intervention or to support 
a monarchical restoration, but Washington’s objections to this policy made it 
impossible to carry them out.154 The US Civil War, then, was the occasion which 
allowed Louis‐Napoléon to prosecute freely France’s “incontestable interest” 
without fear of US protest or reprisal.155 
It was further US aggrandisement that was Louis‐Napoléon’s greatest 
concern and therefore it was to this that representatives of the Conservative 
government appealed, not the reaction against liberal reforms or the popularity of 
the Conservative Party or enthusiasm for monarchy in Mexico. Hidalgo y Esnaurrízar 
saw it as his primary duty to highlight this threat and he brought it up whenever 
possible with Thouvenel, who expressed a “strong interests in Mexico”, understood 
with the US threat and had wanted “to do something for [Mexico] in 1854 and 
1855”.156 Hidalgo y Esnaurrízar argued that the McLane‐Ocampo Treaty would end 
Mexican independence, upsetting the balance of power in the Americas. France 
must intervene as the principal power of the Latin race and to protect French 
strategic and economic interests. Mexico would be stable once the US threat was 
no more, when the Liberals had been defeated and a government conforming to 
                                                          
152 ‘Note verbale remis par Lord Cowley’, 7 February 1860, AAE, CP Mexique, 52.  
153 Gabriac to Thouvenel, 24 April 1860, AAE, CP Mexique, 53. 
154 ‘Proposition anglaise’, January 1860, AAE, CP Mexique, 52. 
155 Louis‐Napoléon states clearly that the US Civil War afforded him a free hand to pursue his policy 
in Mexico. Louis‐Napoléon to Count Flahault, 9 October 1861, AN, 400AP/63. 
156 Hidalgo to foreign minister, 30 March 1860, AHGE, Francia, L. 38; e. 558. 
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the interests of Mexico had been set up. The cause of Mexico was “civilisation, 
Catholicism and European commerce”,157 and in making this argument, which tied 
pan‐Latinism to monarchy and European trade, he was preaching to the converted. 
It was not the Conservative programme in itself that convinced the French 
government of the necessity to intervene, nor was it the representation of the 
political situation in Mexico by French diplomats or Mexican émigrés. Rather it was 
an acceptance of their geopolitical and geostrategic interpretation, and the belief 
that Mexican Conservatives could act as auxiliaries in the prosecution of a French 
foreign policy goal. 
Conclusion 
US expansion remained a constant threat to Mexico throughout the 1850s. 
Moreover, Conservatives understood the United States to be in alliance with 
Liberals and during the War of Reform Washington did actively work to secure the 
triumph of Juárez. Therefore, in order to find support for their own political vision, 
Conservatives increasingly looked overseas for material and diplomatic assistance 
as well as political models. Already predisposed towards Europe, Louis‐Napoléon’s 
success after 1848 in constructing an authoritarian and stable regime further drew 
Conservatives, who placed themselves within the context of a European‐and‐
American‐wide reaction against anti‐clerical democratic and liberal doctrines, 
towards France. Conservatives adapted lessons drawn from post‐1848 France for 
Mexican elections in 1849 and 1850 as well as seeing the French Second Empire as 
inspiration for the dictatorship of Santa Anna. The failure of their political projects 
followed by the polarisation of Mexican politics further convinced members of the 
Conservative Party that their salvation lay outside the nation. This in turn meant 
that France found sympathetic local elites through which it could pursue its long‐
term objective of checking US power in the Americas while developing French 
influence in the region. 
                                                          
157 Almonte to Thouvenel, 26 January 1860, Almonte to Mons, 31 January 1860; Hidalgo to Almonte 
and Thomas Murphy Jr., 23 March 1860; ‘Note verbale remise à Monsieur Thouvenel par Monsieur 
Hidalgo après l’audience du 19 April 1860’; Note verbale remise à Monsieur Thouvenel par Monsieur 
Hidalgo après l’audience du 21 May 1860’, AHGE, Francia, L.38; e.558. 
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This foreign policy goal was praised by the French statistician and senator 
Charles Dupin (1784‐1873). It was not possible for him congratulate the French 
emperor in public because it would mean “imprudently lifting the veil with which it 
is necessary to cover the true reason for the [French intervention in Mexico].” Far 
above the nominal causes, Dupin was able to see the thought that truly directed 
the intervention, and this was the “boldest of our century, I would say further, of 
modern times”. It was to stop the expansion of the United States. Dupin noted that 
the population of the US had been 2 million in 1763, was 32 million in 1863 and 
calculated that in 1963 it would be 512 million. The United States would need more 
land for these people, exactly as Louis‐Napoléon and Chevalier feared the United 
States would thus absorb Mexico, cross over the Isthmus of Panama and invade 
South America. In a hundred years the Anglo‐Saxon race would number more than 
half a million. “Jealous of Europe, enemies of the old world, it would be capable of 
trying to enslave the universe.” Of all the sovereigns only Louis‐Napoléon had 
understood the danger the United States posed and this was the idea that lay 
behind his attempt to save Mexico.158 This was the exactly the rationale of pan‐
Latinism discussed in chapter three; a zero‐sum interpretation of the world that 
argued for an equilibrium between races. And for this reason, the article which 
contained the first use of the term “Latin America” also described Mexico as a “new 
Eastern question”, but in the Western Hemisphere.159  
The rationale for intervention was a joint creation by French imperialists and 
Mexican Conservatives as collaborating elites. Indeed, the War of Reform was to 
some extent a struggle over whether Mexico would be under US hegemony or 
European tutelage. What the Liberals were offering Washington was a virtual 
economic protectorate. Juárez’s minister to Washington made this clear: “the 
[United States] will derive all the advantages which they might obtain from 
annexation of Mexico, without suffering any of the inconveniences which such a 
step would produce.”160 Conservatives wanted European protection rather than US, 
                                                          
158 Charles Dupin to Louis‐Napoléon, 9 November 1863, ‘Du Mexique dans ses rapport avec 
Napoléon III par le baron Charles Dupin, sénateur’, AAE, MD Mexique, 10. 
159 Belly, ‘Du conflit anglo‐américain’, 122. 
160 Quoted in Olliff, Reforma Mexico, 150‐51. 
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and France wanted the benefits Liberals offered to Washington for itself. And 
Dupin’s fears were proved correct: the Spanish‐American War of 1898 and US 
construction of the Panama canal was everything that France (Britain and Spain as 
well for that matter) feared in the 1850s. French intervention was, above all, the 
outcome of a geostrategic and geopolitical contest between Europe and the United 
States. The means that France adopted to challenge Washington’ regional 
hegemony was informal empire on a grand scale, and its failure was as great as its 
ambition. In order to explain this failure, chapter five will explore the form that the 
French intervention and the Second Mexican Empire took. 
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Chapter Five 
The Limits of Informal Empire: French Intervention and the Mexican Second 
Empire 
 
Introduction 
 In a study of the fall of James II and the Glorious Revolution, Louis‐Napoléon 
concluded: “March at the head of the ideas of your century, and these ideas will 
follow and support you. March behind them, and they will drag you along. March 
against them, and they will overthrow you.”1 Although he embodied the very ideas 
that the Emperor of the French extolled, Maximilian’s execution alongside the 
leaders of Mexican conservatism at Querétaro on 19 June 1867 makes him more 
reminiscent of Charles I than of William III. His regime, and the French policy that 
brought it into existence, united an unlikely variety of critics. The ultramontane and 
reactionary Archbishop of Mexico, Pelagio Antonio de Labastida y Dávalos (1816‐
91), used the same word to describe the intervention as the French republican 
Favre: it was “a chimera”.2 That opponents and supporters of the intervention could 
come to the same conclusion is indicative of its politically ambiguous nature. 
Intended to appeal to Mexicans across the political spectrum, the regime it created 
was condemned by opponents and supporters alike after its collapse, while both 
the French and Mexican Second Empires themselves came to be seen as 
anachronisms, like James II, and merely painful interludes before the triumph of 
republicanism in Mexico and France. 
As this thesis has argued, in order to understand why France intervened in 
Mexico to help found this empire it is necessary to imperialise the French 
intervention as well as to Mexicanise it. Chapter one has shown that French 
policymakers wished to extend French influence and that they showed a preference 
for informal means of achieving this. It also demonstrated that Latin America in 
general, and Mexico in particular, were important areas in the French worldview. 
Chapters two, three and four have analysed the political circumstances and shared 
discourses in French and Mexican history (monarchism; pan‐Latinism; anti‐
                                                          
1 Louis‐Napoléon Bonaparte, Oeuvres de Napoleón III: mélanges, (Paris: Plon et Amyot, 1862), 140.  
2 Arrangóiz, Mej́ico desde 1808 hasta 1867, III, 159; Favre, Discours parlementaires, II, 334‐35. 
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Americanism) that meant that some members of the political elite in Mexico 
favoured French intervention by the 1850s. This final chapter will show that the 
French imperial context shaped the Mexican Second Empire, but also that Mexican 
factors limited French freedom of action. 
The French intervention was not an exceptional “adventure”, but an 
example of French informal imperial expansion. The basic aims of the intervention 
were simple: to develop the Mexican economy (and secure much of the consequent 
benefit for France) and to create a powerful and stable regime in North America 
tied to France that would prevent further US expansion. However, unlike other 
contemporary examples of French imperialism, the intervention ended in 
catastrophic failure. 
To help explain this failure, this chapter will place the French intervention in 
the Mexican and French imperial context of the 1860s.3 Section I will explore the 
economic and administrative ideas of Mexican Conservatives, which provided 
another powerful rationale to support French intervention. However, The French 
vision for the political direction of the Mexican Second Empire clashed with the 
clerical wing of the Mexican Conservative Party, which came to disown the empire 
which they had called for because of (what they saw) as its liberal regulation of 
Church‐state relations. Section II will then investigate the architecture of French 
informal imperialism, the means by which France hoped to establish “a close 
solidarity of interests” between the Mexican and French empires through a political 
system that aimed to rally moderates from both parties that had fought in the War 
of Reform.4 Finally, section III will discuss the reasons for the spectacular failure of 
this imperial project. 
I 
 Order and Prosperity: The Mexican Case for Empire 
As has been discussed in chapter four, Mexican Conservatives had called for 
European intervention prior to the War of Reform (1858‐61), and their defeat in 
                                                          
3 For a detailed breakdown of the events in Mexico 1861‐67 please refer to Chronology 3, pp. 261‐
64. 
4 A term used by Drouyn de Lhuys, quoted in ‘La Doctrine Monroe et L’Empire du Mexique’, Le 
Mémorial diplomatique, 12 March 1865, p. 173. 
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this conflict provided another reason to welcome the intervention as a final 
opportunity to implement their ideas and vanquish their Liberal opponents. Thus 
those who initially supported the intervention belonged to the Conservative Party. 
From a French point of view, these individuals acted as “auxiliaries” to the French 
cause.5 The most important “auxiliary” to France for the first two years of the 
intervention (from January 1862 to May 1864) was Juan Nepomuceno Almonte. He 
enjoyed Louis‐Napoléon’s, and Maximilian’s, confidence and was sent to Mexico 
under French protection to organise local forces against Juárez and to act as an 
intermediary between the French intervention and the Conservative Party.6  
As has been shown throughout this thesis, Mexican politics was fluid, 
categorisations difficult and political affiliations changed over time. Santa Anna 
provides a typical example as he charted a course from puro federalist to 
authoritarian centralist; Almonte is another striking case in point. He had been a 
member of the yorkinos in the 1820s, but gravitated towards the anti‐liberal 
spectrum of Mexican politics and the Santanistas in the 1830s and 1840s. He fought 
alongside Santa Anna against the Texan rebels and later served as a diplomat to 
Washington and the major courts of Europe. He was minister of war in 1840 and 
directed a proclamation to the army calling Gutiérrez de Estrada a traitor for his 
monarchical tract published in the same year. Similarly, in 1846 he had been a vocal 
critic of El Tiempo’s monarchical arguments.7 He stood as a candidate in the 1850 
presidential election and came second to Arista (see chapter four), but performed 
better than the Conservative candidate. Under Santa Anna’s dictatorship he served 
again as minister to the United States (1853‐56). He supported the Conservative 
governments of Zuloaga and Miramón and was their minister to Britain (1856‐58) 
and France (1857‐61), but had been appointed to these positions by the moderate 
liberal Comonfort; his republican credentials were not questioned until the late 
                                                          
5 Jurien de la Gravière to Thovenel, 9 February 1862, AAE, CP Mexique, 57. 
6 Almonte personally corresponded with Louis‐Napoléon, the Empress Eugenie and Maximilian. His 
letters to Louis‐Napoléon are in AN, AP400/61. His letters to Maximilian are reproduced in [J]uan 
[N]epomuceno [A]lmonte Papers, 1834‐1865, Dolph Briscoe Center for American History, The 
University of Texas at Austin. Correspondence to Almonte is contained in El archivo del [C]entro de 
[E]studios de Historia de [M]éxico Carso Juan Nepomuceno Almonte, Fondo XXIII. 
7 Manuel Rivera Cambas, Los gobernantes de Mex́ico: galerıá de biografıás y retratos de los vireyes, 
emperadores, presidentes y otros gobernantes que ha tenido Mex́ico, desde don Hernando Cortes 
hasta el c. Benito Juárez, 2 vols. (Mexico City: J. M. Aguilar Ortiz, 1872‐3), II, 638‐9. 
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1850s.8 The son of one of the heroes of Mexican independence, José María 
Morelos, his political journey took him from the company of radical liberals to the 
Conservative Party and then the leader of France’s “auxilaries” during the 
intervention.9  
 Almonte represented a distinctive strand in conservative Mexican thought 
that emphasised economic development and administrative rationalisation. This 
had always been a part of conservative discourse,10 but as outlined, for example, in 
El Sol in the 1820s, by Gutiérrez de Estrada in 1840 or El Tiempo in 1846, there were 
only vague assertions that order would lead to progress. After 1848 economic 
concerns formed a more coherent part of conservatism in Mexico. El Universal 
argued in 1849 that progress, “the spirit of the century” and “positivism” had been 
confused with the ideas of the French revolutions of 1789 and 1848. In this sense, 
the “positivism that marks the current era” had resulted in “disappointments” 
because it had brought violence and disorder. Rather, the paper argued, “what is 
positive” is “peace” and the best government was the one which brought this to the 
nation. Just as with “liberty”, liberals had misunderstood what “progress” meant. 
The paper did not doubt that the “spirit of the century [was] the spirit of progress”, 
but this should not be confused with democracy. For the newspaper, “progress” 
meant “peace, individual security, the perfection of the arts, the development of 
agriculture, the increase of industry and commerce”. Moreover, “the enemies of 
modern democracy and the defenders of the conservative principle, they are the 
true men of progress, and the legitimate sons of the century.” Nowhere 
demonstrated this more than France, argued the editorial, where Louis‐Napoléon 
                                                          
8 Oseguera warned the liberal minister in Paris that Almonte had fallen under the influence of 
Gutiérrez de Estrada. Oseguera to Juan Antonio de la Fuente, 29 October 1859, AHGE, Francia, L. 38; 
e. 553. 
9His public service is chronicled in Anonymous, Hoja de meritos y servicios del ... General de Division 
D. J. N. Almonte ... hasta 30 de agosto de 1864 (Mexico City: Imp. Andrade y Escalante, 1864), and 
his diplomatic career is detailed in AHGE, L. 302;  A, B and C – ‘expediente personal’. Almonte’s life is 
covered briefly in Jack Jackson (ed.), Almonte's Texas: Juan N. Almonte's 1834 Inspection, Secret 
Report & Role in the 1836 Campaign (Austin: Texas State Historical Association, 2003). See also 
Helen Willets Harris, ‘The Public Life of Juan Nepomuceno Almonte’ (PhD thesis: University of Texas 
at Austin, 1935).  
10 Alamán was an entrepreneur and an industrialist, had always supported the development of 
Mexican mining and industry. See Hale, Liberalism, ch. 8. 
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embodied the triumph of the conservative principle, which, unlike socialism, 
represented all classes.11 
The arguments outlined above were part of a debate with the moderate 
liberal El Siglo XIX and the editorials were staking out conservative claims to idea of 
progress,12 but economic and administrative reform became a central part of the 
1850s consolidation of Mexican conservatism. The focus of conservative thought on 
economic progress is illustrated by policies enacted under Santa Anna’s final 
dictatorship, particularly the creation of the ministry of fomento (development).13 
Almonte’s own concern for economic matters is shown by the fact that he founded 
and chaired the Sociedad Promovedora de Mejoras Materiales y Morales in 1851, 
which encouraged economic development in Mexico during the 1850s,14 and his 
published works reflected his interests in administration, forestry, statistics and 
geography.15 
It was not true, as liberal opponents claimed, that “[t]he reactionary party 
lacked a positive program; its war cry was simply the negation of liberal ideas and 
principles” or that the Conservative Party could only “repeal, destroy; postpone the 
rest for a better time.”16 For example, Miramón, who became president of the 
Conservative government in 1859, presented his ideas for the Mexican nation in a 
manifesto. What is striking about this document is that in it he did not attribute 
Mexico’s problems to the 1857 Constitution and liberal anti‐clericalism: only one 
                                                          
11 ‘Espíritu positivo del siglo – su origen – sus consecuencias – aplicaciones en México’, El Universal, 
8 July, front and second pages; ‘Progreso – espíritu del siglo – espíritu de los mexicanos’, ibid., 15 
August, front page; ‘El espiritu del siglo presente no es la democracia pura ‐ Pruébase con la actual 
revolulción de Europa’, ibid., 1 and 2 September 1849, front pages. 
12 Although El Universal used the word “positivism” (positivismo) it is not clear what, if any, link this 
had with the ideas of Comte or earlier Saint‐Simonians. The classic studies of positivism in Mexico 
see it introduced after the Mexican Second Empire. See Leopoldo Zea, El Positivismo en México 
(Mexico City: Colegio de México, 1943), and Apogeo y decadencia del positivismo en Mex́ico (Mexico 
City: Colegio de México, 1944). See also Hale, Transformation of Liberalism. 
13 Mantecón, Santa Anna, 40; 44‐6. 
14 Anonymous, Hoja de meritos, 5; Reports from the society were published in the newspaper El 
Orden. See also Reglamento interior para el gobierno de Sociedad Mexicana, etc. (Mexico City: 
Ignacio Cumplido, 1851), and Actas de la Sociedad Mexicana promovedora de mejoras materiales y 
morales, desde su instalacion (Mexico City: M. Murguia y compañia, 1854). 
15 Juan Nepomuceno Almonte, Noticia estadistica sobre Tejas (Mexico City: Ignacio Cumplido, 1835); 
Catecismo de geografía universal para el uso de los establecimientos de instrucción pública de 
Mex́ico (Mexico City: Ignacio Cumplido, 1837); Guía de Forasteros, y repertorio de conocimientos 
útiles (Mexico City: Ignacio Cumplido, 1852). 
16 Vigil, México a través, 281; 367. 
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paragraph out of thirty five mentioned the Church. Instead, Miramón argued that 
every branch of Mexico’s government needed reform, including the treasury, tax 
collection, education and justice. In addition, he proposed public works to stimulate 
the economy and provide employment. Finally, disorder in Mexico threatened the 
existence of the nation because of the US threat; Miramón, therefore, wanted to 
create a government so loving of “true liberty, civilisation and progress” that it 
would attract the United States and Washington would (by implication) abandon its 
support for Juárez.17  
For those who supported this programme, the French intervention provided 
an opportunity to put it into effect under French guidance. In 1863, La Sociedad ran 
a series of articles outlining the fiscal, commercial, agricultural and industrial 
reforms necessary to modernise what the author saw as Mexico’s largely colonial 
system. These began with an article entitled ‘Finances’. This was, according to the 
writer, a word borrowed from the French language, and French administrators had 
already begun the reform of Mexican government revenues. The article argued that 
“administrative science” was not as advanced in Mexico as it was in other countries, 
not because Mexico lacked men who had indicated the route that needed to be 
followed, but the incompetence of those in power, or vested interests, had 
prevented reform. Crucially, the systems of internal customs needed to be 
abolished and replaced with direct contributions.18  
What followed over the next few months was a discussion of political 
economy which ranged from the purpose of and types of taxation to the role of 
industry, agriculture and commerce, questions which the newspaper considered to 
be equally as important as the political and constitutional ones being debated at 
the same time. The central theme to the articles was the need for reform. Mexico’s 
                                                          
17 Printed in ‘Miguel Miramón, general de division, en gefe del éjercito, y Presidente sustituto de la 
República Mexicana, a la Nación’, Diario Oficial del Supremo Gobierno, 12 July 1859, front and 
second pages. The Plan of Tacubaya, the document with which Conservatives announced the 
overthrow of the constitutional government in 1857, similarly emphasised the need for “order and 
progress”, administrative reform, a short dictatorship for the “pacification” of the country, the 
development of the economy and the establishment of a constitution conforming to the “history, 
traditions and customs of Mexico”. ‘Plan de Tacubaya’, 17 December 1857, Saint Andrews 
University, ‘The Pronunciamiento in Independent Mexico 1821‐1876’ database: http://arts.st‐
andrews.ac.uk/pronunciamientos/dates.php?f=y&pid=1006&m=12&y=1857. 
18 ‘Finanzas’, La Sociedad, 10 August 1863, front page. 
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fiscal policy was “truly monstrous and totally unsupportable”. Theorists from 
Jovellanos to Adam Smith were invoked, but on a practical level there was a model 
to imitate: “truly admirable, as it is in all other branches of public administration, 
France.” This “perfect type” had two advantages for Mexico: first, it was intrinsically 
good and, second, Mexican society, based as it was on Spanish customs and 
traditions, was ideally placed to implement French ideas because Spain had based 
its own institutions on France. Moreover, unlike Spain, Mexico had the opportunity 
to overhaul completely its old practices because it was now unencumbered by 
interests which would resist the “patriotic task of properly ordering our 
economy.”19 
The editorials argued that indirect taxation was inefficient and archaic. 
Instead, direct taxes, traditionally disdained in Mexico, and which hardly figured in 
government revenues, were the foundation of European fiscal systems, especially 
in France, and needed to be adopted by Mexico. Mexico was not an exception in 
the civilised world, and with the help of France, the same principles applied in 
Europe would work across the Atlantic. The reform of Mexico’s fiscal structures, 
combined with order and peace, would mean that “[Mexico’s] economic problem, 
which includes [its] national debt and is the fundamental basis of all [its] social 
problems, would be definitively resolved”.20  
Many of these articles were initialled “M. P. y C.” and were most likely 
written by Manuel Piña y Cuevas (1804‐77) who was a member of the Assembly of 
Notables that voted for Maximilian as monarch and a councillor of state under the 
Empire. He had been finance minister under the moderate presidencies of Herrera 
and Arista and had argued for the formation of a national bank to manage Mexico’s 
debt.21 He was described by a French diplomat as a member of the “reactionary 
party”, but clearly one with a positive programme as far as economic reform 
                                                          
19 ‘Hacienda. Contribuciones directas,’ ibid., 4 September, front page; ‘Hacienda. Contribución 
territorial’, ibid., 6 September, front page; ‘Hacienda. Catastro para la repartición del impuesto 
territorial’, 11 September, front page; ‘Hacienda Pública. Agriculutura’, ibid., 1 November, front 
page; ‘Hacienda’, 28 November 1863, front page. 
20 ‘Hacienda’, ibid., 16 and 22 August 1863, front and second pages. 
21 Pani, ‘Appendice 1: El Personal del Imperio’, 374. His attempts to found a national bank in 1848 
are described in Zamacois, Historia de Méjico, XII, 230‐39. 
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went.22 He is illustrative of a current of thought in Mexican conservatism that belies 
simple categorisation as “reactionary”, and viewed the increasing economic power 
of France with admiration.  
Development and modernisation were central to the Second Mexican 
Empire, or at least to its rhetoric. One of the first acts of Maximilian’s reign was to 
set up an “Economic Commission”, which was “formed of people sincerely 
interested in the prosperity of the country.” The Commission was charged with 
examining all aspects of the Mexican economy, particularly the inability of the 
treasury to cover expenses, the system of taxation, the national debt, colonization, 
industry as well as concessions for the construction of railway and telegraph lines.23 
The Emperor’s speech for the inauguration of the Imperial Academy of Sciences and 
Literature began by highlighting the benefits of modernisation for the Mexican 
economy through railways and steam ships.24 Limited progress was made in railway 
construction,25 but urban regeneration, the introduction of the metric system, 
decimalisation of the currency and administrative reform along European lines 
were successfully implemented.26 
The promise of policies such as these was one of the principal justifications 
for intervention. The conservative newspaper El Pájaro Verde editorialised: the civil 
war in Mexico had severely damaged industry, agriculture and commerce and 
therefore improvement of public finances, administration and the economy were as 
important as the moral and social regeneration of the country.27 In December 1863, 
La Sociedad, wrote that “[w]ith hopes of the political and social regeneration of the 
country, come projects of material development of similar importance.” The paper 
noted and translated appreciatively an article from the French press, which listed 
schemes such as draining the Valley of Mexico, piped drinking water, gas lighting, 
                                                          
22 Montholon to Drouyn de Lhuys, 26 June 1864, AAE, CP Mexique, 62. 
23 Boletín de las leyes del Imperio Mexicano, ó sea Codigo de la restauración, 4 vols. (Mexico: 
Imprenta literaria, 1863‐65), III, 45‐49; Pani, Para mexicanizar, 244‐49. 
24 ‘Discurso Pronunciado por S. M. el Emperador en la solemne instalación de la Academia de 
Ciencias y Literatura, día de su cumpleaños’, El Pájaro Verde (Mexico City), 13 July 1865, front page. 
25 Railway construction is detailed in a report by the minister of development, Luis Robles Pezuela, 
Memoria presentada á S. M. el Emperador por el Ministro de Fomento L. Robles Pezuela de los 
trabajos ejecutados en su ramo el año de 1865 (Mexico: Imprenta de J.M. Andrade y F. Escalante, 
1866). 
26 Duncan, ‘Political Legitimation’, 34‐35; 45‐48. 
27 ‘Agricultura, comercio, industria’, El Pájaro Verde, 28 July 1863, p. 2. 
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improved mining, development of cotton, tobacco and coffee for export.28 The 
paper concluded that draining the Valley of Mexico was the most important of all of 
these measures and the editorial ended with a report from the moderate liberal 
José Fernando Ramírez (1804‐71), at the time an opponent of the intervention, on 
this subject. Later, Ramírez rallied to the empire and was appointed Maximilian’s 
foreign minister. In this position, he outlined and praised the various schemes of 
Maximilian to develop the Mexican economy.29 As with economic reform, 
intervention would facilitate this process through European capital, expertise and 
immigration, a point made by various pro‐intervention newspapers.30 For 
imperialistas, as supporters of Maximillian became known, a strong government 
aided by European expertise would be able to fulfil the long‐held desire for 
economic and administrative reform.  
They also believed the Mexican empire was a solution to the endemic 
political instability of Mexico. In a proclamation of January 1863, Almonte restated 
that the aims of the intervention were to “end the civil war” and contribute to the 
establishment of a solid government based on “order and morality”, which would 
leave it to the Mexican people to elect a government “of the form most suited to 
them”.31 His first proclamation identified Juárez’s government as “the enemies of 
order”, opposed to “morality”. The oldest refrain in the canon of anti‐federal 
conservative thought was ever present: Mexico needed a government in 
accordance with its “character, needs and religious beliefs”, which would finally end 
“anarchy” and guarantee “life and property”, and, as a consequence, allow 
commerce to develop and take advantage of the “immense resources” of the 
country.32 The provisional executive council set up by the French intervention, and 
                                                          
28 ‘Mejoras materiales proyectadas ‐ desagüe de la ciudad y del Valle de México ‐ un opusculo 
inedito del José Fernando Ramirez’, La Sociedad, 6 December 1863, front page. 
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page; ‘Editorial’, L’Estafette (Mexico City), 21 July 1863, front page. 
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known as the Regency from June 1863, was described by Almonte as a step towards 
the “moral, social, political and industrial restoration of Mexico”.33  
The intervention and the Regency government always emphasised “order 
and stability”, together with various combinations of “progress”, “peace” and 
“prosperity”. A letter from the Conservative general, Antonio Taboada (1833‐71), to 
his Liberal friend, Tomás O'Horán y Escudero (1819‐67), began by appealing to the 
latter’s “ideas of order and patriotism”. Taboada wrote that O’Horán must, as he 
himself had done, have studied the situation of “our unfortunate country” and 
concluded that Mexico lacked the capacity to find within itself “the radical remedy, 
much less the peace, progress and much‐vaunted freedom” the nation needed in 
order to find stabilty. Similarly an imperialista pronunciamiento in Chiapas called 
for the foundation of a government based “on the principle of order […] a strong 
and robust government”.34  
For supporters of the intervention, monarchy was a solution to the 
perceived anarchy of Mexico because, for its advocates, it was synonymous with 
“order, peace, prosperity and respect for individual rights”,35 and would provide 
“strong and robust government” without descending into tyranny. One monarchist 
argued that Mexico since independence had been “tyrannised” by “military 
dictatorships”, like Santa Anna’s, which were “immoral”, but respected property 
and “gave guarantees of security”, or by governments of “unchecked 
demagoguery”, as exemplified by Juárez, that “respected nothing, neither religion, 
nor those who did not think like them, nor property”. Having seen the country lose 
nearly half of its territory, and in order to safeguard the existence of the Mexican 
nation, the Conservative Party, therefore, “finally turned to the only remedy that 
could save their nationality and traditions […]: monarchy.”36 It was hoped monarchy 
would end the “vicious circle” or revolts that around which the nation had revolved 
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“without cease since independence”.37 Monarchy was a solution to this endless 
conflict because, as Gutiérrez de Estrada had argued in 1840, the person of the 
monarch was above party conflict and thus factional fighting would cease. And the 
same argument made by El Sol in 1821‐22 was made again in 1863: the hereditary 
principle provided stability in contrast to the elected presidents of a republic.38 In 
response to those who argued that monarchy was retrogressive or incompatible 
with liberty, independent Mexico was contrasted with the constitutional 
monarchies of Europe. Personal and commercial liberty, political rights and 
freedom of the press, which in Mexico had only existed on paper, would become a 
reality as they were in the “great European monarchies”.39 
Other arguments from Mexican monarchist discourse discussed in chapter 
two were deployed. The conservative press countered those who claimed that with 
the French intervention Mexico would renounce its independence and abdicate its 
sovereignty; Mexico would only lose the presidential seat, which would be replaced 
by a throne. Moreover, monarchy was a chance to complete the Plan of Iguala and 
guarantee independence. Indeed, Mexico would affirm the latter because at 
present “the weakness of our industry means we depend on foreign nations, and a 
powerful neighbour [the United States] still conspires to weaken us.” Furthermore, 
by tying itself to the great powers of Europe, Mexico would assure its independence 
in the event of any future international threat.40 And it was not only Spanish 
colonialism that made Mexico’s customs suited to empire, Mexico had been a 
monarchy for as long as a thousand years under various different pre‐Columbine 
rulers.41 For committed monarchists the intervention was presented as the 
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culmination of the work of (what they called) the “monarchist party” begun by El 
Tiempo in 1846.42 
The Regency marked the high‐water mark both of Franco‐Mexican 
cooperation in support of the intervention and of optimism for the future. In a 
manifesto to the Mexican people immediately prior to the formal dissolution of the 
Regency and the proclamation of the Empire, Almonte celebrated a government 
which owed its existence to the “combined action of the national interest and the 
magnanimous and civilizing France”.43 From fiscal reform to political institutions, 
France was seen as a model, the French army was the portrayed as the restorer of 
order and the intervention was a legitimate means of saving Mexico. Pro‐
intervention publicists combed through the pages of Emer de Vattel (1714‐67) and 
Fortuné‐Barthélemy de Félice (1723‐89) to find justification for France’s actions in 
international law. They concluded that since the revolt of Ayutla (begun in 1854), 
Mexico had been in state of perpetual anarchy and, far from diminishing Mexican 
sovereignty, France had come to restore and guarantee it. The French were, 
therefore, not “conqueror[s] of the country”, but “supporters of [conservative] 
ideas”.44 The combined French and Mexican forces that entered Mexico City in June 
1863 were the “allied army”, the French were “generous helpers”,45 and “auxiliaries 
to the conservative cause” who “would take down the [Liberal] government and 
prepare a situation of order and stability.”46  
For Mexican defenders of the intervention, the political institutions set up 
by France were proof that there was no intention of “conquest”, “domination”, “or 
of a “French colony”. Moreover, the material benefits of the Franco‐Mexican 
relationship would be vast. La Sociedad recognised that the interests of France 
were not absent from its policy, but they were combined with those of Mexico: 
railways, telegraphs, immigration, capital and the development of national 
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industry.47 Panegyrics to Louis‐Napoléon were published, hyperbolic propaganda 
even by Bonapartist standards: “[w]e pray to heaven that the Bonapartist dynasty 
lasts forever, and that it continues the work of the current emperor”.48 In the ideal 
view of committed imperialistas, the election of Maximilian was the free wish of the 
Mexican people and there was no interference in internal political affairs. The 
French Second Empire was a paradigm to emulate and the “work undertaken in 
France by [Louis‐Napoléon] has much in common with the ongoing work of 
Maximilian”.49 
It can be seen then that there was support amongst Mexican Conservatives 
for French intervention for a variety of reasons. Central amongst these was the 
hope that the empire of Maximilian would create order and stability, the conditions 
necessary for the administrative reforms and economic development at the heart 
of the Conservative programme. Conservatives theorised a mutually beneficial 
relationship between themselves and France that would further their political 
project as well as French interests without compromising the independence of 
Mexico. As will be seen below, however, there was a disjuncture between the 
French vision for the Mexican Empire and that of some in the Conservative Party, 
which, within the asymmetrical relationship between the two, could only be 
resolved in France’s favour.  
France would not have intervened in Mexico without the support of the 
Conservative Party, but the utility of these Mexican collaborating elites was that 
they provided a government in waiting which gave a semblance of legitimacy for 
the establishment of the Mexican Second Empire. Louis‐Napoléon’s letter to 
General Forey, who was appointed leader of the French intervention after the 5 
May 1862 defeat at Puebla, outlined this policy. He wrote that the general should 
treat with “greatest consideration all the Mexicans” who rallied to the intervention. 
These “notable persons” would then be called upon to form a provisional 
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government that would choose an assembly to deliberate on the future form of 
Mexico’s government.50 This resulted in the Junta Superior del Gobierno, composed 
of thirty‐five men, predominantly members of the Conservative Party,51 set up by 
decree in June 1863. This body nominated a triumvirate Regency Council as an 
“executive power” and selected an “Assembly of Notables” made up of 215 men, 
who supposedly represented the will of the Mexican people which voted on the 
form of government Mexico should adopt. The process was, of course, carefully 
stage‐managed: Forey was able to report to Paris, and Almonte to Maximilian, that 
the assembly would vote in favour of monarchy before it had delivered its verdict.52  
In this sense the establishment of the Mexican Second Empire was an elite 
project, which relied on the “respectable and wise portion of the Mexican public to 
express its wishes [in favour of monarchy]”.53 Chapters two and three have shown 
just how narrow French commentators considered the “respectable and wise” 
portion of the Mexican public to be. As will be seen, once established, the Mexican 
Empire was presented as the will of the Mexican people and, eventually, to be 
constituted on lines not dissimilar to the French Second Empire, but, to continue 
the parallel, the intervention was Louis‐Napoléon’s coup d’état of 2 December 
1851; plebiscites would come later. And, in this sense, discussion of the popularity 
or otherwise of monarchy in Mexico, and whether Louis‐Napoléon was misled over 
this, somewhat misses the point: there was support for monarchy amongst limited 
– but crucial – sections of the Mexican elite. Moreover, as will be discussed in 
section II, the Mexican Second Empire did rally significant support from across the 
political spectrum of Mexico. 
The political course of the French intervention and the empire of Maximilian 
demonstrates that neither were intended for the benefit of the Conservative Party 
alone, as contemporary critics, and many historians, have alleged. As soon as the 
Regency was established, French policy broke with those who had done most to 
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bring about and support the intervention, which in turn led some Mexican 
Conservatives to disown both the intervention and later Maximilian. Hence the 
ultramontane Labastida could agree with the republican Favre that French policy 
was a chimera. Louis‐Napoléon’s vision for Mexico was Bonapartist. The clerical‐
conservative wing of Mexican conservatism would have agreed with the French 
Emperor that “a country torn by anarchy cannot be regenerated by parliamentary 
liberty.” However, they were less enamoured with Louis‐Napoléon’s solution: 
“What is needed in Mexico is a liberal dictatorship; that is to say a strong power 
which shall proclaim the great principles of modern civilisation”, which included 
“religious liberty”.54 The Emperor had made it clear to Almonte that “as long as my 
army is in Mexico, I will not permit the establishment of a blind reaction that 
compromises the future of this beautiful country and, in the eyes of Europe, 
dishonours our flag.”55 Instructions to Forey and Bazaine were unequivocal: do not 
follow a reactionary policy because France represents the “cause of civilisation and 
progress in Mexico”.56  
The French interpretation of civilisation and progress in Mexico differed 
from the clerical wing of the Conservative Party in one important aspect: relations 
between Church and state. One of the primary aims of clerical conservatives was 
the revocation of the reforms against the Church enacted during the War of Reform 
and confirmed by Juárez after his victory. The intervention was supported not only 
because monarchy would restore order and prosperity, but also because the new 
government would be founded upon “the principles of Catholicism and the 
Church”, principles which, Conservatives argued, liberal republicanism had 
attacked. The clerical conservatives could not in any event accept a religious 
settlement unless it was authorised by the Pope; in their eyes France had been sent 
by providence to rescue Mexico from the irreligious abyss Juárez had plunged it 
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souvenirs de Ernst Louet ... Nouvelle èdition, 3 vols. (Paris: P. Ollendorff, 1906), I, 144‐45; Drouyn de 
Lhuys to Bazaine, 17 August 1863, AAE, CP Mexique, 60; Louis‐Napoléon to Bazaine, 12 September 
1863, in García, Documentos, XVI, 34‐36. 
  210 
into.57 Liberals had oppressed the Church in Mexico and wherever, argued a 
conservative newspaper, there “exists an oppressed people, there will go the flag of 
France to protect them”.58 Unfortunately for Mexican clerical conservatives though, 
French policymakers believed that “the secret of [France’s] influence in the world, is 
that she represents those immortal ideas known as the principles of 1789”. The 
intervention must, therefore, “foster in Mexico those liberal and progressive ideas 
which she has introduced into [France] with so much success.”59  
It was over this divergence that clerical conservatives soon became 
disillusioned with the intervention despite the role they had played in bringing it 
about. Almonte worked with the French and refused to revoke the sale of Church 
property, but in so doing he earned the disdain of other Conservatives, such as 
Labastida, who was also a member of the Regency (along with Almonte and José 
Mariano de Salas (1797‐1867), a former interim president of Mexico) and tried 
unsuccessfully to restore mortmain property to the Church. Arrangoiz, a clerical 
conservative and supporter of Labastida, argued that Almonte presented himself as 
the leader of the “progressive Conservatives” in contrast to those, like Labastida or 
Gutiérrez de Estrada, who belonged to the “retrogressive Conservatives”.60 Another 
clerical conservative, the Bishop of Puebla, Javier Francisco Miranda (1816‐64), 
warned: “[Almonte] counts on no elements [of support] and by his apathy, 
moderatism (moderantismo) and indolence he may yet lose those I have so 
painstakingly put into his hands.” The Bishop argued that Almonte was determined 
“to follow a policy of half‐measures and compromises” to the detriment of the 
Conservative Party.61  
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Many leaders of the Conservative Party refused to be associated with this 
moderate policy.62 However, Almonte’s “eminently practical” nature,63 which 
Liberals and later clerical conservatives attacked as “ambition” and an absence of 
principle, made Almonte useful to the French, and he enjoyed the support of Louis‐
Napoléon, Thouvenel and Saligny.64 He acted as an intermediary between the 
French political vision for the intervention and the ultramontane members of the 
Conservative Party, attempting to reconcile their views with the liberal settlement 
envisaged by Louis‐Napoléon. It was hoped that Almonte would form a “liberal‐
conservative” party, which would be “wise, moderate, fighting Juárez and opposed 
to [the clerical conservatives].”65 Moreover, he represented a current of thought in 
Mexican politics, discussed in section I, that emphasised economic development. 
Almonte was thus amongst the first of the hundred or so Mexican elites who rallied 
to the empire.66  
As chapters three and four have shown, transnational ideas such as pan‐
Latinism and anti‐Americanism were flexible enough to be embraced by Mexican 
Conservatives. They were not, however, flexibly interpreted in Paris. Louis‐
Napoléon was determined to impose his own vision on Mexico through an 
informal‐imperial framework and if this was unpalatable to clerical conservatives, 
which it was, then so be it. This was not only an ideological decision, but also a 
pragmatic one. Mexican Conservatives had proved themselves unable to defeat 
Juárez’s Liberals. If the Mexican empire were to survive, it was necessary to attract 
moderate liberals to the cause as well. It was the implementation of liberal ideas 
during the intervention and under Maximilian which followed from this policy that 
led Arrangoiz to conclude the “disastrous end” of the Mexican Second Empire was 
“exclusively” the result of the “improvidence of the Emperor of the French” 
because of the “complete ignorance of his ministers in Mexican affairs” and the 
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“desire to govern [Mexico] from Paris and in a French fashion”. As regards the initial 
collaborating elites who supported the intervention, the failure of Mexican Second 
Empire was “not the fault of the Conservatives […] or the clergy”.67 Arrangoiz was 
right: it was not the Conservatives who were responsible for the collapse of the 
Mexican Second Empire, but nor was it the interference in the internal affairs of 
Mexico from Paris he criticised. Rather, it was the model of imperialism that France 
adopted. The final two sections will address what this model was, and why it failed. 
II 
"You Are Free, Govern Yourself!":68 The Architecture of Informal Rule  
French imperialism in Mexico followed the model it did because 
policymakers of the French Second Empire wished to avoid the burden of formal 
rule. The lawyer and economist, William Senior Nassau (1790‐1864), in 
conversation with French foreign minister Drouyn de Lhuys, remarked “[y]our 
presence and your influence [in Mexico] can do [Britain] nothing but good. I should 
be glad to see you make an Algeria of [Mexico].” Alarmed, Drouyn de Lhuys replied 
“[s]o should I not”. He continued, “We are mad, perhaps, to go thither at all; but we 
are not mad enough to wish for a dependency, four thousand miles off […] which 
would cost us two or three millions sterling a‐year, and would be lost the first time 
that we quarrelled with you, or the Southern Anglo‐American States. What we 
might do, and what it is your interest that we should do, is to establish there a 
constitutional monarchy with European sympathies.”69  
As Drouyn de Lhuys made clear in December 1863 to the French minister in 
Mexico Charles‐François‐Frédéric, marquis de Montholon (1814‐86), “the part that 
[France] has taken as the guardian of [Mexico’s] regeneration” meant Montholon 
was charged with imprinting on “the administration of this country a direction 
conforming to the ideas France attempts to make prevail everywhere it extends its 
influence.”70 Or what Louis‐Napoléon described as the necessity that “in Mexico 
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you [General Forey] are [in charge] without appearing to be so”.71 In short, the aim 
was exactly that identified by Walter Bagehot in The Economist: “[Louis‐Napoléon] 
has contrived to obtain a splendid position upon the American continent without 
incurring all the responsibility a colony would have imposed.”72 
Aside from Chevalier’s work, the clearest articulation of the French plan for 
the Mexican Empire modelled on the French was sketched by Emmanuel Masseras 
(1830‐99), a journalist and former editor of the Courrier des États-Unis. He had 
been hired by Montholon to edit L’Ere Nouvelle, a newspaper set up by the French 
legation in order to promote French interests. Having spent only fifteen days in 
Mexico, Masseras published Le Programme de l’Empire, a small brochure which 
outlined familiar pan‐Latinist ideas behind the intervention and the problems 
caused by republicanism in Mexico followed by the imperial solution. Previously, 
argued Masseras, the word “empire” had been associated with “absolute” 
government, but Louis‐Napoléon had made “an intimate alliance” between the 
“modern principles of progress” and “democracy” with conservatism and stability. 
France’s role in founding the government in Mexico would ensure that the regime 
could not be a “retrogressive” one.73 
This was an argument frequently made during the intervention: France was 
“one of the freest [regimes] in Europe”, founded on the principle of universal 
suffrage so it would never impose colonial government on Mexico.74 The brochure 
concluded by outlining what underwrote the Mexican Empire: the reconciliation of 
parties, the organisation of a stable government supported by the law, religion and 
the nation, material and moral transformation and “democracy in the empire”. 
Mexico would perhaps one day supersede the United States, it was claimed, and for 
those who thought such dreams unrealisable, one need only compare the sad state 
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of France in 1851 with its present day glory.75 The brochure, written by a 
Frenchman, commissioned by the French minister, agreed by Bazaine and Almonte, 
was sent to Maximilian for his approval the day he disembarked at Veracruz.76 
The paper that Masseras edited, L’Ere Nouvelle, was set up to defend the 
French worldview: “conservative and liberal […] it worked to spread the doctrines 
of equality before the law, the abolition of Church and aristocratic privilege” – the 
“doctrines of 1789”.77 It was, as Masseras described it, an “organ of French policy”. 
The contract stated that intervention had established “a special bond” between 
France and Mexico, which it was necessary to maintain through “moral influence” 
in the press. The paper, therefore, would be “devoted to the interests and 
legitimate influence of France”.78 According to Montholon’s replacement, Dano, the 
paper was not a success. It had failed to attract the sympathies of anyone – either 
amongst the French or the Mexicans – and it would have folded without the 
financial support of France. It had only a quarter of the subscribers of the other 
French language paper, L’Estafette.79 This paper, edited by Charles de Barres (dates 
not known), existed prior to the intervention, when it was liberal and pro‐Juárez.80 
Barres welcomed Juárez’s entrance to Mexico City in 1861, but was equally happy 
to celebrate the arrival of the French in 1863,81 his contentment no doubt 
facilitated by the subsidy he received from the new government.82 Given that the 
French backed the Church reforms enacted under Juárez there was no change in 
the newspaper’s arguments in favour of the sale of Church property, freedom of 
worship and the independence and supremacy of the state in ecclesiastical 
matters.83 
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A proclamation of 12 June 1863 issued by Forey outlined the general French 
vision for Mexico. The key points were: the sale of Church property would be 
confirmed; the press would be regulated as it was in France; army recruitment was 
to be reformed; the system of taxation would be overhauled; and Catholicism was 
to be “protected”, but Louis‐Napoléon would welcome the freedom of worship if it 
were possible. However, while Forey confirmed the sale of existing Church 
property, the proclamation contained the caveat that fraudulent purchases could 
be revised,84 which gave hope to clerical conservatives who further expected that 
Maximilian would not implement a liberal religious settlement, or that at least that 
any settlement would be agreed by the Pope. Nonetheless, clerical conservative 
opposition forced the French to shatter whatever illusion there was of Regency 
autonomy. This was precipitated by the return of Archbishop Labastida to Mexico, 
who was opposed to the French idea of “civilisation” and the “ideas of the century”. 
He attacked the political direction of the French intervention. He explained to 
Bazaine that “to search for the elements of a restoration [in Mexico] similar to 
those that have consolidated order [in Europe] is a chimera.” Mexico could not be 
understood through the prism of Europe and to judge it so was a mistake that 
would have disastrous consequences, “the revolution here has sacrificed everything 
to greed”, concluded the Archbishop, “and as regards the century, we are part of 
the current one, but only chronologically; Mexico shares nothing more with this 
century than the date, that is all.” 85 
Labastida, as a member of the executive council of the Regency, and as 
Archbishop of Mexico, had power and influence. Regardless, Bazaine had been 
instructed to ensure that the Regency governed in accordance with “modern 
civilisation” and Louis‐Napoléon relied on him “in order to direct the Provisional 
Government towards justice and reconciliation.”86 Bazaine had succeeded in 
coercing the Regency to reverse a decree confiscating the property of those who 
had fought against the intervention, although it did so “reluctantly”, but he 
considered the problem more serious than merely controlling the executive power 
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because the government’s administration was anti‐liberal and therefore could carry 
out retaliatory measures, especially through the judiciary.87 Therefore the 
revocation of the sequester of property was not carried out, the high clergy urged 
renters of property formerly belonging to the Church not to pay the new owners 
and refused to issue bearer bonds to those who had acquired Church property 
under Juárez’s reforms. In a letter to Almonte, Bazaine threatened to employ the 
powers granted to him by Louis‐Napoléon in order to ensure that Forey’s 
declaration of 12 June was carried out, and in a letter to the French Emperor he 
claimed that, if it were necessary, he would “place this weak and spiteful power 
[the Regency] under guardianship”. Nonetheless, Bazaine was able to accomplish 
what was asked of him: to follow a moderate liberal policy in the hope that it would 
rally liberals to the intervention. According to Bazaine, Almonte remained well 
disposed towards France and Bazaine was able to control the Regency.88 When 
Labastida’s protest became too much he was removed from the xecutive council, 
which thereafter governed with Almonte and Salas alone. Furthermore, the 
Tribunal Supremo de Justicía was dismissed for ruling against those who had 
purchased property from the Church.89  
It was hardly an exercise in the subtleties of informal influence, but France 
was at least able to achieve its aims, and Bazaine’s conduct was approved by Louis 
Napoléon and Drouyn de Lhuys.90 Partially to convince Maximilian that he was 
called by the will of the Mexican people, and partially as a means of fulfilling the 
Bonapartist model of government, a plebiscite was undertaken in the states under 
French occupation to endorse the Assembly of Notables’ decision to declare in 
                                                          
87 Bazaine to Drouyn de Lhuys, 8 October 1863, CP Mexique, 62; ‘Derogación de todas las 
disposiciones sobre secuestro de bienes de individuos hacen armas contra la Intervención’ in Boletín 
de las leyes, I, 386‐7. 
88 Bazaine to Almonte, 7 November 1863, AAE, CP Mexique, Bazaine to Drouyn de Lhuys 10 
November 1863; Bazaine to Louis‐Napoléon, 25 October 1863, Bazaine to Budin, 29 October 1863 
and Bazaine to Louis‐Napoléon 10 November 1863 in García, Documentos, XVI, 133‐44; 197‐199; 
223‐31; Bazaine to Almonte, 20 November 1863, in ibid., XVII, 9‐12. Despite his cooperation with the 
direction of French policy, Almonte was not happy with the erosion of Mexican sovereignty and 
what he saw as the overly liberal policy of France. Almonte to Maximilian, 27 October, 10 and 27 
November 1863. JNA Papers. 
89 Montholon to Drouyn de Lhuys, 25 January 1865, AAE, CP Mexique, 61; Zamacois, Historia de 
Mej́ico, XVI, 819‐40; Gaulot, I, 235‐44. 
90 Drouyn de Lhuys to Bazaine, 15 December 1863, AAE, CP Mexique, 60. 
  217 
favour of monarchy and invite Maximilian to become emperor. Drouyn de Lhuys 
left to Bazaine’s discretion the best way to procure this vote according to the 
customs and traditions of Mexico,91 which General François Claude du Barail (1820‐
1902), one of those charged with collecting the vote, described in his memoirs: 
Mexicans “would have acclaimed the devil or the Grand Turk, if we had presented 
them as a candidate at the end of our sabres and bayonets.”92 Montholon admitted 
that to implement “universal suffrage” as it was understood in Europe was 
impossible and therefore the figures that were sent to Paris were merely a census 
of the states that had adhered to the empire. Using this measure it was declared 
that 5,498,587 Mexicans had pronounced in favour of the empire and Maximilian, 
while 2,184,468 remained in states not under control of the Regency.93 Here, and 
on other key issues such as confirmation of the sale of Church property and the 
composition of the Regency or the Tribunal Supremo de Justicía, France was able to 
push policy in the direction that it wanted. 
 Once Maximilian accepted the imperial crown of Mexico, the relationship 
between France and Mexico was legally formalised by the Treaty of Miramar. This 
was signed on 10 April 1864 and marked a new phase in the relations between the 
two empires. The treaty regulated, amongst other things, the number of French 
troops and the pace of eventual French withdrawal. In addition to 270 million 
francs payable at three percent interest for the cost of the intervention up to 1 July 
1864, Mexico undertook to cover the expense of a continued French presence at 
1,000 francs “per man per year” as well as a transport service between France and 
Veracruz. Moreover, the treaty contained a secret clause, which demonstrates the 
importance France attached to its liberal policy in Mexico, that committed 
Maximilian to “the principles and promises announced in General Forey's 
proclamation, dated 12 June 1863, as well as the measures taken by the Regency 
and by the French general‐in‐chief in accordance with said declaration”.94 On top of 
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this, two loans totalling 534 million francs were raised by British bankers and 
French capitalists.95 If these financial ties were not enough, a “Commission of 
Finances” was set up in Paris, the purpose of which was to make sure that the 
financial stipulations of the treaty and French reclamations were paid using money 
kept in France from the loans.96 
In Mexico itself, institutions were modelled on France, often with French 
administrators to oversee them. A Legion de Gendarmería, which was to be 
commanded by officers from France, was set up in consultation with the French 
gendarmerie.97 Moreover, a Corsican who had organised the police in French‐
controlled Cochinchina,98 was appointed head of the Mexican police.99 France 
provided civil and military engineers and teachers as well as advice on economic 
and administrative reform, mining and the development of railways and telegraph 
lines.100 The Scientific Commission of Mexico, a Franco‐Mexican venture, was 
intended as much to encourage the rationalisation and modernisation of the 
Mexican state, as it was to add to the canon of knowledge.101  
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Maximilian’s empire was thus financially indebted to France, owed its 
establishment and continued existence to French troops and was bound by treaty 
to approve and continue the moderate liberal policy begun by the intervention. 
However, less than a month after Maximilian had been crowned Emperor of 
Mexico, Montholon already identified “worrying tendencies for the future” in his 
government, which rapidly demonstrated anti‐French tendencies. Maximilian 
showed his determination to reconcile factions in Mexican politics by appointing a 
mixed cabinet. Thus the moderate liberal and formerly republican José Fernando 
Ramírez, who had opposed the intervention, was appointed foreign minister, while 
Joaquín Velázquez de León (1803‐82), a prominent Conservative, served as minister 
of state.102 
Montholon was unhappy with these ministerial appointments. He noted 
that one belonged to the “retrograde party” and the other the “moderate party”, 
but believed that both were part of the “Hispano‐Mexican school” and therefore 
hostile to France. Moreover, these Mexicans charged with directing affairs were 
“not up to the task”.103 These frustrations with the government of Maximilian were 
expressed by Drouyn de Lhuys in a despatch that was to be brought to the attention 
of Ramírez: “The lustre of a court, academic solemnities and the spread of 
compulsory education are the lights of the most advanced civilisation”, wrote the 
foreign minister, and “we would applaud these intentions and acts more willingly if 
we were able to observe at the same time the effects of [Maximilian’s] government 
on the social, political, administrative, financial and military reorganisation of a 
country, where, despite our efforts and our sacrifices, everything remains in crisis.” 
A government “born under [the French] flag, and defended by [French] arms” 
seemed determined in its political direction to “make every day the task of 
sustaining it more onerous [for France].”104 
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This criticism was a consequence of the slow progress that was made in the 
development of the two areas Paris identified as critical to the survival of the 
Mexican Empire: its finances and the organisation of its own armed forces. Louis–
Napoléon blamed Maximilian: “I cannot understand by what fatality it always 
happens that the most essential measures are always adjourned or opposed. 
Mexico owes her independence and her present regime to France, but it looks as 
though some mysterious influence constantly stepped in to prevent French agents 
from devoting themselves to the good of the country.”105 French frustrations, 
however, were largely of their own making. Maximilian appointed numerous 
French administrators to positions of power. In addition to the post and positions 
described above, Bazaine headed the commission set up to deliberate on military 
reform, a French civil servant was the vice‐chairman of the economic commission, 
Léonce Détroyat (1829‐98), a French naval officer, was named head of the Imperial 
Navy.106 In his correspondence with Louis‐Napoléon, Maximilian wrote that it was 
difficult to find capable Mexicans and therefore he relied on French advisers, 
especially for financial matters. He even claimed that Mexicans had told him that 
they were incompetent and finances were too important and must be left to 
foreigners. In a letter to the Emperor of the French he concluded: “the more I study 
the Mexican people, the more I arrive at the conviction that it will be necessary to 
make them happy without their aid, and perhaps even in spite of themselves.”107 
Montholon wrote to Paris that Maximillian would therefore soon come to 
arrangement that would favour French over Mexican administrators and this would 
advance French interests. The minister looked forward to a day when France would 
exercise complete control over the Mexican administration, particularly its 
finances.108 
However, as Maximilian explained, it was impossible to have a government 
composed completely of Europeans.109 The Emperor needed to construct an image 
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that overcame the contradiction between Mexican nationalism, European dynastic 
rule and French intervention.110 If independence and national sovereignty were 
largely a fiction under the intervention and Regency, under the Empire, despite the 
enormous pressure France was able to exert on the regime, they became too real 
for Paris. Maximilian’s commitment to continue the liberal path of Forey’s 12 June 
1863 manifesto, combined with the attempt to reconcile the parties and attract 
moderate liberals to his cause, meant that he had to appoint Mexicans, not French 
nationals, to key positions in his ministries, his council of state and other branches 
of the Mexican government.  
Moreover, the French appointments that were made contributed to the 
very thing France complained about: anti‐French attitudes. Ramírez complained to 
Hidalgo y Esnaurrízar that the idea had been to create an independent empire and 
not have Maximilian as a puppet, but French administrators behaved as if Mexico 
were a conquered country and Bazaine was treated better than the Emperor 
himself.111 Referring to the new gendarmerie Arrangoiz noted that it was “not very 
wise” to staff this organisation with those who did not know Spanish and that a 
“foreign police force” would not be looked upon kindly by Mexicans. Conservatives, 
he argued, did not mind the appointment of capable men regardless of nationality, 
but they did object to the “appalling number of foreign mediocrities” involved in 
the empire. Distrust of foreign influence was exacerbated by the multi‐national 
nature of the Empire itself, which manifested itself through Maximilian’s privy 
council. This body was described by Arrangoiz as “polyglot, a sort of Tower of Babel, 
composed of French, Belgians, Hungarians and I do not know what other 
nationalities”.112 
Many in the Conservative Party were further angered that France retained 
control of the military command, refusing their generals, with the exception of 
Tomás Mejía (1820‐67), a significant role in the pacification of the country.113 This 
was a deliberate French policy. Louis‐Napoléon instructed Bazaine: “[in order to] 
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prevent the reaction in Mexico, make sure that it is always the sword of France that 
commands [….] Organise a small Mexican army”.114 Furthermore, the liberal policy 
necessitated excluding many clerical conservatives from positions of power in 
favour of moderates. Arrangoiz described Ramírez, Maximilian’s first foreign 
minister, as formerly “one of the reddest republicans” and claimed his appointment 
was “agreed in the Tuileries”. Wrong on the specifics, Paris had no more love for 
Ramírez than the clerical conservatives, Arrangoiz was correct in general: France 
wished to see moderate liberals appointed to positions of prominence. In addition 
to Ramírez, Arrangoiz noted that Pedro Escudero y Echánove (1818‐97), the 
minister of justice and ecclesiastical affairs was a “moderate republican”, and the 
interim minister of war merely a “republican”;115 the appointment of moderate 
liberals necessarily reduced the number of Conservatives serving in the highest 
positions of state. 
What was worse for clerical conservatives like Arrangoiz was that 
Maximilian continued the “anti‐Catholic” policies of the Regency and the 
intervention. Apart from their exclusion from office –  Miramón and Márquez 
leaving Mexico on diplomatic missions to Berlin and the Ottoman Empire 
respectively was the most striking example of this –  the Mexican Emperor decreed 
that government employees should work on Sundays, gravitated to merging the 
two independence holidays into one celebrated on 16 September, the Grito de 
Dolores, rather than the Conservative preference for 27 September, which marked 
Iturbide’s entry into Mexico City.116 The liberal pièce de résistance which most 
angered clerical conservatives was, of course, the confirmation of Juárez’s reforms, 
namely freedom of worship, civil registry, the sale of Church property and the 
supremacy of the state over the Church and Rome, which Maximilian enacted 
through a series of decrees and laws between December 1864 and December 1865 
after he had failed to arrange a concordat with a Papal nuncio.117 
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These policies were satirised by the periodical La Orquesta, which depicted 
Maximilian as more liberal than Juárez, and described by the Empress Carlota as 
“going beyond the programme of the liberal party”, were intended to attract 
adherents to the empire, strengthen the moderates and facilitate a fusion of the 
parties along Bonapartist lines.118 They were successful in so far as many did rally to 
the empire.119 Tomás O’Horán, was one such example, who had fought against the 
intervention at Puebla and refused Taboada’s overtures to join the intervention in 
1862, but he was killed in Mexico City in 1867 defending the capital against liberal 
forces. He decided to join the imperialistas because, like many republicans, 
according to Zamacois, he realised that “national independence” was not 
threatened and that the Empire had widespread support.120  
The failure of the Mexican Second Empire was therefore not a consequence 
of its inability to rally support from across the political spectrum to its side, certainly 
not at elite level. As Pani has shown, the Second Mexican Empire attracted “an 
impressive list of Mexicans of relatively diverse social and ideological or partisan 
backgrounds, distinguished in the fields of law and culture, with experience in high‐
level politics since the 1840s.”121 Adherents were attracted for a number of 
reasons, many of them outlined in previous chapters. There was significant support 
for Maximilian beyond monarchists, or those whose association with the 
Conservative Party made their support something of a default option (although, as 
has been seen, clerical conservatives disowned his liberal policies). As this thesis 
has demonstrated, many of the factors that drew Mexican elites to the empire 
were concerns that stretched back in Mexican history long before the 1860s. The 
fear of US expansion, the economic programme of the empire as outlined in section 
I above, the hope that the empire would end party conflict, the creation of a strong 
centralised government, and the belief that a French‐backed regime would bring 
order and stability were mutually reinforcing reasons to support it.  
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Moderates were, therefore, rallying to the empire. Moreover, French arms 
had been successful in every major engagement they had fought since the 5 May 
1862 battle of Puebla. By 1865, Juárez had been pushed back to the US border at 
Paso del Norte (today Ciudad Juárez), Porfirio Díaz had been captured at the siege 
of Oaxaca and Bazaine was optimistic that the pacification of Mexico was nearly 
complete.122 Why, then, seemingly on the brink of military success, with French 
troops occupying Chihuahua City, only a four day march from Juárez’s last refuge on 
the border, did Louis‐Napoléon order the withdrawal of his soldiers? And why did 
Maximilian’s regime collapse so swiftly without French bayonets to support it? 
III 
“The Empire Can do no more than Prolong its Agony”:123 
The Failure of the Second Mexican Empire 
The Times’ Mexican correspondent proclaimed the Mexican Empire to be in 
the name of “humanity and civilisation”,124 and hoped that the “Mexican people 
[would] seize the opportunity so unexpectedly offered to them, and rise to that 
position among civilised nations which […] they ought long before this have 
attained.”125 In 1864, The Economist argued that Louis‐Napoléon’s intervention had 
been a success.126 The English commentator on foreign affairs, Robert Hogarth 
Patterson (1821‐86), argued “[o]f all the projects of [Louis‐Napoléon], this is the 
one which is to be the most applauded for the good which it will accomplish for the 
world” and added “it may happen that the House of Hapsburg […] be the head of a 
great and flourishing empire in the New World after the original empire in Europe 
has been broken into pieces.”127  
Yet the empire ended with the execution of its emperor only months after 
the final withdrawal of French troops. As has been noted, for many contemporary 
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critics, as well as subsequent historians, the explanation was simple: the French 
intervention was undertaken because Louis‐Napoléon was misled over the true 
situation of Mexico. It is to be hoped that this thesis has demonstrated this 
interpretation is not true, but even if it were the assumption inherent within the 
conclusion is that a detailed knowledge of the economic, political and social ‘reality’ 
is necessary for imperialism to succeed. A cursory glance at nineteenth‐century 
imperialism elsewhere on the globe would suggest otherwise.  
The claim that France lacked knowledge of Mexico has an element of truth 
to it. An anecdote told by France’s minister of war suggests that France was not 
best prepared: the army had no good maps of Mexico and thus Louis‐Napoléon was 
obliged to lend Forey, the leader of some 30,000 troops, one from his own personal 
collection.128 However, such seemingly farcical levels of preparation were hardly 
uncommon in nineteenth‐century imperialism. In 1830, France launched its 
expedition against Algiers; the primary reference material for commanding officers 
was Sallust and Livy.129 Even so, the long conquest of Algeria was eventually 
completed. In Mexico, by comparison, France could rely on local allies, knowledge 
gained from the 1838‐39 intervention and maps and narrative accounts from the 
US‐Mexican War.130 In this sense Mexico was not a “terra incognita”.131 
If the failure of the intervention was not predicated upon a lack of 
knowledge, and the policy never relied upon the clerical conservatives for its 
success, then another explanation must be sought for its catastrophic denouement: 
the model of imperialism France adopted. It was precisely because Algeria took 
over seventeen years to ‘pacify’, with more than 100,000 French troops deployed at 
enormous expense, that French imperialism elsewhere was informal in nature. 
Syria, Cochinchina and China were all small‐scale expeditions, usually in 
cooperation with one or more power and which did not aim at territorial conquest. 
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In Mexico, the defeat at Puebla saw significant reinforcements sent to Mexico, but 
the intention was always to create a stable regime that would ultimately sustain 
itself, indemnify France for the intervention, pay for the ongoing cost of French 
occupation and honour its foreign debts to ensure access to international credit 
markets. 
However, the Mexican Second Empire was not able to pay for the privilege 
of French intervention and occupation and nowhere was France’s frustration more 
apparent than in its attempts to reform Mexico’s finances. The Mexican Second 
Empire, like all Mexican governments before it,132 failed to establish itself on a firm 
financial footing. This was in no small part a consequence of the financial burdens 
the French imperial model imposed upon Maximilian’s treasury. France had a 
“direct interest” in Mexican finances: “the proper management of the public money 
is the guarantee of our debts […] we have good reason to exercise active control 
over the financial administration.” A succession of financial advisors, “special agents 
delegated for [the purpose of reforming Mexico’s finances] by the [French] minister 
of finance”,133 were sent to Mexico including a deputy of the Corps législatif, 
Charles Corta (1805‐70), who provided a glowing report on the financial future of 
the empire upon his return to France.  
According to Corta, Mexico, properly governed, had more than enough 
resources to cover its deficits and from a financial point of view the government of 
Mexico “has a chance of strength in the future, providing it hastens to develop the 
numerous resources which are in the country.”134 However, Montholon lamented 
that Corta had left Mexico at the “most painful period in a time of transition full of 
dangers and difficulties.”135 In a dispatch of 10 October 1864 to Drouyn de Lhuys, 
Montholon wrote, “I cannot hide [from you] how worried I am about the financial 
                                                          
132 See Tenenbaum, The Politics of Penury. 
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cie 1865), 15; 21.  
135 Montholon to Drouyn de Lhuys, 27 September 1864, AAE, CP Mexique, 62. 
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situation”. Expenses were increasing while income was diminishing – the overall 
situation warranted “strong concern for the immediate future”. The weakness of 
Mexican finances, the difficulty of reforming the treasury and the penury of a 
government which often required advances from the French treasury were the 
consistent complaints of French diplomats.136  
Whether these complaints were founded or not is somewhat irrelevant 
given the enormous burden of debt that the two loans undertaken by Maximilian 
and the Treaty of Miramar placed on Mexico. It was expected that under the 
“enlightened influence” of France’s financial advisors, the “seeds of prosperity […] 
cannot fail to be rapidly developed”.137 In this, however, France proved no more 
successful than previous Mexican governments: between 1822 and 1856 only one 
had managed to run a budget surplus (for nine months, 1822‐23).138 The French 
counsellor of state, Jacques Langlais (1810‐66), was sent to Mexico in 1865 on a 
salary of 150,000 francs a year, and his team of French employees, were given 
“dictatorial powers” to reorganise Mexican finances. He died before he could 
complete his task, but his report was finished by his assistant. It was withering in its 
assessment of the Mexican treasury: “properly speaking, up to the present, there 
has been no budget in Mexico” and “it is impossible with such a system, which 
excludes all idea of order or control, to have good finances.”139  
Nonetheless, Langlais was no more successful than those sent before him 
balancing the Mexican budget. Based on the estimates of the Mexican Ministry of 
Finance for the year 1866, the treasury would receive 18.43 million piastres. Of this, 
over half (54 percent) would go to service the Mexican loans and just over a quarter 
(26 percent) to honour the Treaty of Miramar, the majority of which was to pay for 
the French army in Mexico. Thus financial obligations arranged with France as a 
consequence of the intervention took up over four‐fifths of the Empire’s budget, 
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while the British and Spanish debt added another 6 percent. With the application of 
Langlais’ proposed cuts to expenditure, the budget deficit for the year 1866 would 
be roughly 11.5 million piastres. This was to be partially dealt with by various 
measures that intended to raise revenue through new and more efficient taxation. 
However, even with a reduction in expenditure combined with the proposed 
increase in revenue, a deficit of 1.1 million piastres remained. In short, even in the 
imagination of French administrators, where all their reforms were not only carried 
out, but their hypothetical estimates for increased revenue met, the Mexican 
budget could not be balanced.140  
The Empire was not a model of austere government, and was more 
expensive than the previous republican regimes.141 But it was not domestic 
expenditure that bankrupted Maximilian. The foreign and domestic debt was 
calculated at nearly 510 million francs to which it was necessary to add the 270 
million Maximilian agreed to pay France as the cost of the intervention.142 
Moreover, of the 534 million francs raised by the two loans Maximilian only 
received 34 million.143 The Emperor complained to Louis‐Napoléon, “without order 
and economy in the finances, with a constantly recurring deficit, I cannot govern.” 
Maximilian argued Mexican finances were in a “deplorable” state because the vast 
majority of revenue went to cover the cost of the military expenses.144  
The miscalculation, then, that France made was not political, as 
contemporary French critics and many subsequent historians alleged, but financial. 
The historian Paul Gaulot (1852‐1937), who completed his history from the notes 
and correspondence of Ernest Louet, the paymaster general of the French army in 
Mexico, wrote that the French government, and the Corps législatif which voted for 
the funds to finance the intervention, “counted on the riches which are usually 
attributed to faraway countries in order to cover the cost with interest. It seems”, 
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he continued, “so simple to our regularly organised societies to establish order 
amongst all nations, and by this order bring them a wonderful prosperity.” No one 
doubted that Mexico would soon find the resources to pay its debt to France. This 
in itself was not an illusion. Gaulot estimated that the cost of governing Mexico was 
about 100 million francs annually and it could easily secure revenues of 250 million 
francs. “The illusion consisted in believing that these results could be reached in 
months, and that they could be achieved by the sole fact of the French army 
occupying Puebla and Mexico [City].”145 
Drouyn de Lhuys made it clear that France would not take upon itself “the 
burdens of the Mexican government”; the French army could not be responsible for 
Mexico’s defence, nor the French treasury for its administration. In January 1866 
the French foreign minister wrote that French “public opinion has pronounced with 
an irrefutable authority that the limit of sacrifices has been reached.”146 Similarly, 
Louis‐Napoléon announced in his 1867 speech from the throne that when the day 
was reached where “our sacrifices seemed to me to surpass the interests which had 
called [France] to the other side of the ocean, I spontaneously decided to recall our 
troops.”147 The reason for the withdrawal of French forces was the non‐payment by 
the Mexican government of the costs imposed by the Treaty of Miramar. However, 
France was willing to withdraw its troops gradually from Mexico and leave behind 
the foreign legion. What caused the “spontaneous” withdrawal, at the height of 
French military success, was US pressure.148 Indeed, Bazaine, acting on instructions 
from Paris, had recalled French troops from northern Mexico in pursuit of Juárez 
because of fears they would become involved in clashes with US troops stationed 
on the border. The sacrifices Louis‐Napoléon was unwilling to make were not only 
continued financial support, but also confrontation with Washington. 
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France further undermined Maximilian’s government through a treaty which 
replaced Miramar. This convention, signed on 30 July 1866, and to come into effect 
on 1 November of the same year, secured half of all Mexico’s customs receipts 
raised on imports entering from the Atlantic seaboard and a quarter of all Pacific 
coast exports to pay French debts,149 thus denying Maximilian his principal source 
of revenue. Bereft of French support, Maximilian was forced to rely on the only 
section of Mexican politics willing to support him in continuing the struggle against 
Juárez: the Mexican Conservative Party. Moderate liberals deserted the empire 
once it became clear that Maximilian would solely embrace the Conservative 
Party’s cause and that France’s withdrawal, combined with US diplomatic and 
material support for Juárez, made the survival of the Mexican Second Empire highly 
unlikely.150 The limited resources Conservatives could mobilise meant that 
Maximilian’s empire was swiftly defeated militarily: the leaders of the Conservative 
Party, Miramón and Márquez, who returned to Mexico from their diplomatic 
missions in November 1866,151 proved no more able to vanquish Juárez then they 
had done in the War of Reform.  
Conclusion 
After the shock of the defeat at Puebla on 5 May 1862, the fortunes of the 
French intervention improved. France was able to impose on Mexico a political 
system that attracted adherents from Liberal and Conservative moderates, 
particularly as a consequence of the economic and administrative reforms which 
appealed across the political spectrum. France created a regime closely tied to Paris 
and wielded considerable influence over it. However, this informal imperial model, 
which placed the financial burdens of the French intervention and occupation on 
the Mexican Empire, was unable to pay for itself. This meant that the Mexican 
Second Empire was unable to divert resources to consolidation. Moreover, Louis‐
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Napoléon refused to countenance devoting more French military resources than 
were already in Mexico, which proved insufficient to pacify Mexico in the time 
afforded to France before the end of the US Civil War resulted in US demands for 
complete withdrawal.  
The monumental failure of Louis‐Napoléon’s Mexican intervention led Émile 
Ollivier (1825‐1913) to claim that he “had searched vainly for a great thought in the 
mass of contradictions” that made up French policy in Mexico. However, it was not 
his inability to comprehend the ideas behind the intervention that led him to this 
conclusion, but rather his conviction that “what is impossible in politics is not great, 
it is absurd”.152 On the other hand, Jacques‐Louis Randon, Louis‐Napoléon’s 
minister of war at the time of the intervention, admitted that the ideas behind the 
expedition “were undoubtedly great.” However, he agreed with Ollivier in that 
these ideas had one fault, but “a serious one: they were impossible.”153  
However, for those Frenchmen in Mexico who fought for and helped 
administer the Mexican Empire the problems were of a more practical nature. In his 
memoirs, the military commander Barail asked if the conquest of Mexico had been 
conceivable: “Yes, obviously […] it is impossible to say what would have happened if 
the [intervention] had been better conducted […] by sending sufficient forces to 
crush all resistance”, but he believed that had this been done then Mexico would 
have been “reconciled and reunited under the incontestable rule of Maximilian”.154 
In his history of the French intervention, the French soldier who served as part of 
France’s “counterguerilla” forces, Émile de Kératry (1832‐1905), complained that 
the French “army spent itself gloriously in the immensity of space”, and that “our 
troops traversing Mexico resembled a ship gliding through the water and leaving 
behind it no traces of its track.”155 French troops temporarily occupied territory, but 
their departure resulted in “scenes of horror” as the local population was assailed 
by armed bands, “so‐called liberals, who pillage”.156 Bazaine wrote that “the empire 
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built by [France] does not yet have deep roots.” The problem was not a lack of 
sympathy amongst the “great majority of the intelligent population of Mexico”, but 
rather that there was little confidence in the civil and military functionaries because 
it was believed the support of France was only temporary.157 The diplomats 
Montholon and Dano both concluded that Mexico’s financial problems could only 
be resolved under French control.158 Indeed, one naval officer summed up what 
many others on the ground had concluded: the solution was “none other than the 
permanent occupation of Mexico […] and the complete absorption of all the 
branches of government and administration.”159  
This solution was, however, exactly what Louis‐Napoléon had hoped to 
avoid by backing the creation of the Second Mexican Empire. This regime’s survival 
was not impossible, but French policy did make its success highly improbable. In the 
end, the Second Mexican Empire collapsed because of the informal‐imperial model 
France imposed on it. By refusing to take on the burden of pacification, and placing 
the financial cost of this on a regime that was unable to pay for it, France ensured 
that the Mexican Second Empire remained on shallow foundations.  
  
 
                                                          
157 Bazaine to Drouyn de Lhuys, 2 January 1866, AAE, CP Mexique, 66. A point also made by Henri 
Agustin Brincourt who temporarily occupied Chihuahua in 1865. Brincourt to Castagny, 17 October 
1865 printed in Henri Agustin Brincourt, Lettres du Geńeŕal Brincourt, 1823-1909 (Plon‐Nourrit et 
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Conclusion 
 
In 1863 the pro‐intervention French‐language newspaper L’Estafette 
understood French imperialism in Mexico as qualitatively different to that practised 
in Algeria. An editorial argued: “[w]hat comparison can seriously be made between 
Algeria and Mexico”? In “Africa”, ran the article, France was faced with a people to 
“fight, reduce or to exterminate”, but in Mexico “we have six and a half million 
allies calling us”. In Algeria, it was necessary to “conquer” a nation; in Mexico “to 
liberate and constitute” one.1 As has been noted, L’Estafette was a (paid) supporter 
of the Mexican Second Empire, nonetheless in its differentiation between the 
French intervention and other examples of imperialism it echoed the sentiments of 
many who backed the creation of a monarchy in Mexico.2 This thesis has argued 
that in order to understand why many in France and Mexico believed the Second 
Mexican Empire to be the solution to internal problems of Mexico and beneficial to 
the interests of France it is necessary to analyse both the imperial and Mexican 
context within which it took place; to imperialise and mexicanise the French 
intervention and the Second Mexican Empire.  
By placing the French intervention in the context of French policy in other 
parts of the world light has been shed on the rationale behind Louis‐Napoléon’s 
course of action towards Mexico. Rather than viewing it as an aberration, the 
French expedition to Mexico was part of the informal assertion of French power 
and influence globally during the period 1820‐67, which reached its high‐water 
mark under the French Second Empire. This was underpinned by a discourse of 
European civilisation within which France occupied a privileged position and, as 
chapter one has shown, Latin America, and Mexico specifically, were marked out as 
areas especially receptive to French approaches to a non‐colonial form of 
imperialism. Moreover, there was nothing particularly controversial at the time 
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about Louis‐Napoléon’s general goals in Mexico: the development of French 
influence and commerce. As Favre, one of the most ardent French critics of 
intervention, remarked: a monarchy “placed in [France’s] orbit” founded on French 
“civilisation” was a great “dream”.3 Favre’s point of departure, like Thiers, was not 
the aims of the French intervention, but its impracticality. For contemporary critics 
of Louis‐Napoléon, and for many historians, the Mexican Second Empire was always 
an impossible dream.  
This thesis has challenged this conclusion. The attempt to consolidate the 
empire of Maximilian was the greatest effort, transnational in both the ideas that 
underpinned it and the means mobilised to support it, to establish an informal‐
imperial relationship anywhere on the globe in the nineteenth century. Aside from 
the resources France mobilised across its formal and informal empire, and the 
Mexican soldiers who fought for it, the empire attracted thousands of Austrian and 
Belgian volunteers, 534 million francs of European capital raised by two separate 
loans, recognition by the major powers of Europe and support in the press from 
influential periodicals such as The Times and The Economist. If it was a dream, it 
was one dreamed by many, and the weight thrown behind it convinced others that 
it would become reality.  
 
Mexicanising the French Intervention 
However, the call to both imperialise and mexicanise shows that French 
intervention should not merely be considered a delusion of the Emperor of the 
French which he tried to will into existence. Nor should the Mexican origins of the 
Mexican Empire be dismissed as only existing in the imagination of a few Mexican 
émigrés defeated in civil war. Chapter two has shown the endurance of 
monarchism in Mexico as a solution to the endemic instability of Mexican politics. 
The foundation of a federal republic was seen by some as the cause of Mexico’s 
inability to constitute an enduring and constitutional regime after independence. In 
this view, Mexico’s political traditions were monarchical and independence had 
been achieved on these principles. The failure of the First Mexican Empire was 
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attributed to the inadequacies of Iturbide rather than a disproof of the Plan of 
Iguala and the ideas behind it. 
Monarchism had a transnational dimension from early on, therefore, 
because those who supported monarchy in Mexico looked overseas for both a 
monarch and material aid from European powers in order to found a kingdom. This 
was not limited to avowed monarchists, such as Gutiérrez de Estrada, but remained 
an option for conservative politicians in Mexico, such as Alamán, who tried to found 
a monarchy with Spanish support in 1845‐46, or Santa Anna, who in 1854 
authorised the search for a monarch to replace him during his dictatorship. From a 
European perspective it was a generally accepted truth, at least amongst those who 
were not republicans, that monarchy was the form of government best suited to 
Mexico. It is hardly surprising that policymakers and diplomats under the Bourbon 
Restoration, the July Monarchy or the French Second Empire considered, what they 
saw as, overly‐democratic federal republicanism to be the cause of the so‐called 
anarchy in Mexico. And it is even less surprising that Louis‐Napoléon believed the 
cure for the tumultuous politics of post‐independence Mexico was the same 
medicine he had seemingly applied so effectively in France. But it was not only 
those tied to these French regimes who saw monarchy as a panacea for Mexico: it 
was a view frequently stated in British and French commentary and travel writing 
on Mexico. 
Nonetheless, monarchism in Mexico, at the level of public political discourse 
at any rate, had limited support even amongst conservatives after the fall of 
Iturbide in 1823. What further drew conservatives towards Europe was the 
increasing anti‐Americanism within conservative thought. As chapter two has 
shown, this was in evidence in the 1820s, but the Texan revolt followed by the US‐
Mexican War confirmed what conservatives already held to be true: the United 
States was the avowed national enemy of Mexico intent on its destruction.  
US expansionism, which caused Mexico to lose nearly half its national 
territory within thirty two years of its independence, was bad enough for 
conservatives. However, conservative discourse was concerned about the role the 
United States played in Mexican politics as well. In the conservative view, the US 
government, through the agency of Poinsett, had deliberately exported federal 
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republicanism, which was ill‐suited to Mexican political traditions, in order to 
weaken Mexico and facilitate the seizure of its northern states. As has been shown 
in chapters three and four, this narrative was present in the 1820s, but conservative 
fears had become more acute in the 1850s for two reasons. First, US expansion was 
no longer a fear, it was a fact. Second, the polarisation of Mexican politics saw 
Washington openly side with Juárez’s Liberals diplomatically and materially during 
the War of Reform. European intervention, therefore, was deemed to be a solution 
to the external threat to Mexico posed by the United States and the internal one 
posed by US‐backed liberalism.  
It was within this context of a hostile power, which conservatives viewed as 
ideologically opposed to their vision for the nation and which posed an existential 
threat to Mexico, that the transnational discourse of pan‐Latinism found adherents 
amongst members of the Conservative Party in the 1850s. Here monarchism and 
anti‐Americanism, combined with French influence and power, came together. 
However, as chapter three has demonstrated, pan‐Latinism can be traced back 
much earlier than the 1850s where it is usually first identified. The idea of Latin 
America was not a French construct of the 1850s, and nor was pan‐Latinism an 
ideology composed to legitimate French imperialism under the French Second 
Empire. Moreover, Mexico shows that it was by no means the case that early 
adopters of the term “Latin America” tended to be liberals. In Mexico the opposite 
was true. It was the Conservative Party that was waging an anti‐democratic crusade 
against Juárez’s US‐backed Liberals.  
In part, the conservative association with pan‐Latinism may be seen as a 
logical outcome of the European sympathies of conservative Mexican politicians 
and intellectuals, such as Alamán, who never renounced Mexico’s Spanish past. 
However, the declining power of Spain, and the hispanophobia ingrained in much of 
Mexico’s political culture, meant that France was a more attractive and useful 
European benefactor. As outlined in chapter three, one of the first arguments for 
French intervention in Mexico made at a government level and depicted in pan‐
Latinist terms was advanced not by French pan‐Latinists, but José Ramón Pacheco 
and Buenaventura Vivó – Santa Anna’s ministers to Paris and Madrid respectively. 
They asked France to cash the cheques written out by French pan‐Latinists in their 
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repeated assertions that France was the leader of Latin civilisation and must take an 
active role to defend it. 
Finally, the international dimension to the consolidation of Mexican 
conservatism was crucial. As chapter four has argued, it was not only Louis‐
Napoléon who saw in his own regime the cure for Mexican ills: the Mexican 
Conservative Party identified itself as part of an “international reaction” based on 
“conservative principles”. Alamán believed that the French Second Empire was the 
model upon which to construct the dictatorship of Santa Anna in 1853. 
Furthermore, the Conservative Party argued that French politics after the 
revolution of 1848 mirrored Mexico: a small cabal of radical and well‐organised 
liberals had overthrown the government against the wishes of the people, who 
were a silent conservative majority. What was needed was a strong leader to defeat 
revolution and restore order. The groundwork for the hyperbolic praise of 
Bonapartism in the conservative press during the early years of the intervention 
had, therefore, been laid in the 1850s. In this decade, France under Louis‐Napoléon 
appeared to have been restored as the greatest continental power in Europe. 
Victory in the Crimean War demonstrated the prowess of the French military, and 
French policy towards the Ottoman Empire was transplanted to the Americas in 
order to present Mexico as the “western question”, which argued European 
powers, headed by France, should intervene in Mexico in order to save it from the 
United States.  
Mexican Conservatives believed the French Second Empire had married 
authoritarian government with economic development and democratic politics. In 
short, it was an ideal example for Mexico to follow. Moreover, French 
administration was seen by many in Mexico as a model to imitate in order to 
achieve rationalised government combined with material progress, a goal which 
formed a significant part of Conservative Party’s programme, and was given 
particular prominence by Almonte. In 1867, the Emperor of the French stated that 
behind his Mexican policy lay the desire to “implant there ideas of order and 
progress”.4 For the reasons outlined above, there were many in Mexico who, even 
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if they had not called for French intervention, ultimately rallied to the Mexican 
Empire and saw in it the best chance for Mexico to become a stable and 
constitutional regime free from US interference.  
Maximilian’s empire did rally support from moderate liberals as well as from 
the Conservative Party, but it was from this latter institution that France initially 
found its collaborating elites and its imperial bridgehead in Mexico. This was a 
consequence of the fissure in Mexican politics between Liberals and Conservatives 
during the 1850s, which reached its apogee in the War of Reform. From 
independence, Mexican conservative politicians were never strong enough to 
impose their vision on Mexico. Administrations in Mexico in which conservatives 
actively participated (and subsequently approved of) were short‐lived. 
Bustamante’s regime directed by Alamán lasted for two years (1830‐2); Paredes 
was president for only seven months in 1846; Santa Anna’s last dictatorship 
endured from 1853 to 1855; the de facto Conservative governments of Zuloaga and 
then Miramón contested power with, and were defeated by, Juárez from 1858 to 
1861. Whatever configuration conservatives relied upon in Mexican politics to 
remain in power, be it in alliance with moderate liberals or santanistas, and with 
the backing of the Church, proved insufficient to sustain them in power. Partly as a 
consequence of this weakness, many in the Mexican Conservative Party called for 
European intervention throughout the 1850s.  
When it finally arrived, French arms provided what seemed a providential 
opportunity to implement the Conservative Party’s conception of the Mexican 
nation after defeat by Juárez. The transnational ideas which underwrote French 
imperialism were, initially at least, embraced by Mexican Conservatives, who 
represented an intervention led by, what they called, the most civilised power in 
Europe as necessarily civilizing in itself. In this view, France, as it had (supposedly) 
done elsewhere, would protect Christian civilisation, impose order, rationalise 
administration, increase commerce and develop the economic potential of Mexico, 
while at the same time safeguarding the social order, protecting Mexico from 
further US invasion and stemming the tide of radical puro liberalism. In this sense, 
locating Mexico within Latin civilisation was not merely a sensible geostrategic 
option, but a shorthand expression for the core aims of the Conservative Party in 
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the 1850s. This helps explain why some Mexican elites supported French 
intervention: transnational ideas supported by French arms could be adapted to 
local circumstances and French power could be co‐opted to further the ends of 
collaborating elites.  
 
Imperialising the French Intervention  
At least that was the theory. The asymmetrical relationship between 
Mexican Conservatives and France is demonstrated by the fact that they were 
swiftly marginalised once the intervention was underway. Certainly France’s initial 
allies in Mexico were Conservatives, but the problem for Mexican Conservatives 
who supported the intervention was that France had little interest in Mexican 
conservatism except insofar as it could deliver immediate French goals: the swift 
pacification of the country and the establishment of stable regime tied closely to 
France. With the defeat at Puebla, 5 May 1862, it became clear to Paris that 
Mexican Conservatives were unable to secure this and, therefore, what little 
autonomy they enjoyed in the intervention ended. As chapter five has shown, the 
utility of Mexican Conservatives was not primarily, for the French, military, but 
rather political in that they provided an imperial bridgehead as well as acting as 
collaborating elites to set up and administer the empire. However, once the regime 
was established those who proved inimical to French, or later Maximilian’s, broadly 
liberal policy were discarded. 
The disavowal of the Mexican Conservative programme, or at least the 
clerical wing of Mexican conservatism, calls into question the conclusion that 
France intervened at the behest of a those who supported it. In fact, Louis‐
Napoléon had a singular vision for the French intervention that had little to do with 
the clerical‐conservative plans of many of those who called for the intervention. 
Transnational ideas such as pan‐Latinism were flexible enough to be shaped to fit 
Mexican conservatism, but they were not interpreted quite so freely by 
policymakers in Paris. As chapter five has shown, Louis‐Napoléon ordered his 
commanders not to follow what he called a “reactionary” course in Mexico. French 
intervention was predicated upon the assumption that a moderate liberal 
government, ordered on the principles of French civilisation and backed by French 
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arms, was the solution to endemic political instability in Mexico and one that would 
quickly defeat opposition. Although driven by the belief that French civilisation was 
the apex of modernity and inherently attractive, the attempt to rally moderates 
from both parties was also a pragmatic choice. The weakness of the Conservative 
Party meant the Mexican empire needed support from moderate liberals as well as 
clerical conservatives in order to survive.  
This was the vision for Mexico that lay behind the French intervention. But 
why try to implement it in Mexico in the first place? As outlined in chapter two, 
Latin America occupied a position of increasing importance for French global trade, 
the protection and development of which was at the forefront of French policy in 
the region, as much for Thiers as it was for Louis‐Napoléon. Mexico was identified 
as a particularly lucrative potential market because, it was argued, its immense 
wealth under Spanish colonialism could be restored by bringing an end to the so‐
called anarchy that reigned there after independence. A strong, regular, 
government administered along French lines, would develop the mineral resources 
and agricultural potential of the country. Mexico had been cut off from European 
capital markets, while immigration had been low because of political instability, but 
the Mexican Second Empire would attract both. It would, therefore, be easy to 
restore Mexico’s place as a world‐leading economy under French tutelage. 
As chapter two has shown, French diplomats, policymakers and many 
commentators argued that the political solution for Mexico, from which economic 
progress would follow, was monarchy. This shared discourse of monarchism 
undoubtedly influenced French thinking towards Mexico under the French Second 
Empire. In 1861, Gutiérrez de Estrada thanked Chevalier alongside Eugène Duflot de 
Mofras and Alleye de Cyprey for their continued support for monarchy in Mexico.5 
It is worth stressing that without European support for the idea of monarchy in 
Mexico it would never have been realised, and that this support, unlike in Mexico, 
was not confined to a minority, but was shared by many in Britain and Spain as well 
as France. Although monarchy enjoyed only limited support amongst elites in 
Mexico itself, the endurance of the idea and the willingness of some Mexicans to 
                                                          
5 Gutiérrez de Estrada, Le Mexique et l'archiduc, 14; 17‐18. 
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declare in favour of it meant that Mexico was the only country in Latin America, 
certainly by the 1860s, where a European attempt to establish a monarchical 
regime could be seriously entertained.    
The economic development of a wealthy nation subordinated to French 
interests and part of the European dynastic system was an attractive one in itself, 
but it was the geopolitical significance of Mexico that placed it at the forefront of 
Louis‐Napoléon’s worldview. As outlined in chapter three, French fears of US 
aggrandisement in Mexico and the circum‐Caribbean were a leitmotif of foreign 
policy discussion as regards Latin America from the Texan revolt onwards. These 
were often expressed in pan‐Latinist terms. And the ideas that lay behind pan‐
Latinism were expressed beyond the canonical texts of influential proponents, such 
as Chevalier, and shaped the views of diverse French diplomats and commentators 
on Mexico. Indeed, Guizot’s insistence on an equilibrium in North America between 
the Protestant United States and (what he termed) southern Catholic nations was 
pan‐Latinist in all but name.  
Pan‐Latinism was central to the intervention because, as discussed above, it 
drew some Mexican conservatives towards France and it demarcated Latin America 
as a sphere of French influence. In this sense, pan‐Latinism was a confident 
assertion of the primacy of French civilisation in Latin regions, but it should also be 
noted that it was also an explanation for the diminishing influence of France in the 
face of rising US and Prussian power. A pan‐Latinist worldview greatly expanded the 
reach and power of France, but at the same time made this influence precarious 
because any Latin nation challenged by a non‐Latin nation undermined France and 
upset the balance of power between races.  
US policy had shown itself to be openly hostile towards Cuba, Central 
America and especially Mexico, while at the same time threatening European 
interests in the Caribbean. As discussed in chapter three, many French 
commentators identified rising US power as a direct affront to Latin civilisation and 
Mexico as a battleground between races and civilisations, which, if not fought, 
would result in the destruction of the one by the other. Even for those like Guizot 
who did not openly discuss the US in pan‐Latinist terms, Mexico was seen as a 
bulwark to prevent US expansionism because it was feared further US annexation 
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would limit European access to markets and, more generally, US power threatened 
the global geopolitical balance. As chapter three and four have demonstrated Louis‐
Napoléon and Chevalier, alongside many others, understood French intervention in 
Mexico to be a response to the rise of US power and a chance to reassert French 
influence in the Americas.  
Any analysis of the French intervention must therefore place Latinity at its 
heart because it underpinned the intellectual argument for geopolitical concerns, 
marked Latin America as an area of French imperial influence and saw some 
Mexicans welcome France in this role. It is also worth noting that Thiers opposed 
both Guizot’s policy over Texan annexation and Louis‐Napoléon’s in Mexico 
because he dismissed the idea that the United States was a threat to France. For 
Thiers, the rise of the United States benefitted France because it diminished Britain. 
Guizot and Louis‐Napoléon, on the other hand, were both anglophiles who largely 
understood Anglo‐French cooperation as a means to extend European influence in 
the extra‐European world and to protect British and French interests in Europe 
itself. 
France was prepared to intervene militarily across the globe in order to 
advance its interests with a marked preference for limited military expeditions, in 
conjunction with other European powers, rather than colonial conquest. Mexico 
should be placed within this context of the extension of French global influence, 
especially the Orleanist interventions in Latin America of 1838 and the joint 
overseas expeditions of the French Second Empire: the Second Opium War (Anglo‐
French, 1856‐60), Syria (with international agreement, 1860‐61) and to Cochinchina 
(initial campaign, Franco‐Spanish, 1858‐62). In addition, France was consolidating 
its long‐term influence in Egypt, particularly with the construction of the Suez 
Canal. Nonetheless, the currents of French thought outlined above and the trends 
in French imperialism should not be seen as an ineluctable march towards French 
intervention. It was the outbreak of the US Civil War which provided France with a 
free hand to prosecute its goals in Mexico, while it was the end of civil war in 
Mexico which increased the number of elites willing to work with France in order to 
further their own ends. 
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The Failure of the Mexican Second Empire 
Nonetheless, if the French intervention is placed within French imperialism 
generally and the Mexican origins of Maximilian’s empire are taken seriously the 
question still remains: why did it fail? For some in the Conservative Party who 
requested French intervention, its collapse was a consequence of too much 
imperialism. Directing affairs from Paris, and with little understanding of events in 
Mexico, Louis‐Napoléon’s refusal to follow the Conservative Party programme was 
the primary cause for the failure of Maximilian’s empire. This charge can be 
dismissed: it is clear that the Mexican empire did not collapse because it was not 
conservative enough. Contradicting the Mexican Conservative interpretation, 
contemporary French critics, and many subsequent historians, argued that it was 
precisely because the intervention was launched in favour of a clique of Mexican 
Conservative émigrés, who misrepresented the chances of success, that it did not 
succeed.  
From a military point of view, however, the temporary conquest and 
occupation of Mexico had been demonstrated to be a very real possibility by the 
US‐Mexican War. Certainly the French defeat at Puebla by the republican Mexican 
army was a shock, but this was a consequence of the assumption that 6,000 battle‐
hardened French troops, veterans of various conflicts such as the first Carlist War, 
the conquest of Algeria, the Crimean War and the Italian campaigns, would easily 
defeat the forces of Juárez. Furthermore, the 23,000 or so reinforcements sent by 
France ensured that there were no major subsequent military defeats. The military 
campaign in Mexico was expensive, requiring more soldiers than originally 
anticipated in 1862, and the resistance of Juárez and his liberal supporters proved 
much more determined than expected. Nonetheless, as the 1864 Treaty of Miramar 
made clear, France was willing to maintain a significant level of troops in Mexico 
with numbers reduced to no fewer than 20,000 by 1867, and with an 8,000‐strong 
French Foreign Legion remaining in Mexico for six years after the departure of all 
other French troops (after which it would pass into the service of the Mexican 
government). 
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It was not, therefore purely military concerns that led to the announcement 
of the withdrawal of French troops in 1867. France faced determined resistance to 
imperialism in Algeria and Indochina, but what local leaders in these regions did not 
have was the support of a major regional power, with an army of 500,000 over the 
border, that refused to recognise the legitimacy of the French‐backed regime, 
provided material aid to Juárez and ultimately threatened France with war if it did 
not withdraw its troops. Far from checking US power, French intervention in Mexico 
merely afforded Louis‐Napoléon the opportunity to witness its reality.  
Still, if US pressure explains the withdrawal of French troops it does not 
account for the collapse of the Mexican Second Empire. Indeed, Louis‐Napoléon 
had always taken into account that the Union was hostile to French intervention, 
reasoning that even if the North won the US Civil War Maximilian’s empire would 
have been consolidated, internationally recognised and internal opposition 
crushed. Presented with a fait accompli, and with France legally bound to withdraw 
its troops, the United States would have no choice but to acknowledge the Mexican 
Second Empire. 
In large part, the reasons why the Mexican Second Empire failed to establish 
itself before the end of the US Civil War can be found in the informal‐imperial 
model that France adopted in Mexico. The nominal reason for the French 
withdrawal of troops given to Maximilian was the inability of the Second Mexican 
Empire to comply with the terms regulating the French intervention in the Treaty of 
Miramar. As discussed in chapter five, the exhausted Mexican treasury was unable 
to maintain the payments agreed in order to finance the French army in Mexico. 
This was the pretext for French abandonment of Maximilian, but it was 
symptomatic of a wider problem that made the consolidation of his empire 
problematic.  
All Mexican regimes after independence suffered from financial difficulty, 
which was why Juárez suspended international payments in 1861 precipitating the 
intervention, but the Treaty of Miramar, combined with the Mexican loans 
contracted in Paris and Spanish and British claims which predated the intervention, 
meant that 86 percent of Maximilian’s budget for 1866 was taken up with foreign 
debt repayment. The French goal was to create a stable regime that would 
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ultimately sustain itself, indemnify France for the intervention, pay for the ongoing 
cost of French occupation while building up its own military and honour its 
international debts to ensure access to international credit markets. However, the 
Treaty of Miramar made it highly improbable that the French aim of establishing a 
self‐sustaining regime could be achieved given the weight of debt it put on the 
Mexican treasury. After the announcement of the French withdrawal in 1866, 
France replaced the Treaty of Miramar with a convention that appropriated 
Mexico’s customs receipts to cover French debts, thus further starving Maximilian 
of the resources required to administer his empire. 
This problem was exacerbated because, like many previous Mexican 
regimes, the Second Mexican Empire did not control the entire territory of the 
nation it claimed to rule. In part, this was also a failure of French policy. French 
forces did not take Puebla until May 1863, the French army only reached Mexico 
City in June of the same year and Maximilian did not accept the crown until April 
1864. This meant that the French army and French administrators alongside 
Mexican imperialistas had little over a year in which to consolidate the Second 
Mexican Empire before the end of the US Civil War. This short period of time 
proved insufficient to secure and legitimise the regime, let alone organise a 
Mexican army capable of defending the empire independently of French troops. 
Although many moderate liberals did rally to the empire, their support proved 
ephemeral and once it became clear that French soldiers would leave Mexico these 
liberals encouraged Maximilian to abdicate. In short, it was the shallow foundations 
of the regime and the lack of resources available to Maximilian in order to maintain 
his government, combined with the unwillingness of France to commit more money 
and men to maintain the state it had help create in Mexico – the consistent 
reluctance of France to assume the costs of formal empire – that led to its swift 
collapse in the face of republican forces after French withdrawal. 
 
Informal Empire 
As has been noted in the introduction, the commitment of French resources 
to Mexico was far larger than any other contemporary imperial French project, with 
the exception of Algeria. This scale of French military involvement in Mexico has 
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obscured historians’ understandings of the intervention. However, to categorise the 
intervention as “formal empire” and “colonialism” is to conflate the means by 
which French intervention was conducted with the ends of the imperial project: at 
no point did France want to establish direct rule, acquire territory or maintain a 
permanent military presence in Mexico.  
This disjuncture between the practice of French imperialism in Latin America 
and the desired outcome highlights one of the distinguishing features of French 
imperialism in Latin America which separates it from British policy, namely in both 
Mexico and the River Plate, France was willing to deploy military force in order to 
achieve its ends. In addition, it became involved in domestic politics in the hope of 
securing its goals. France distanced itself from the Mexican Conservative Party once 
Mexico City was occupied in 1863, but those who initially fought alongside the 
intervention were those who had lost the War of Reform. Similarly, as discussed in 
chapter two, in the River Plate, French forces aided Argentine Unitarians who had 
recently been defeated in civil war by Rosas, while they backed Uruguayan liberals 
in their civil conflict against the pro‐Rosas Oribe. Furthermore, in the 1838‐39 
Mexican intervention Admiral Baudin briefly flirted with liberal federalists in revolt 
against the central government and lifted the blockade on liberal‐held ports. The 
trend is clear: France was willing to involve itself in domestic politics because it was 
thought that factions in Latin America would further French policy goals. These 
elites were attracted to France because of a sympathy for French ideas, but also 
because French arms were a means advancing local ambitions. Moreover, in both 
the River Plate and, more dramatically, in Mexico, the combination of local allies 
and French support proved incapable of founding long‐lasting informal influence, or 
even securing the aims of those local elites who sided with France. 
The contrast with Britain is perhaps not as marked as it initially appears. As 
chapter two has shown, Britain supported some French policy goals in the region. 
Furthermore, they did commit limited naval forces in support of these aims and in 
conjunction with France. Britain jointly blockaded Buenos Aires from 1845‐47 and 
was part of the tripartite intervention of 1861. Furthermore, Palmerston privately 
welcomed the 1838 expedition against Mexico and hoped that the Second Mexican 
Empire under Maximilian would be a success. Influential British periodicals such as 
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The Economist and The Times also championed the Mexican Second Empire. While 
Britain was not willing to deploy military force on anywhere near the same scale as 
France, particularly not in support of such an ambitious project as overturning the 
political institutions of Mexico and establishing a Mexican empire under French 
tutelage, Britain was willing to acquiesce, and at times openly collaborate, with 
French imperial ambitions in Latin America. 
Nonetheless, Lord Aberdeen made clear that if he had 20,000 British troops 
to spare he would not send one to the River Plate, while Lord Clarendon similarly 
baulked at the resources that would be necessary to contain US expansionism in 
Mexico and Central America. How, then, to account for the willingness of France to 
mobilise its forces to develop its influence in Latin America? Many French 
policymakers, including Chateaubriand, Guizot, Thiers and Louis‐Napoléon, believed 
that the extension of French influence in Latin America was a desirable outcome. 
The question was how to achieve it. All of them, albeit to different degrees, were 
prepared to send French forces in order to further this goal.  
This may perhaps be explained by the fact that France lacked the economic 
hegemony enjoyed by Britain. In the classic model of informal empire commerce 
and capital, backed by the threat of military intervention, are the means to procure 
political influence. In the case of France, to secure political influence it was first 
necessary to create the conditions for it. The threat of force was not the means by 
which French influence was to be maintained; rather force was the method that 
would establish French power in regions, like Mexico, where it was thought French 
civilisation would be welcomed. The preferred means of doing this was through 
collaborating elites influenced by elements of French political culture who, at times 
of domestic political conflict, were willing to embrace French arms in support of 
transnational ideas, which were adopted and adapted to their local circumstances 
in order to promote their own vision of the nation.  
In terms of what they hoped to create in Mexico, namely an independent 
regime tied closely to French interests, the model of French informal imperialism is 
closer to Darwin’s categorisation, discussed in the introduction, of the “eastern” 
version of British informal empire, which was underwritten by legal and/or 
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territorial concessions.6 There were no territorial concessions, but France’s 
relationship with Mexico was regulated by the Treaty of Miramar. This document 
outlined the financial obligations undertaken by Maximilian in return for the 
military support of France, while a secret clause bound the Second Mexican Empire 
to continue the policies enacted by France at the beginning of the intervention and 
followed by the Regency government. The two Mexican loans tied the Mexican 
government to French capital, and intellectual institutions, such as the Franco‐
Mexican Scientific Commission and the Imperial Academy of Arts and Sciences were 
intended to spread culture, but French capital (the first Mexican loan was raised in 
1864) and French culture (the Academy was opened in 1865) followed the 
establishment of French political influence (the Regency was proclaimed in 1863), 
they did not create it. Commerce was always an important consideration, and 
French trade with Mexico was second to that of Britain and equal to the United 
States, but, again, the intervention was intended to protect and develop French 
economic interests, which had not in themselves secured much, if any, political 
influence for France in its relations with Mexico. French informal empire Mexico 
was, then, an aspiration and one that policymakers were willing divert considerable 
resources to in order to create, even without the economic bases which British 
informal influence in Latin America is conventionally understood to have been 
predicated upon.   
This thesis has shown that French regimes which in the (until recently) 
dominant historiography have frequently been dismissed as failures or 
anachronisms were admired by many Latin American intellectuals and politicians. 
Moreover, it was not merely the political thought of the widely influential pantheon 
of French intellectuals, such as Constant, Guizot or Alexis de Tocqueville (1805‐59), 
that drew some towards France in this period, but also the constitutional, 
administrative and, in the case of the French Second Empire, economic examples 
French regimes provided. Indeed, in 1853, as discussed in chapter four, it was 
Alamán’s interest in the apparent success of Bonapartism in France that led him to 
seek legislation from the French minister to Mexico, Levasseur, to base Santa 
                                                          
6 Darwin, ‘Imperialism and the Victorians’, 617. 
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Anna’s press law on and saw the French minister feted at various banquets held by 
various important politicians in 1853. In this sense, it was this French political model 
that gave Levasseur what he termed influence in Mexican politics, not French 
capital or commerce. 
The thesis has argued that the concept of informal empire elucidates our 
understanding of the Mexican Second Empire because it theorises a relationship 
through which those who embraced French imperialism hoped to benefit from 
French intervention. This was not based on economic self‐interest; the 
advantageous economic relationship with France never developed beyond the 
commerce endemic to the period, but rather was motivated by an ideological 
conviction that Conservative Party’s vision for Mexico was the only one that could 
save the nation, and that it could only triumph with the help of French arms. 
Finally, if the intervention is placed within French imperialism regionally and 
globally, it also should be situated within the context of the US Civil War, the study 
of which has undergone a “transnational turn”. This has led one historian to 
conclude that the French intervention and the Union’s conflict against the South 
were linked as an “illiberal alliance between the slaveholding Confederate States of 
America and monarchical France […] an ideological conflict centred in North 
America’s southern tier.”7 The thesis has demonstrated that such a conclusion is 
not plausible. A central aim of the French intervention was to prevent the further 
expansion of the United States, and this threat was understood by French 
policymakers to emanate primarily from the South, while the liberal face of the 
Second Mexican Empire belies any attempt to tie it ideologically to the 
Confederacy. As regards the United States, the intervention should be understood 
as a direct and deliberate challenge to US regional hegemony, the greatest defiance 
of the Monroe Doctrine until the Cuban Missile Crisis. The discourses that 
underwrote monarchism, pan‐Latinism, conservatism and French imperialism were 
part of this challenge and tied to anti‐Americanism. The attempt to support and 
                                                          
7 Patrick Kelly, ‘The North American Crisis of the 1860s’, Journal of the Civil War Era, 2 (2012), 337; 
339. For an overview of the US Civil War in an international context see Don H. Doyle, ‘The Global 
Civil War’ in Aaron Sheehan‐Dean (ed.), A Companion to the US Civil War, 2 vols. (Chichester: Wiley 
Blackwell, 2014), II, 1103‐1120. 
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further these currents of thought in Mexico was in part provided by the break‐up of 
the Union, and the failure of the Second Mexican Empire was in no small part due 
to reconstitution of the United States in 1865. 
By analysing sources not normally utilised in the history of ideas, the thesis 
has demonstrated that currents of thought often considered to be the preserve of 
well‐known intellectuals and politicians were part of a wider political culture that 
influenced French policy in Mexico, and shaped the contours of Mexican political 
discourse. It has demonstrated that the ideas of Alamán or Chevalier, for example, 
were not merely the preserve of elite intellectuals, but were shared and developed 
by diplomats, travel writers and publicists, who discussed and debated them in 
their published works and correspondence. However, more research into the 
popular appeal of these ideas, especially those of Mexican conservative thought, 
their regional reach, particularly in the different states of Mexico, would deepen 
our understanding of Mexican conservatism. In addition, the links between anti‐
Americanism, conservatism and pan‐Latinism in Latin America would be especially 
interesting to explore in order to see if Mexico is an exceptional case in the region, 
or whether similar currents of pro‐European or pro‐French thought were shared by 
other Latin American conservatives. 
The thesis has placed French imperialism in its global and Latin American 
context; however, the focus has necessarily been on Mexico. Further research into 
French imperial projects worldwide, and regionally in Latin America, particularly 
comparative case studies, would help elucidate links, commonalities and 
differences. Pan‐Latinism, for example, was not just a discourse applied to Latin 
America, but to Africa and Asia too, while France’s role as the defender of 
Catholicism in the period 1815‐70, particularly under the French Second Empire, 
may have more important implications for its appeal to Mexican conservatives than 
this thesis has been able to identify. The impact of the failure of the French 
informal‐imperial model in Mexico on French imperialism may also perhaps help 
explain the move to formal colonialism under the Third Republic. Ultimately, 
informal empire building in Latin America was, for France, an expensive and futile 
exercise and thus may have led French imperialists towards other imperial 
strategies on other parts of the globe. 
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‐‐‐ 
An article published in 1863 in El Pájaro Verde concluded that the memory 
of Louis‐Napoléon would remain engraved in the hearts of all Mexicans.8 In the 
aftermath of the French intervention it was, although not in the manner that the 
pro‐intervention newspaper or the Emperor of the French would have hoped. The 
importance of the French intervention in the construction of Mexican national 
identity, as one of the foundational myths of Mexican history, is well documented.9 
However, if Louis‐Napoléon is remembered at all today in public discourse it is 
generally because of Marx’s oft‐repeated quip on history, the first time as tragedy, 
the second time as farce, or because of the catastrophic defeat in the Franco‐
Prussian War, rather than his Mexican policy. Maximilian would be an even more 
obscure footnote to European history than he is if it were not for Manet’s 
‘Execution of Maximilian’. Juárez, by contrast, has Mexico City’s international 
airport named after him.  
Despite Louis‐Napoléon’s fondness for the “ideas” or “spirit” of the century, 
contemporaries and historians have generally concluded that the Emperor of the 
French, the Mexican Conservative Party and Maximilian were on the ‘wrong side’ of 
history. This thesis has built on the work of scholars who have deepened our 
understanding of ideas that underpinned their projects, especially recent work in 
Mexican history which has demonstrated that the Manichean division between 
Liberal patriots and traitorous reactionaries is unhelpful. As Van Young writes, 
“revolutionary mythologies […] blur or efface others altogether, the act of creative 
remembering implies selective forgetting as well.”10 After all, Juárez’s Liberals 
disagreed with Alamán, but his analysis of the best course for Mexico, namely 
economic development combined with political authoritarianism, was one largely 
adopted by the PRI in the twentieth century. And Porfirio Díaz may have fought 
against French ideas on the battlefield, but he would surely have agreed with Louis‐
                                                          
8 ‘Editorial. Napoléon III – El Arbitro de la paz del mundo’. El Pájaro Verde, 15 August 1863, p. 2. 
9 See, for example, Knight, ‘Peculiarities of Mexican History’, 125. 
10 Van Young, Writing Mexican History, 160. 
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Napoléon’s judgement that “[w]hat is needed in Mexico is not parliamentary 
liberty, but a liberal dictatorship”.11
                                                          
11 Louis‐Napoléon to Maximilian, 2 October 1863, quoted in Corti, Maximilian, I, 389‐90. 
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Chronology 1: Mexico, 1820-61    
1820 
March – Spanish Constitution of 1812 reintroduced in Spain and 
throughout the Americas. 
1821 
24 February – Agustín de Iturbide issues the Plan of Iguala. 
27 September – The Army of Three Guarantees, led by Iturbide, enters 
Mexico City. 
1822 
19 May – Iturbide proclaimed Emperor of Mexico. 
1822-23 FIRST MEXICAN EMPIRE 
2 December – Santa Anna in Veracruz revolts against Iturbide. 
1823 
1‐2 February – Plan of Casa Mata issued which unites opposition 
against Iturbide. 
19 March – Iturbide abdicates. 
1824 
19 July – Iturbide executed after returning to Mexico. 
1824-35 FEDERAL REPUBLIC 
September – 1824 Constitution proclaimed; Guadalupe Victoria first 
elected president of Mexico (in office 1824‐28). 
1825 
Masonic Rite of York, whose members are known as yorkinos, is set up 
with the cooperation of Joel Poinsett, US minister to Mexico, to 
counter the influence of the Scottish Rite, whose members are known 
as escoceses.  
1827 
10 May and 20 December – laws approved which expel Spaniards from 
Mexico. 
1828 
August to September – Presidential elections held; Manuel Gómez 
Pedraza wins. 
16 September – Santa Anna leads yorkino revolt which proclaims 
Vicente Guerrero president (in office 1829). 
4 December – Fighting in Mexico City which brings Guerrero to power 
sees sack of the Parián market.  
1829 
26 July – Spanish expedition to reconquer Mexico lands at Tampico. 
11 September – Santa Anna defeats Spanish troops. 
4 December –Anastasio Bustamante revolts against Guerrero. 
254 
 
1830 
January – Bustamante president, heads an administration directed by 
Alamán from 1830 to 1832. 
6 April – Law drafted by Alamán passes which restricts Anglo‐American 
immigration to Texas. 
1831 
14 February – Vicente Guerrero executed. 
1832 
2 January – Santa Anna revolts against Bustamante’s presidency. 
23 December – Bustamante steps down as president. 
1833 
1 April – Santa Anna becomes president, does not take up office; 
Valentín Gomez Farías rules as vice‐president (in office 1833‐4).  
1834 
25 May – Plan of Cuernavaca begins a series of revolts against liberal 
reforms enacted by Gomez Farías. Santa Anna intervenes, annuls 
reforms and strips Gomez Farías of vice‐presidency. 
1835 
April – Federalist revolt against centralism breaks out in Zacatecas. 
11 May – Santa Anna defeats federalists in Zacatecas. 
22 June – Revolt in Texas begins. 
1835-46 CENTRAL REPUBLIC 
23 October – The federal 1824 Constitution is replaced by a Centralist 
Constituent Congress. 
1836 
2 March – Declaration of Texan independence. 
6 March – Santa Anna defeats Texan rebels at the Alamo. 
21 April – Texan forces defeat Santa Anna at the battle of San Jacinto. 
29 December – The Siete Leyes (Seven Laws) consolidate centralist 
political system and create the Supreme Conservative Power. 
1837 
April –Bustamante elected president (in office 1837‐41). 
1838 
16 April – French fleets blockades Mexico  
7 October – José Antonio Mejía begins federalist revolt in Tampico 
27‐28 November –French navy bombards and then occupies fort of 
San Juan d’Ulúa at Veracruz. 
1 December – Mexican government declares war on France. 
1839 
22 January – José Urrea begins federalist revolt in Tamaulipas.  
9 March – Peace treaty between France and Mexico signed. 
1840 
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6 June – Yucatán proclaims itself independent of Mexico. 
15 July – Urrea leads federalist revolt in Mexico City; Bustamante 
taken hostage in the National Palace. 
27 July – Revolt defeated and Bustamante restored to power. 
October – Gutiérrez de Estrada publishes pamphlet in favour of 
monarchy. 
1841 
August to October – Triangular Revolt overthrows Bustamante; Santa 
Anna becomes president (in office 1841‐44). 
6 October – Bases de Tacubaya approved; new constitution awards 
Santa Anna temporary dictatorial powers  
1842 
19 December – Congress dominated by federalists is closed down and 
replaced with a Junta de Notables to draft a new constitution.  
1843 
8 June – Bases Orgánicas, santanista constitution, is imposed. 
1844 
6 December – Revolt in Mexico City overthrows Santa Anna. 
7 December – José Joaquín de Herrera nominated president (in office 
December 1844 to December 1845). 
 
1845 
1 March 1845 – US President Tyler signs bill admitting Texas into the 
Union. 
14 December 1845 – General Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga issues plan 
of San Luís Potosi against the national government; Paredes wishes for 
the election of a Constituent Congress to decide on the form of 
government best suited to Mexico. He is backed by Alamán, who 
wishes to see Mexico constituted as a monarchy. 
1846 
12 February – El Tiempo publishes ‘Nuestra profesión de fe’, first 
public argument for monarchy in Mexico since Gutiérrez de Estrada’s 
pamphlet. 
April – War with the United States begins. 
6 August – Paredes is overthrown by a federalist revolt; centralist 
constitution is overturned and 1824 Constitution is reinstated. 
1846-55 SECOND FEDERAL REPUBLIC 
1847 
15 September – US army occupies Mexico City.  
1848 
2 February – Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo signed. Mexico loses nearly 
half of its national territory in return for $15 million. 
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June‐July – José Joaquín de Herrera elected president (in office 1848‐
51). 
1849 
February – Conservative Party formed. 
1850 
August to October – presidential elections. 
1851 
8 January – Mariano Arista declared winner of the presidential 
elections; Juan Nepomuceno Almonte second placed. 
15 January – Arista assumes power (in office to January 1853). 
1852 
26 July – Plan of Blancarte issued in Jalisco which called for the return 
of Santa Anna. 
1853 
7 January – In the face of growing support for the Plan of Blancarte 
Arista renounces the presidency. 
8 January – Juan Ceballos nominated interim president. 
6 February – Ceballos renounces the presidency; Manuel María 
Lombardini becomes interim president until the return of Santa Anna. 
23 March – Alamán writes letter to Santa Anna outlining Conservative 
Party programme and offering support if Santa Anna follows this 
manifesto. 
1 April – Santa Anna returns to Mexico and is declared dictator. 
LAST DICTATORSHIP OF SANTA ANNA, 1853-55 
2 June 1853 – Alamán dies. 
1854 
1 March – Plan of Ayutla issued. This plan rallied liberal opposition 
against Santa Anna.  
25 April – Sale of La Mesilla, known as the Gadsden Purchase in the 
United States, ratified by US Congress.  
1855 
12 August – Santa Anna resigns. 
4 October – Juan Álvarez nominated president; appoints Benito Juárez 
as minister of justice. 
November – Juárez Law (ley Juárez) abolishes Church and army fueros. 
11 December – Álvarez renounces presidency and is replaced by 
moderate liberal Ignacio Comonfort (in office 1855‐58). 
1856 
25 June – Lerdo Law (ley Lerdo) forced the sale of corporate property 
owned by the Church and Indian communities. 
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1857 
5 February – 1857 Constitution ratified. 
17 December – Plan of Tacubaya issued by Conservative leader Félix 
María Zuloaga calling for the suspension of the 1857 Constitution. 
1858 
WAR OF REFORM (1858-61) 
11 January – Zuloaga becomes de facto presidency of a Conservative 
regime in Mexico City; Juárez as President of the Supreme Court 
becomes president by virtue of the constitution and heads a de jure 
Liberal government. 
May – Juárez reaches Veracruz which becomes the capital of the 
Liberal government. 
1859 
6 April – US government recognises Liberals as government of Mexico.  
July – Liberals pass a series of laws further secularising the state. 
14 December – McLane‐Ocampo Treaty signed between Mexican 
Liberal government and the United States. 
1860 
6 March – Two Conservative ships seized by the US navy before 
Veracruz at battle of Anton Lizardo. 
25 December – Liberal troops enter Mexico City. 
1861 
1 January – Liberal ministers reach Mexico City, end of the War of 
Reform. 
March – Juárez elected president.
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Chronology 2: France, 1815-70 
1815-30 BOURBON RESTORATION 
1815 
7 July – After Napoléon Bonaparte’s defeat at Waterloo, Louis XVIII 
returns to Paris to rule as King of France. 
1821 
December – The royalist ultra Jean‐Baptiste de Villèle forms his first 
ministry. 
1822 
28 December – Chateaubriand appointed foreign minister, a position 
he occupies until August 1824. 
1823 
October – Britain and France sign Polignac Memorandum, which 
disavows armed intervention in Latin American wars of independence. 
April – French troops invade Spain to restore Ferdinand VII to 
absolutist rule. 
1824 
16 September – Louis XVIII dies and is succeeded by his brother 
Charles X. 
 
 
1825 
17 April – Royal ordinance proclaims Haiti independent on condition of 
paying France an indemnity and granting favourable commercial 
terms. 
June – Haitian government accepts French conditions under threat of 
naval action. 
1827 
8 May – Declaration signed in Paris by France and Mexico which 
regulates commerce between the two nations, but does not recognise 
Mexican independence. 
1830 
June – French troops enter Algiers. 
1830-48 JULY MONARCHY 
July‐August – July Revolution overthrows Charles X; Louis‐Phillipe 
becomes King of the French. 
4 September – Count Molé, French foreign minister, announces that 
France will recognise independence of former Spanish American 
colonies. 
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1834 
October – Government of New Granada (Colombia) accedes to French 
demands under threat of military action from French navy. 
1838 
28 March – French blockade of Buenos Aires begins. 
1839 
29 September – France recognises independence of Texas. 
1840 
21 October – Thiers ministry falls; Guizot, as foreign minister until 1847 
and then as prime minister, heads governments of July Monarchy. 
29 October – French blockade of Buenos Aires raised. 
1845 
July‐August – Anglo‐French blockade of Buenos Aires begins. 
1847 
July – British blockade of Buenos Aires raised. 
1848  
23 February – Guizot resigns as French prime minister after civil unrest 
in Paris marking the beginnings of the revolutions of 1848. 
1848-51 SECOND REPUBLIC 
August – Second French blockade of Buenos Aires raised.  
20 December – Louis‐Napoléon named as President of the Second 
Republic after securing 74 percent of the votes cast. 
1849 
April – French troops, in conjunction with Spanish, reach Italy to 
forcibly the restore Pope Piux XIX to temporal rule in Rome. 
1851 
2 December – Louis‐Napoléon launches coup d’état and seizes control 
of the French state. 
20‐21 December – national plebiscite held on whether the French 
people approved the actions of Louis‐Napoléon; of the votes cast, 92 
percent vote yes. 
1852 
21‐22 November – second referendum on whether to make Louis‐
Napoléon “Emperor of the French”; 97 percent approve. 
1852-70 FRENCH SECOND EMPIRE 
2 December – French Second Empire proclaimed. 
1854 
27 March – Crimean War begins. 
1856 
1 February – Crimean War ends. 
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1859 
17 February – Joint Franco‐Spanish expedition takes Saigon in 
Cochinchina. 
3 May‐11 July – Italian War of 1859. 
1860 
August‐September‐ As part of an international agreement, French 
forces occupy Syria to protect local Christian population. 
21‐22 November – China signs the Convention of Peking which brings 
to an end Anglo‐French intervention in China known as the Second 
Opium War. 
1863 
14 April – Treaty of Hué confirms French possession of Saigon as well 
as declaring a protectorate over three provinces of Cochinchina. 
1866 
14 June‐23 August – Austro‐Prussian War. 
1869 
27 December – Former republican opposition deputy, Émile Ollivier, 
appointed prime minister of France in order to oversee the creation of 
the Liberal Empire. 
 
 
1870 
8 May – Plebiscite held on whether the French people accept the 
liberal reforms introduced to the Second Empire; over 82 percent vote 
in favour. 
19 July – France declares war on Prussia. 
1 September – Louis‐Napoléon surrenders at the battle of Sedan. Third 
Republic proclaimed on 4 September. 
1873 
9 January – Louis‐Napoléon dies in exile in England. 
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Chronology 3: The French Intervention and the Second 
Mexican Empire, 1861-67 
1861 
12 April – US Civil War begins. 
4 July – Gutiérrez de Estrada writes to Austrian ambassador to France, 
to ask his views on whether Austria and Maximilian would welcome a 
proposal for the Archduke as a candidate for a Mexican empire. 
17 July – Mexican Congress passes law suspending payments on 
foreign debt for a period of two years. 
25 July – France and Britain break diplomatic relations with Mexico. 
9 October – Louis‐Napoléon writes to French ambassador to Britain 
outlining his desire to see Mexico constituted as a monarchy, 
preferably under Maximilian. 
31 October – Convention of London, signed by France, Britain and 
Spain, regulates the means by which the three powers will intervene in 
Mexico in order to restore payment on foreign debt.  
15 December – Spanish troops occupy Veracruz. 
 
 
 
 
1862 
7‐9 January – French and British contingents reach Veracruz. French 
forces, commanded by Admiral Jurien de la Gravière, consist of roughly 
2,000 marines and 600 soldiers. 
19 February – Representatives of France, Britain and Spain sign the 
Convention of La Soledad which recognises the government of Juárez 
as the legitimate government of Mexico and promises not to interfere 
in the internal affairs of the Mexican republic. 
March – Juan Nepomuceno Almonte arrives at Veracruz under the 
protection of the French flag. This same protection is extended to 
prominent members of the Conservative Party. 
6 March – French reinforcements, 4,573 men and an artillery battery, 
arrive; commanded by Charles Ferdinand Latrille, Comte de Lorencez.  
19 April – France breaks terms of the Convention of La Soledad and 
military operations begin. 
24 April – Last Spanish and British forces leave Mexico. 
5 May – French forces defeated at battle of Puebla. 
24 September – General Forey arrives at Veracruz with French 
reinforcements. By the end of the year, the French general 
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commanded roughly 30,000 men, a figure that remained constant 
throughout the French intervention. 
1863 
17 May – French troops occupy Puebla. 
29‐31 May – Juárez evacuates Mexico City. 
7 June – First French troops enter Mexico City. 
10 June – Forey enters Mexico City in a triumphal procession. 
12 June – Forey issues proclamation outlining the direction of the 
French political policy in Mexico. This proclamation is the basis of 
French political direction for Mexico throughout the intervention. 
16 June – Provisional government created by decree. A “Junta Superior 
de Gobierno” of thirty five Mexicans created with two principal aims: i) 
nominate an executive council made up of three Mexicans and ii) the 
appointment of an Assembly of Notables made up of 215 Mexicans. 
The Assembly of Notables will then deliberate on the form of 
government the Mexican nation is to adopt, while the executive 
council will govern until the government decided upon is established. 
24 June – Almonte, Archbishop Labastida and General Salas named as 
the members of the executive council. 
11 July – The Assembly of Notables decrees that the nation adopts 
constitutional, hereditary and Catholic monarchy as the form of 
government for the Mexican nation and that the crown will be offered 
to Archduke Maximillian. The executive council to govern as the 
“Regency of the Mexican Empire” until the acceptance of the crown by 
Maximilian and his arrival in Mexico. 
16 July – Forey promoted to Marshal of France and recalled from 
Mexico. 
30 July – Achille Bazaine appointed commander of French forces in 
Mexico responsible for military and political direction of the 
intervention. 
3 October – Mexican commission, headed by Gutiérrez de Estrada, 
charged with offering the Mexican crown to Maximilian presents itself 
at Miramar, home of the Archduke. 
1864 
10 April – Maximilian formally accepts the Mexico throne; signs Treaty 
of Miramar, which regulates relations between France and Mexico. 
April – First Mexican loan issued. 
28 May – Maximilian arrives at Veracruz. 
12 June – Maximilian enters Mexico City. 
July – Maximilian appoints his first cabinet, which includes moderate 
liberals, such as José Fernando Ramírez. 
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November – Former president of Mexico and leader of the 
Conservative Party, Miguel Miramón, departs Mexico City on a 
diplomatic mission to Berlin. 
December – The Conservative Party’s most notorious military 
commander, Leonardo Márquez, is sent to the Ottoman Empire as 
minister plenipotentiary. 
27 December – After failing to arrange a concordat with the Papacy, 
Maximilian confirms many of the Church reforms enacted by Juárez 
during the Reform era. 
1865 
21 January to 8 February – Siege of Oaxaca, French forces take Oaxaca 
City and capture Porfirio Díaz. 
9 April – General Robert E. Lee, commander of the Confederate Army 
of Northern Virginia, surrenders to Union forces. 
April – Second Mexican loan issued. 
15 April – Abraham Lincoln assassinated. 
9 May – President Andrew Johnson proclaims the end of the US Civil 
War. 
June – Ulysses S. Grant sends 50,000 US troops to Texas; US forces 
garrison Brownsville on the US‐Mexican border.  
15 August – French soldiers occupy Chihuahua City; Juárez had fled 
from this city to Paso del Norte (today Ciudad Juárez) on the US‐
Mexican border four days earlier. 
6 November – Secretary of State William Seward writes to inform the 
French government that the United States will not recognise any 
government other than Juárez’s in Mexico. 
1866 
15 January – Louis‐Napoléon informs Maximilian that French troops 
will withdraw from Mexico.  
22 January – Louis‐Napoléon announces in the Corps législatif that 
French troops will withdraw. 
January – French forces begin retreat from their northernmost 
positions in order to avoid clashes with US troops; Chihuahua 
abandoned 31 January. 
23 June – Mexican forces loyal to Maximilian surrender Matamoros to 
Juárez’s troops. 
30 July – Maximilian’s government signs a convention which gives half 
of all Mexico’s customs receipts raised on imports entering from the 
Atlantic seaboard and a quarter of all Pacific coast exports to France.  
August‐September – Maximilian appoints Conservatives to key 
ministerial positions. 
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October –General Castelnau sent from France by Louis‐Napoléon to 
encourage Maximilian to abdicate reaches Mexico. 
1 November – 30 July convention comes into effect. 
10 November – Miramón and Márquez return to Mexico. 
1867 
11 January – Junta convened to discuss whether Maximilian should 
abdicate; body votes in favour of the continuation of the empire. 
19 February – Maximilian arrives in Querétaro to take personal 
command of imperial forces. 
5 March – Liberal forces begin siege of Querétaro. 
11 March – Last French troops leaves Veracruz. 
15 May – Liberal forces enter Querétaro and capture Maximilian. 
13 June – Military trial convened, Maximilian sentenced to death. 
19 June – Maximilian executed alongside his Conservative Generals 
Tomás Mejía and Miramón.
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Map 1: Mexican Territorial Losses, 1836-53 
 
Source: Mark Wasserman, Everyday Life and Politics in Mexico: Men, Women and War (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2000), 88.
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Hidalgo y Esnaurrízar, José Manuel. Apuntes para escribir la historia de los proyectos de 
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Aldrich, Robert. Greater France: A History of French Overseas Expansion (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1996). 
Aldrich, Robert. ‘Imperial mise en valeur and mise en scène: Recent Works on French 
Colonialism’, Historical Journal, 45 (2002), 917‐936. 
286 
 
Alstyne, Richard van. ‘Anglo‐American Relations, 1853‐1857: British Statesmen on the 
Clayton‐Bulwer Treaty and American Expansion’, American Historical Review, 42 
(1937), 491‐500. 
Anceau, Éric. Napoléon III: Un Saint-Simon à cheval (Paris: Tallandier, 2008). 
Andrade Ceja, Claudia. Al amparo del imperio: ideas y creencias sobre la justicia y el buen 
gobierno durante el Segundo Imperio mexicano (Mexico: Universidad Autónoma de 
Ciudad Juárez, 2007). 
Andrews, Catherine. ‘In the Pursuit of Balance. Lucas Alamán's Proposals for Constitutional 
Reform (1830‐1835)’, Historia constitucional, 8 (2007), 13‐37. 
Andrews, Catherine. ‘El debate político de la década de 1830 y los origenes de las Siete 
Leyes’ in Cecilia Noriega and Alicia Salmerón (eds.), México: un siglo de historia 
constitucional, 1808-1917 (Mexico City: Instituto de Investigaciones Dr José María 
Luis Mora, 2009). 
Andrews, Catherine. ‘Sobre conservadurismo e ideas conservadores en la primera república 
federal (1824‐1835)’ in Erika Pani (ed.), Conservadurismo y derechas en la historia 
de México, 2 vols. (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica: Consejo Nacional 
para la Cultura y las Artes, 2009). 
Anna, Timothy. The Mexican Empire of Iturbide, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
1990). 
Anna, Timothy. ‘Demystifying Early Nineteenth‐Century Mexico’, Mexican Studies, 9 (1993), 
119‐137. 
Anna, Timothy. Forging Mexico: 1821-1835 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998). 
Anna, Timothy. ‘Agustín de Iturbide and the Process of Consensus’ in Christon Archer (ed.), 
The Birth of Modern Mexico, 1780-1824 (Delaware: SR Books, 2003). 
Aprile, Sylvie. La IIe République et le Second Empire, 1848-1870: du prince président à 
Napoléon III (Paris: Pygmalion, 2000). 
Archer, Christon. ‘Death’s Patriots – Celebration, Denunciation, and Memories of Mexico’s 
Independence Heroes: Miguel Hidalgo, José María Morelos, and Agustín de 
Iturbide’ in Lyman Johnson (ed.), Death, Dismemberment and Memory (New 
Mexico: University of New Mexico Press, 2004). 
287 
 
Archer, Christon. ‘Independence and the Generation of the Generals, 1810–1848’ in 
William Beezley (ed.), A Companion to Mexican History and Culture (Chichester: 
Wiley‐Blackwell, 2011). 
Ardao, Arturo. Genesis de la idea y el nombre de América Latina (Caracas: Centro de 
Estudios Latinoamericanos Rómulo Gallegos, 1980). 
Argudín, María Luna. ’De Guadalupes a borbonistas: desarrollo y proyección política de 
Fagoaga, Sardaneta y Sánchez de Tagle (1808‐1824)’, Secuencia, 38 (1997), 25‐50. 
Armitage, David. ‘The International Turn in Intellectual History’ in Foundations of Modern 
International Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
Avenel, Jean‐David. La campagne du Mexique, 1862-1867: la fin de l'hégémonie 
européenne en Amérique du Nord (Paris: Économica, 1996). 
Avenel, Jean‐David. L'affaire du Rio de la Plata: 1838-1852 (Paris: Économica, 1998). 
Barker, Nancy Nichols. ‘Devious Diplomat: Dubois de Saligny and the Republic of Texas’, 
The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, 72, (1969), 324‐334. 
Barker, Nancy Nichols. ‘The Duke of Morny and the Affair of the Jecker Bonds’, French 
Historical Studies, 6 (1970), 556‐61. 
Barker, Nancy Nichols. ‘In Quest of the Golden Fleece: Dubois de Saligny and French 
Intervention in the New World’, The Western Historical Quarterly, 3 (1972), 253‐
268. 
Barker, Nancy Nichols. ‘The French Legation in Mexico: Nexus of Interventionists’, French 
Historical Studies, 8 (1974), 409‐426. 
Barker, Nancy Nichols. ‘The Factor of "Race" in the French Experience in Mexico, 1821‐
1861’, The Hispanic American Historical Review, 59 (1979), 64‐80. 
Barker, Nancy Nichols. The French Experience in Mexico 1821-1861: A History of Constant 
Misunderstanding, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1979). 
Barton, Gregory. Informal Empire and the Rise of One World Culture (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2014). 
288 
 
Baycroft, Timothy. ‘The Empire and the Nation: The Place of Colonial Images in the 
Republican Visions of the French Nation’ in Martin Evans, Empire and Culture: The 
French Experience, 1830-1940 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). 
Baycroft, Timothy. France: Inventing the Nation (London: Hodder Education, 2008). 
Bayly, Christopher, Beckert, Sven, Connelly, Matthew, Hofmeyr, Isabel, Kozol, Wendy, and 
Seed, Patricia. ‘AHR Conversation: On Transnational History’, The American 
Historical Review, 111 (2006), 1441‐1464. 
Bayly, Christopher. Recovering Liberties: Indian Thought in the Age of Liberalism and Empire 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
Bazant, Jan. Historia de la deuda exterior de Mex́ico, 1823-1946 (Mexico City: El Colegio de 
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Iglesias Gonzaĺez, Romań (ed.). Planes polıt́icos, proclamas, manifiestos y otros documentos 
de la independencia al Mex́ico moderno, 1812-1940 (Mexico City: UNAM, 1998). 
Jackson, Jack (ed.). Almonte's Texas: Juan N. Almonte's 1834 Inspection, Secret Report & 
Role in the 1836 Campaign (Austin: Texas State Historical Association, 2003). 
Jeanneney, Jean‐Marcel, and Barbier‐Jeanneney, E lizabeth. Les ećonomies occidentales du 
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Económica, 1998). 
Pani, Erika. Para mexicanizar el Segundo Imperio: el imaginario polıt́ico de los imperialistas 
(Mexico City: Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Históricos, 2001). 
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Sainlaude, Stève. La France et la Confed́eŕation sudiste, 1861-1865: la question de la 
reconnaissance diplomatique pendant la guerre de Sećession (Paris: L’Harmattan, 
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